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INTRODUCTION
No one in this country wants to see a person wrongly accused of a
crime actually convicted of that crime. The United States Constitution
provides criminal defendants a host of important rights, including the
right to counsel, largely to ensure that the innocent are not wrongly
convicted.' Further, we presume those accused of a crime to be
innocent and insist that no defendant should be found guilty unless the
prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is,
in fact, guilty.2  Our system imposes this high burden on the
prosecution and provides the defendant with so many rights because we
believe that it is better to let the guilty go free than to convict the
innocent.3 Indeed, the premise of our adversarial system is that the
clash between partisan advocates produces reliable, accurate results.
4
In theory, then, if the adversary system is working properly, innocent
persons will not be convicted.
Consequently, defense counsel plays a critical role in our
adversary system because counsel aids the defendant in exercising most
of his or her other rights.' In fact, without counsel's assistance, few
accused persons would be capable of mounting any meaningful
challenge to the prosecution's case. A one-sided, untested presentation
1. U.S. CONST. amend VI.
2. See, e.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
3. Inre Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
4. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) ("'The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case
will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go
free.'" (quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975))).
5. As Justice Stewart observed, "[ i n an adversary system of criminal justice,
there is no right more essential than the right to the assistance of counsel." Lakeside v.
Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341 (1978).
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of the facts compromises reliability and increases the likelihood of
error. Accordingly, if the adversarial system is to function properly, a
defendant must be provided the effective assistance of counsel.'
Moreover, once we acknowledge that a lawyer's assistance is
essential to securing accurate results, then equal justice demands that all
defendants be provided counsel. We cannot proclaim a commitment to
equal justice and deny indigent defendants the assistance needed to
obtain justice.7 Thus, the right to counsel promotes equal access to
justice by promising that every defendant, regardless of wealth, status,
or race, has an advocate who will fight to see that the defendant is
afforded the rights enshrined in the Constitution. Many look proudly to
the American adversarial system as the "premiere legal system in the
world today" because, at least in part, "[o]ur constitution provides to
the lowest of persons the guarantees not even possessed by the affluent
in most countries."8
In practice, however, the right to adequate counsel in the United
States is disturbingly unequal. Only some American criminal
defendants actually receive the effective assistance of counsel.
Although some indigent defendants are afforded zealous, effective
representation, many indigent defendants and almost all of the working
poor are not.9 The quality of representation a defendant receives
generally is a product of fortuity, of economic status, and of the
jurisdiction in which he or she is charged. ° For many defendants, the
6. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970).
7. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
8. Torres v. State, 2005 OK CR 17, 4, 120 P.3d 1184, 1191-92 (Lumpkin,
P.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
9. See infra notes 46-155, 290-303 and accompanying text. My observations
about the performance of criminal defense lawyers and of the operation of the criminal
justice system are also a product of almost thirty years of working in and writing about
the system. I was a public defender in Milwaukee, Wisconsin for six years, ran
criminal defense clinics in Wisconsin and Oklahoma for almost fifteen years, and was a
member of the Terry Nichols defense team in the Oklahoma City bombing state trial. I
also served as Vice Chair of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section Defense Services
Committee that included leaders of many public defender programs from around the
country. Appointed by Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, I served for three years on
the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System Board. Finally, I have lectured frequently at
seminars and conferences on criminal practice and have spoken with hundreds of
lawyers and criminal defense experts about the delivery of defense services.
10. See ABA COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEoN'S
BROKEN PROMISE 9 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf (noting that disparities in indigent defense
funding mean "the measure of justice received by an indigent defendant may depend
more upon location than the actual merits of a case") [hereinafter GIDEON's BROKEN
PROMISE]. For an extensive look at the relationship between quality of counsel in
capital cases and the defendant's economic situation, see Stephen B. Bright, Counsel
2006:739
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assistance of counsel means little more than counsel's help in
facilitating a guilty plea. With luck, money, and location primarily
determining whether a defendant has meaningful access to justice in this
country, the promise of equal justice remains illusory."
Providing defendants access to competent counsel with the time
and resources to meaningfully test the prosecution's case is a badly
needed step that would enhance the fairness and reliability of our
criminal justice system. It is, however, just one step in fixing a
"broken system."2 For even the presence of a capable defense lawyer
does not necessarily ensure that the innocent will, in fact, go free.
Contrary to popular wisdom, our system of justice does not overprotect
criminal defendants, thereby minimizing the conviction of the
innocent. 1 3 Rather, our state criminal justice systems, as they currently
operate, inadequately protect those wrongfully accused of crimes. 4
Part I of this Article begins by examining the uneven right to
counsel in this country. Wealthy defendants-and surprisingly,
indigent defendants in some better funded jurisdictions-generally
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crimes But for the Worst Lawyer,
103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994).
11. See GIDEoA.s BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 1 (stating that a detailed
study of indigent defense services in this country "has led to the inescapable conclusion
that, forty years after the Gideon decision, the promise of equal justice for the poor
remains unfulfilled in this country"); Norman Lefstein, In Search ofGideon 's Promise:
Lessons from England and the Need for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 906
(2004) ("[T]here is overwhelming evidence that defense representation in the United
States often is egregiously inadequate."). For a powerful indictment of the criminal
justice system, arguing that there are really two systems: one for the privileged and
another for the less privileged, who also happen to be disproportionately black, see
DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE (1998).
12. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995 (2000), available at http://ccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/jreport/
fmrep.PDF [hereinafter LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM] (describing the death
penalty system as broken because roughly two-thirds of death penalty convictions
between 1973 and 1995 were reversed due to serious error); JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL.,
A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/
brokensystem2/report.pdf [hereinafter LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II]
(discussing reasons for high error rates and suggesting systemic reforms).
13. See infra notes 413-51 and accompanying text.
14. This Article focuses on the state criminal justice systems and not the
federal system. The federal criminal justice system handles far fewer cases and
generally provides indigent defendants with counsel who are better paid, have more
manageable case loads, and have greater access to investigative services and experts.
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 4 (2000) (reporting that 95 percent of criminal
defendants are charged in state court). For a very positive assessment of the better-
resourced federal defender system, see Igna L. Parsons, Making It a Federal Case: A
Model for Indigent Representation, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 837.
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receive representation that is substantially better than that accorded
most other defendants. For many indigent defendants and most of the
working poor, however, the lawyers who represent them do not have
the time or resources to effectively challenge the prosecution's case.15
Ultimately, overworked or inept lawyers increase the likelihood that
innocent defendants will plead or be found guilty.
It is not just bad lawyering, however, that produces wrongful
convictions. Rather, other systemic practices and pressures contribute
to such convictions. To illustrate this, Pait II of the Article focuses on
Arizona v. Youngblood,6 a case in which Larry Youngblood, despite
the assistance of competent counsel, was convicted and imprisoned for
seven years for a rape he did not commit. 7
Yet for many Americans, the lessons of the Youngblood case and
other DNA exonerations are not easily grasped. Quite simply, many
Americans harbor myths about the actual workings of the criminal
justice system that in turn create or influence attitudes about the system.
Part III of the Article explores some of these common myths and
corresponding attitudes and exposes systemic shortcomings and
practices that need to be addressed if we are to minimize the number of
innocent persons who will be wrongfully convicted.
Fixing the system, however, will not be easy. Self interest and
deeply held views about the criminal justice system create barriers to
learning the lessons of the DNA exonerations and other cases of
wrongful convictions. Indeed, some even refuse to acknowledge the
existence of any significant systemic problems, arguing that the number
of innocent persons wrongfully convicted has been grossly
exaggerated.18 Others contend that the costs of improving the system
outweigh the marginal benefits gained by freeing a few more innocent
persons.' 9 Part IV of the Article responds to those critics and discusses
the extent to which entrenched attitudes and narrow perspectives create
barriers that impede meaningful systemic reforms. Finally, the Article
concludes by identifying steps that can and should be taken to improve
the criminal justice system and thereby minimize convicting the
innocent.
15. See infra notes 68-87, 110-55, 290-303 and accompanying text.
16. 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
17. See infra notes 170-289 and accompanying text.
18. See Joshua Marquis, The lnnocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2006, at Al. But see infra notes 437-51 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 523-24 and accompanying text.
2006:739 743
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I. THE UNEVEN RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. 0.1. Simpson: The Rich Can Buy a Better Defense
According to Justice Hugo Black, "[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he
has." 20 It is commonly proclaimed, especially on Law Day, that our
system of criminal justice guarantees equal justice under the law.21
Anyone accused of a crime in this country has the virtually unfettered
right to choose whomever he or she wants to serve as defense counsel
and spend whatever resources the person deems appropriate to defend
the charges that person faces. 2 The catch, of course, is that in most
felony cases, it is expensive to hire a private criminal defense lawyer.
Not only is the cost of an attorney often prohibitively high, but
generally, the bulk of the money must be paid up-front or shortly after
counsel is retained. Additionally, the cost of an investigator and
defense experts must be borne by the defendant. As a result, it is often
only a wealthy person or one who has family or friends with
considerable assets who can afford to hire a lawyer and to pay counsel
what it takes to mount a vigorous defense in a serious criminal case.23
A small percentage of defendants can and do hire defense lawyers
who aggressively challenge the government's case before, during, and,
if necessary, after trial. These defendants do, in fact, receive zealous
representation. O.J. Simpson is an obvious example of a defendant
who could afford to pay for a vigorous defense. Simpson spent close to
$10 million to retain his "dream team" of lawyers, investigators, and
20. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21. Presidential Proclamation of Law Day, U.S.A., 2002 (Apr. 30, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/O5/200205Ol.html. In the
proclamation, President George W. Bush stated,
One of our Nation's greatest strengths is its commitment to a just, fair legal
system and the protection it affords to the rights and freedoms we cherish.
On May 1, we observe Law Day to draw attention to the principles of
justice and the practice of law. The theme of this year's Law Day,
"Celebrate Your Freedom: Assuring Equal Justice for All," acknowledges
the essential task of protecting the rights of every American.
Id.
22. A defendant's freedom of choice of counsel may be limited because of
conflict of interest issues or other ethical concerns. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States,
486 U.S. 153, 159-63 (1988).
23. See Glenna Whitley, Oklahoma Railroad, DALLAS OBSERVER, July 21,
2005, available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/issues/2005-07-21/news/feature_
print.html (reporting that Charlie and Nancy Jackson spent more than $140,000 to pay
for the defense of their daughter, who was charged with vehicular manslaughter).
744
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experts to defend him.24 Although commentators and the public
disagree dramatically as to the reasons for Simpson's acquittal, few
would disagree with the proposition that the money Simpson spent on
his defense made a significant difference in the verdict handed down in
that case.25
Money does not necessarily guarantee, however, that a defendant
will receive quality representation. Given the difficulty of selecting
truly skilled counsel,26 some defendants or their families simply make
poor choices when hiring defense counsel. Certainly, some clients
spend considerable sums of money only to find out later that the lawyer
they retained was inept,27 overrated,28 or unscrupulous.29
24. Deborah L. Rhodes, Simpson Sound Bites.- What Is and Isn't News About
Domestic Violence, in POSTMORTEM: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 83, 84 (Jeffrey
Abramson ed., 1996).
25. Peter Arenella, Foreword" O.1. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1234-
35 (1996); Cheryl Fiandaca, Both Sides Helped to Raise Doubts, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16,
1995, at A21.
26. Charged with a rape he did not commit, Mark Bravo did what many
people do when selecting a lawyer-he went to the phone book. J. Michael Kennedy,
DNA Test Clears Man Convicted of Rape, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at B1. He
picked Steve Nieto from the Yellow Pages because his name had a nice ring to it. Id.
Partly as a result of Nieto's questionable representation, but also because the police
withheld exculpatory evidence, Bravo was convicted of rape. See id.; infra notes 313,
519, 549, 574. Bravo's conviction was sustained despite significant inconsistencies in
the victim's identification and the alibi testimony of Bravo and other witnesses. People
v. Bravo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (Ct. App. 1993). It took three years for Bravo to secure
the DNA testing that cleared him. Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Mark Diaz Bravo,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=03 (last visited Feb. 28,
2006).
27. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 303, 306-09 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding that, despite being mentally incapable of defending himself in a pending
disciplinary hearing and being incompetent to practice law, the seventy-one-year-old
lawyer with health problems retained by a mother to represent her son in a murder case
did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel because of an inadequate showing of
prejudice).
28. For example, Gary Gauger's well-paid lawyers failed to conduct a serious
investigation and effectively challenge the prosecution's highly circumstantial case.
Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1999, at 66, 80. Gauger
was released after serving almost three years in prison when the Second District
Appellate Court of Illinois threw out his confession. People v. Gauger, 698 N.E.2d
724 (11. App. Ct. 1996). Ultimately, two members of a motorcycle gang who actually
murdered his parents were convicted and Gauger was pardoned by Governor George
Ryan. Center for Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, The Illinois
Exonerated: Gary Gauger, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/
exonerations/gauger.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006).
29. For a detailed investigative series recounting the unscrupulous
representation provided by John Pyle and other private lawyers, see Fredrick N.
Tulsky, The High Cost of a Bad Defense, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 24, 2006, at
1A; see also Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts, CHI. TRIB.,
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Take for example, Richard Glossip, the manager of the Best
Budget Inn in Oklahoma City, who faced the death penalty for allegedly
convincing a maintenance man who worked at his motel to commit a
murder.3" Glossip asked his family to hire a lawyer and they paid a
substantial sum of money to Wayne Fournerat to conduct Glossip's
defense.3  That substantial sum of money, however, purchased
representation that was "so ineffective that [the court had] no
confidence that a reliable adversarial proceeding took place."32
The case against Glossip rested almost entirely on a codefendant,
Justin Sneed who admitted murdering Barry Van Treese, but claimed
he did so at Glossip's behest.33 Sneed agreed to testify against Glossip
in exchange for a sentence of life without parole.34 Mr. Fournerat was
amazingly inept. The court noted that Fournerat's most glaring
deficiency was his failure to impeach Sneed, the State's star witness,
with a videotape of Sneed's prior statement to the police that contained
numerous material inconsistencies and omissions when compared wid
his trial testimony.35 In fact, Fournerat was so incompetent that he
could not lay a proper foundation to get the videotape into evidence and
ultimately never used the tape at all.36 Additionally, Fournerat
presented an incomprehensible theory of defense that reflected his lack
of legal research and preparation.37 In the end, the court reversed
Glossip's conviction finding that "trial counsel was not prepared for
trial, had not formulated any reasonable defense theory, fully expected
Appellant to enter a plea, and never expected to get to the second
Nov. 15, 1999, § 1, at 1 (reporting the shoddy performance of Earl Washington, a
veteran Chicago lawyer who was paid $8,000 to defend Bernon Howery in a death
penalty case, and other examples of inept and unethical lawyers).
30. Glossip v. State, 2001 OK CR 21, 1 5, 29 P.3d 597, 599.
31. Glossip's brother and his girlfriend chose Fournerat because he
represented her in a civil suit. Email from Janet Chesley, Attorney, Oklahoma Indigent
Defense System, to author (Jan. 13, 2006) (on file with author) (relating her
experiences representing Glossip in a habeas corpus petition following his conviction
when his murder case was retried). They paid Fournerat as much as $50,000,
including some of the proceeds of that civil suit. Id
32. Glossip, 2001 OK CR 21, 1 8, 29 P.3d at 599.
33. Id. 1 5, 29 P.3d at 599.
34. Id.
35. Id. 11 16-17, 29 P.3d at 601.
36. Id. 1 24, 29 P.3d at 603.
37. The court cited numerous examples of Fournerat's lack of preparedness
including his last minute requests for discovery that had already been provided; his
claim to the jury that a particular witness was fictitious when his identity was obvious;
his failure to lay proper foundations for evidence; his calling of only one witness other
than the defendant during the mitigation phase; and his failure to object to improper
victim impact evidence. Id. 11 21-25, 29 P.3d at 602-03.
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stage" and concluding, therefore, that "[Glossip] was prejudiced by his
trial counsel's performance." 3"
Other defendants are more fortunate than Mr. Glossip. Some
simply stumble upon a good lawyer. Others benefit from a diligent
search and, based on reputation or a referral, hire-or have hired for
them-a zealous, conscientious advocate.
The size of one's wallet does not guarantee a favorable result.
Numerous well-heeled defendants have spent large amounts of money
only to be convicted at trial.39 Money does, however, enhance the
wealthy defendant's ability to challenge the prosecution's case.' Not
only does defense counsel have more time to prepare, but counsel also
has the time to research, brief, and aggressively pursue pretrial
motions.4' More importantly, counsel can enlist the aid of investigators
and forensic experts who can help marshal the facts and enable counsel
to present defense evidence persuasively.42 Frequently, it is through the
efforts of investigators or defense experts that defense counsel uncovers
the weaknesses of the prosecution's case or finds the proof that reveals
the defendant's innocence. Thus, money improves the defendant's
chances for success at trial. Indeed, in rare instances, a rich defendant
38. Id. 25, 29 P.3d at 603.
39. The two top Westar Energy, Inc. executives, David Wittig and Douglas
Lake, recently were convicted of multiple charges despite spending $4.36 million and
over $8.5 million, respectively, in attorneys' fees and costs. See Dan Margolies,
Witig, Lake Sued Over Defense Fees, KAN. Crrv STAR, Oct. 7, 2005, at C1.
40. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 28-31 (1997). As Stuntz explains,
one of the consequences of the fact that only wealthy defendants can fully exploit the
intricacies of criminal procedure is that prosecutors tend to focus more on easy-to-
convict poor defendants rather than litigious rich ones. Id. at 28. Thus, the prospects
of going up against a defendant with the resources to litigate affects prosecutorial
charging decisions. Id.
41. Many commentators have discussed the importance of good motion
practice for the criminal defense practitioner. 2 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL
MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 221-253A (1989); Welsh S. White,
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases" The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993
U. ILL. L. REv. 323, 370.
42. As the Court noted in Ake v. Oklahoma, defense counsel must have the
"basic tools" or "raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." 470
U.S. 68, 77 (1985). National standards also recognize the critical importance of
investigators and experts in properly preparing and defending a criminal case. See
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-1.4
cmt. at 22 (3d ed. 1992) (stressing the importance of support services including
investigators and experts and concluding that "[t]he quality of representation at trial, for
example, may be excellent and yet unhelpful to the defendant if the defense requires the
assistance of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are available").
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may be able to take advantage of a significant edge in expert assistance
to raise reasonable doubt in a seemingly unassailable prosecution case."
In addition, money buys wealthier defendants more leverage in the
plea-bargaining process. Admittedly, in some instances the defendant's
status may generate press coverage that reduces the defendant's ability
to obtain a favorable plea bargain. More often, however, well-paid
defense counsel can push more aggressively in the bargaining process
because both counsel and the prosecutor know that counsel has the
ability, time, and incentive to push forward to trial if a favorable
bargain is not struck. Ultimately, both counsel and the prosecutor
know that wealthier defendants generally have the power to reject any
deal and insist on a trial." Unlike an indigent defendant, a wealthier
defendant is better able to resist counsel's pressure to plead guilty
because, if dissatisfied with defense counsel, the wealthier defendant
may simply choose to hire someone else.45
B. Larry Wade Mc Vay The Working Poor Get Stiffed
The vast majority of defendants in this country cannot afford to
hire private counsel. Nationally, over 80 percent of those accused of a
felony are deemed indigent and qualify for counsel provided to them at
public expense.' Jurisdictions vary markedly in how those indigency
determinations are made and who qualifies for indigent defense
representation.47  A person in one state may qualify for such
representation, while in a neighboring state another person in an
identical financial situation facing the exact same charges will not.
43. See June D. Bell, Using Your Most Valuable Asset. The Client, NAT'L
L.J., June 21, 2004, at 56 (describing how attorney Dick DeGuerin utilized his client's
wealth to hire experts and do investigation that led to Robert Durst's acquittal). For a
discussion of the importance of the experts and investigators in the O.J. Simpson case,
see Arenella, supra note 25, at 1234-35.
44. Although all defendants have this authority in theory, many defendants, in
fact, are unable to wield such power. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2
(2004). It is usually fruitless for a defendant to insist upon trial and risk a far greater
sentence when counsel is not prepared to mount a vigorous defense. See infra notes
128-46 and accompanying text. Certainly some defendants do go to trial against
counsel's wishes and pay the price for doing so. Most defendants, however, will
succumb to the pressure to plead. See infra notes 69, 112-27, 373-412 and
accompanying text.
45. A defendant's right to fire defense counsel is not absolute, of course, but
subject to court approval. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(c) (2004).
46. HARLOW, supra note 14, at 1, 5.
47. RANGITA DE SILVA-DE ALwis, THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
DETERMINATIONS OF ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE (2002), available at
http://abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/determinationofeligibil
ity.pdf.
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Perhaps even more problematic is the fact that similarly situated
defendants within the same state, or even in the same courthouse, may
be treated differently when that indigency determination is made. 8
Although many poor people receive an indigent defender, a significant
number of working people are deemed ineligible for indigent
representation.49 In the end, therefore, the indigency decision is critical
because it generally determines whether a low-income defendant has
any realistic hope of contesting the charges lodged against him or her.
A criminal defendant deemed ineligible for indigent representation
faces a daunting challenge. Some struggle in vain to raise enough
money to retain any lawyer. Take, for example, Larry Wade McVay
who was charged with robbery in South Carolina in 1996." 0 McVay
submitted an affidavit of indigency to the court showing a gross weekly
income of $182 and no savings or other sources of income." After
subtracting basic living expenses, he had virtually no disposable
income.5 2 Because South Carolina law created a presumption of non-
indigency if the accused's gross income exceeded $125 per week, the
court required McVay to overcome the presumption. 3 Finding that
48. See, e.g., Lola Velizquez-Aguihi, Comment, Not Poor Enough: Why
Wisconsin's System for Providing Indigent Defense Is Failing, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 193,
207-10 (describing the judge-to-judge and county-to-county disparity in indigency
determinations made once a defendant is deemed ineligible for public defender
representation). Catherine Greene Burnett, Michael K. Moore & Allen K. Butcher, In
Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective Counsel The Past and Future of
Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 425 S. Tax. L. REv. 595, 615-618 (2001) (stating
that results of a state bar survey reflect widespread variation in indigency
determinations in Texas). For a look at the variation within states regarding the
appointment of counsel at bail hearings, see Douglas Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After
Gideon: The Illusory Paght to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. Rev. 9-13.
49. See GIDEoi'/s BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 7, 12, 26 (reporting
that thousands of accused poor persons who cannot afford counsel are denied
representation each year); see also infra notes 58-67, 159-60 and accompanying text.
50. See United States v. McVay, 32 Fed. Appx. 661 (4th Cir. 2002).
McVay's case is discussed in detail in Adam Gershowitz's excellent article, The
Invisible Pillar of Gideon, 80 IND. L.J. 571, 590-692 (2005) (highlighting the Supreme
Court's failure to establish any minimal definition of indigency and discussing the
extent to which that failure undermines the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963)).
51. McVay, 32 Fed. Appx. at 664.
52. McVay was employed as a part-time picture framer with take-home pay of
about $160 per week. Id. at 668 (King, J., dissenting). According to his affidavit,
McVay had monthly rent of $275, paid $80 to $100 in utility costs a month, and spent
$60 to $65 a week in food. Id. As the dissent noted, "[alllowing for basic living
expenses, McVay was left with disposable income of virtually nothing." Id.
53. Id. at 664 (majority opinion).
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McVay failed to do so on the information provided, the trial court ruled
he was not entitled to appointed counsel. 4
McVay subsequently attempted to retain counsel but was quoted
fees of $8,000 and $10,000 by the two lawyers he approached. Both
insisted on at least half of that sum up-front. McVay did not have
anything remotely close to that amount of money, nor any way of
raising such a sum.55 Not surprisingly, between the date of his
indictment in February and his trial date in July, McVay was unable to
save enough to retain counsel.56 When he appeared for his July trial
without counsel, the prosecutor offered a plea to common law robbery,
which McVay accepted. 7
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many defendants find
themselves in McVay's predicament. Nevertheless, estimates provided
by many commentators over the last forty years indicate that the
number is significant.58  My observations and discussions with
Oklahoma judges and defendants regardig indigency ..............
54. Id. at 665-66.
55. As the dissent observed, no bank or lender will give a defendant who is
facing a serious felony, with a criminal record and working for a minimal wage, a loan
to pay for a lawyer. Id. at 668 (King, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 665 (majority opinion).
57. Id. In his appeal, McVay collaterally challenged the validity of his 1996
robbery conviction claiming he was denied his right to court-appointed counsel. Id.
The Fourth Circuit rejected McVay's challenge, holding that he failed to carry his
burden of showing that he was financially unable to retain counsel to defend himself in
the robbery case. Id. at 667. As the dissent pointed out, however, the uncontradicted
evidence showed he plainly lacked the $4,000 to $5,000 he needed to hire a lawyer.
Id. at 668 (King, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Laura Parker, 8 Years in a Louisiana Jail, But He Never Went
to Tial, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al (noting that tens of thousands of poor
people go to jail every year without ever talking to a lawyer); Press Release, National
Legal Aid and Defender Association [NLADA], Forty Years After Landmark Supreme
Court Ruling, Right to Counsel Still Denied to People Who Can't Afford an Attorney
(Mar. 12, 2003), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/DefenderPublic/
Defender/DefenderGideon/DefenderGideon Press (noting that in one California
county alone, 1200 people pled guilty to misdemeanors without counsel; and declaring
"the dirty little secret of the criminal justice system is how many people accused of a
crime get no lawyer at all"); NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR, METHODS AND
PROGRAMS FOR PROVIDING LEGAL REPRESENTATION AND THE NEED FOR ADEQUATE
FINANCING 2 (1982) (finding that millions of people are denied effective assistance of
counsel or provided no representation at all); Mary Zahn & Jessica McBride, Unequal
Justice (Part 1): Poor Often Left Defenseless in Courtroom, $250 a Month Too Much
to Qualify for a Public Defender, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 2002, at Al
(reporting that thousands of people who would qualify for a public defender in other
states do not get a lawyer in Wisconsin). For a thorough look at how the indigency
standards and practices in Wisconsin operate to deprive economically strapped
defendants of their right to counsel, see generally Veldzquez-Aguihi, supra note 48.
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coupled with frequent conversations with lawyers, court personnel, and
clinic students about the handling of indigency questions led me to
conclude in 1993 that a sizeable number of indigent defendants in
Oklahoma were being forced to retain counsel in lieu of receiving
counsel at public expense.59  Then-and now-most Oklahoma
defendants who are not in custody are denied counsel paid for by the
State of Oklahoma.'
The reason is simple. The decision to post a bond, even if that
bond is as small as fifty dollars, or posted by a friend, raises a statutory
presumption of non-indigency.61 Admittedly, the defendant does have a
choice, albeit an unhappy one. The defendant can choose not to post
bond and wait in jail until counsel is appointed. Once bond is posted,
however, the statutory presumption is raised and it is extremely
difficult for an unrepresented defendant to overcome that presumption.
Indeed, some judges and court personnel make it perfectly clear that a
person out on bail or bond will not receive an appointed lawyer unless
he or she is prepared to return to custody.62 Not surprisingly,
defendants under such a threat either find some way to raise a minimal
amount of money to hire counsel or, more frequently, just plead guilty,
as Larry McVay did.63
This problem is not unique to Oklahoma. Other states have
statutory presumptions or practices that frustrate or block access to
indigent defense representation. 64  In Wisconsin, for example, the
59. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Right to Appointed Counsel." Why Defendants
in Oklahoma Still Are Unrepresented, 64 OKLA. B. J. 918 (1993).
60. Telephone Interview with Terry Hull, Clinical Professor, Univ. of Okla.
Coll. of Law, in Norman, Okla. (Dec. 16, 2005).
61. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355A (2003). But see ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-7.1 cmt. at 89 (3d ed.
1992) (stating that counsel should not be denied because bond has been or can be
posted).
62. See Burnett et al., supra note 48, at 616-18 (reporting that many Texas
judges follow similar practices).
63. See Zahn & McBride, supra note 58 (reporting that in over 400 cases
examined in which the defendant was ruled ineligible for a public defender, the judge
referred the defendant to the prosecutor and a guilty plea was entered).
64. In Missouri, for example, the Public Defender Commission has created,
by administrative regulation, a presumption that anyone released on bail of $5,000 or
more is ineligible for a public defender. For a look at the practices in Missouri,
including the policies of the public defender program, that restrict persons too poor to
hire private counsel from gaining access to indigent defense counsel, see THE
SPANGENBERG GROUP, ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM,
FINAL REPORT 18-21 (2005) [hereinafter SPANGENBERG GROUP, MISSOURI]; see also
THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES AND CASELOADS IN STATES WITH MIXED STATE AND COUNTY FUNDING
16 (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
2006:739
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Office of the State Public Defender (SPD) is charged by statute with the
responsibility for making the initial determination of indigency.65 In
making that determination, the SPD utilizes a formula that compares
the defendant's available income and assets with the estimated cost of
counsel. Unfortunately, the SPD's formula currently relies on cost of
living figures that are hopelessly outdated and estimated costs of
counsel projections set far below the actual costs of retaining counsel.'
Thus, thousands of defendants in Wisconsin living substantially below
the federal poverty guidelines do not qualify for a public defender and
many go unrepresented.67
The low-income defendant who cannot afford any lawyer or who
can only muster a modest retainer undoubtedly can be found in every
jurisdiction in this country. In some instances, defendants in such
economic circumstances can and will find lawyers who are willing to
sacrifice their own personal well-being to provide competent
representation even if that means spending hours at a trial without any
expectation of additional compensation.6" For an innocent defendant
facing a serious felony charge, however, it is exceedingly difficult to
find a lawyer willing to devote the hours necessary to prepare for and
try a complicated criminal case on the lawyer's own time and money.
Most of the time, therefore, the couple of hundred dollars given to
defense counsel buys only a plea bargain. Even a defendant who
professes innocence will usually be forced into a guilty plea by the
threat of a much harsher sentence, should the defendant go to trial and
be found guilty.69 It is very risky to go to trial facing a significant
indigentdefense/comparativeexpenditurescaseloads.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG
GROUP, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS] (noting that systemic problems in the Georgia
criminal justice system prevented indigent defendants from obtaining appointed counsel
in a majority of misdemeanor cases).
65. WIs. STAT. § 977.07(1)(b) (2003-2004).
66. See Velizquez-Aguihi, supra note 48, at 201-03.
67. Id. at 194 (noting that Wisconsin's indigency threshold is set at 33 percent
of the federal poverty guidelines so that anyone with an annual income of $3,000 is
deemed able to afford counsel); see Press Release, NLADA, supra note 58, at 1
(estimating that over eleven thousand people annually in Wisconsin go unrepresented
because they have an annual income of more than $3,000).
68. One such conscientious lawyer was Steven Benjamin, a court-appointed
lawyer in Virginia who was paid $840 to handle a death penalty case. See Alan
Berlow, Requiem for a Public Defender, AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, June 5, 2000,
http://www.prospect.org/print-friendly/print/Vl 1/1 4fberlow-a.html. Despite the
judge's refusal to lift the cap, Benjamin spent countless hours preparing for a trial that
culminated in an acquittal for his client. Id.
69. See infra notes 382-412 and accompanying text. For an extended look at
the pressure to plead guilty faced by those defendants who have retained counsel, see
Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179, 1179-1206 (1975).
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sentence knowing that defense counsel will not be prepared to conduct
that trial. Regardless of guilt or innocence, most defendants are
unwilling to take that risk and the vast majority plead guilty.
Nonetheless, some defendants insist on going to trial. Numerous
stories have been written about horrific representation provided by
counsel retained by defendants ineligible for a public defender or court-
appointed lawyer, but too poor to pay anything other than a modest
retainer.7" Consider the plight of Bernon Howery, a Kankakee County
Board member with no criminal record, who faced the death penalty for
allegedly setting a fire that killed four children, including three of his
own.71 Howery hired Earl Washington, a veteran Chicago lawyer, for
a flat fee of $8,000.72 Unbeknownst to Howery, Washington was
facing disciplinary charges at the time he defended Howery. 73
Washington did little investigation. Indeed, he failed to follow
leads pointing to other suspects, claiming later that he trusted the police
to do that investigation.74 According to Howery, Washington never
even talked to him about the facts of the case.75 Washington regularly
showed up late or missed court appearances, irritating the trial judge to
the point that he threatened Washington with contempt and eventually
complained to disciplinary authorities.76 Ultimately, Washington
persuaded Howery to waive his right to a jury and opt for a bench trial
to save time and money.77
After the judge found Howery guilty, he set the sentencing hearing
for a week later. Washington appeared late at the sentencing hearing
and offered only brief testimony from three witnesses. 78  The trial
judge, Patrick Burns, stated on the record that he was "totally amazed"
at the minimal evidence Washington offered even after the court had
"almost begged" Washington to give him some mitigating evidence.79
Burns concluded that because the defense offered no mitigating
70. See, e.g., Tulsky, supra note 29; Alschuler, supra note 69, at 1181-98,
1248; Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 1005 (1983);
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 411 (1982); Armstrong & Mills, supra note
29.
71. Armstrong & Mills, supra note 29.
72. Id.
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evidence, he had no choice but to impose the death penalty.80 Given
Washington's feeble performance, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
vacated Howery's death sentence and remanded the case for a new
sentencing hearing.8 '
C. Jimmy Ray Bromgard and Leonard Peart: Indigent Defendants in
Underfunded Systems Get Underrepresented
Indigent defendants represented by overworked public defenders82
or poorly compensated appointed counsel often experience the same
dismal representation provided to the working poor who have scraped
up a minimal retainer to hire counsel.8 3 Since Gideon,'4 numerous
reports have been released highlighting the crisis in indigent defense
funding in many jurisdictions and decrying the often abysmal
representation afforded to many criminal defendants.8 5 That is not to
say that all indigent defendants receive substandard representation.
Even in underfunded jurisdictions, some indigent defendants are well-
served. Moreover, as the next section of this Article discusses, some
80. People v. Howery, 687 N.E.2d 836, 864 (Ill. 1997).
81. Id. at 865.
82. See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 11, at 838-58; GIDEOis BROKEN PROMISE,
supra note 10, at 17-19; Trisha Renaud & Ann Woolner, Meet 'em and Plead 'em,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta, Ga.), Oct. 8, 1990, at 1; Christopher Johns,
'Slaughterhouse Justice'.- Crushing Workloads, Underfunded Public Defenders
Shortchange Inaigent Clients, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 23, 1993, at C1.
83. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just.- The Rationing and
Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 783; Burnett et al., supra note 48, at 612-45; Berlow, supra note 68;
Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect.- Indigent Defense From a Legal Ethics Perspective,
52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1179-85 (2003).
84. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
85. See, e.g., GIDEoes BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10; SPECIAL COMM. ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE Soc'Y, ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS (1988); LEFSTEIN, supra note 58, at 56-57; ABA & NAT'L LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASS'N, GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING
(1982); RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (1993); LAURENCE A. BENNER, NAT'L LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASS'N, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE (1973). In addition, the Spangenberg
Group has studied the delivery of indigent defense services in virtually every
jurisdiction in the United States. Many of the group's reports document severe funding
problems in the jurisdiction being evaluated. See, e.g., THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-
report2004.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA] (finding that Virginia's
indigent system is "deeply flawed" and fails to provide many indigent defendants with
effective assistance of counsel, and documenting scores of other reports with similar
findings).
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jurisdictions, for the most part, offer indigent defendants very good
representation.86 Indeed, in some jurisdictions, indigent defendants not
only receive better representation than the working poor, but receive
representation that compares favorably to that provided to all but the
very rich.87 In underfunded jurisdictions, however, poor defendants,
regardless of whether they are indigent or among the working poor,
generally receive representation that is markedly inferior to that
provided to defendants with means. In such jurisdictions, too many
defendants get an inept or overworked lawyer with little time to do
more than just plea bargain.
Unquestionably, the amount of money spent on indigent defense
services varies dramatically across this country. Some jurisdictions
spend less than five dollars per capita while others spend over twenty
dollars per capita."s It is difficult, however, to get a clear picture of
exactly how much money is being spent in each state on indigent
defense services. Not since 1986 has the Department of Justice
attempted to gather nationwide figures comparing indigent defense
expenditures.89  Since then, the Spangenberg Group, a nationally
recognized consulting firm under contract with the American Bar
Association's Bar Information Program, has collected the most
comprehensive data relating to the delivery of indigent defense services
across the United States. 90  Yet, as the Spangenberg Group
acknowledges, a number of variables make gathering and comparing
86. Oregon, Minnesota, Colorado, and Massachusetts all have statewide
public defender programs that are widely regarded as quality programs. Parker, supra
note 58.
87. For an excellent example of outstanding defense work done by some
energetic public defenders, see the case of Brenton Butler, ifr notes 161-69, 314-15,
434 and accompanying text. The Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service has long
been recognized for providing its clients quality representation. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, AN EXEMPLARY PROJECT: THE D.C. PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE (1975);
Charles J. Olgetree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1263-67 (1993).
88. Jim Neuhard, Mich. State Appellate Defender Office, Per Capita Public
Defense Expenditure; All States for 2002, http://www.sado.org/publicdefense/
2002_all _expense. pdf.
89. GIDEoV'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 28; see BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY 22-
33 (1986). In 1999, the Bureau of Justice Statistics gathered data of the spending on
indigent defense services in the nation's one hundred most populous counties. CAROL
J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN LARGE COUNTIES, 1999 (2000).
90. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 2-3 (noting that the
Spangenberg Group has been under contract with the ABA for eighteen years and has
done research on indigent defense delivery systems in all fifty states).
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expenditures challenging.91 Part of the problem is that data from some
jurisdictions is so sketchy that the Spangenberg Group can only
estimate expenditures in those states.92
Additionally, comparing state expenditures is complicated because
states vary markedly in how they fund indigent representation, as is
demonstrated in Appendix L" Although most states fund indigent
defense representation primarily at the state level,94 several states rely
entirely or very heavily on county funding. 95 In Indiana, for example,
each county determines the method that will be used to provide indigent
defense representation in that county. 96 A defendant in Indiana may
have a contract lawyer, public defender, or court-appointed counsel,
depending on the county in which he or she is charged. 97 In those
states that rely primarily on counties to fund indigent defendant
services, there may well be considerable variation in the quality of
representation provided. 9 Thus, indigent defendants prosecuted in a
poor county within a state are less likely to gain access to competent
counsel than those prosecuted in a richer county."
Just as states vary in the amount and manner of funding defense
services, states rely on different systems for delivering those services.
In some states, most indigent defendants are represented by salaried
public defenders. " Other states primarily use a contract system
91. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 64, at 4.
In addition to different funding mechanisms, those variables include: population
differences; lack of complete, reliable data; lack of statewide data collection or
oversight; different ways to count cases; percentage and types of cases handled; and
rate of pay for court-appointed counsel. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
10, at 28 (noting that the lack of reliable data is a barrier to reform).
92. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN FISCAL YEAR 2002 (2003), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/indigentdefexpe
nd2003.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG GROUP, STATE AND COUNTY EXPENDITURES].
93. Id.
94. Id. (noting that twenty-three states provided 100 percent of indigent
defense funding with another five contributing at least 80 percent of such funding).
95. Id. (noting that as of 2002, Utah and Pennsylvania were entirely county-
funded while California, Nebraska, Nevada, Washington and Texas had state
contributions ranging only from 2.6 percent to 6.6 percent).
96. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 8.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 8-9.
99. Id.; see also Bright, supra note 10, at 1851-52; State v. Smith, 681 P.2d
1374, 1375-83 (Ariz. 1984) (describing the patchwork system of indigent defense
representation that existed in Arizona).
100. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, 1999, at 2 (2001) (reporting that
sixteen of the nineteen states with public defender programs had statewide programs).
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whereby a private attorney or group of private attorneys handle some or
all of the cases in a particular jurisdiction.' 1° Additionally, one state
and a number of counties across the United States use the assigned
counsel model in which private lawyers provide indigent representation
on a case-by-case or systemic basis.1 2
A significant number of states use a mixture of systems for
delivering defense services to indigent defendants. 10 3 Take Oklahoma
for example. Indigent defendants in Tulsa or Oklahoma City generally
are represented by public defenders." In most other counties in
Oklahoma, a contract lawyer-or group of contract lawyers-provides
representation to all indigent defendants, except those charged with
capital murder. °" Contract lawyers are paid markedly different
amounts in different parts of the state.
Not surprisingly, defendants often receive markedly different
representation depending on the county in which they are charged. For
example, in Woods, Cherokee, and Payne County, contract lawyers
were paid a per case average in fiscal year 2005 of $79.41, $93.46, and
$115.43, respectively.' 6 In Jefferson, Caddo, and Grady County,
contract lawyers in fiscal year 2005 received a per case average of
$380.43, $333.33, and $329.64, respectively.0 7 Outside of Tulsa and
Oklahoma City, almost all defendants facing the death penalty are
represented by full-time staff lawyers from the Oklahoma Indigent
101. See STEVEN K. SMITH & CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SELECTED FINDINGS, INDIGENT DEFENSE 2 (1996)
(reporting that in 1992, 25 percent of counties used contract systems with 8 percent
relying exclusively on such systems).
102. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAD TO COURT-
APPOINTED COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE
OVERVIEW 1-2 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/compensationratesnoncapital2003.pdf [hereinafter SPANGENBERG
GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION] (noting that Maine is the only state to rely
exclusively on assigned counsel).
103. Id. at2.
104. Id. at 13. The public defender offices in these two counties also handle all
capital cases and appeals. See id. Conflict cases, however, are handled by private
lawyers. See id.
105. I was a member of the board of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System
from 1995 to 1998. The board is responsible for overseeing the operation of the entire
program including awarding contracts to private practitioners to provide indigent
defense services. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1355 (West 2003).
106. For fiscal year 2005, the statewide average cost per case in Oklahoma was
$197.22. E-mail from Terry Hervey, Non-Capital Trial Div., Okla. Indigent Def.
Sys., to author (Dec. 28, 2005, 10:50 CST) (on file with author).
107. E-mail from Terry Hervey, Non-Capital Trial Div., Okla. Indigent Def.
Sys., to author (Nov. 9, 2005, 14:58 CST) (on file with author).
2006:739
HeinOnline  -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 757 2006
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
Defense System.'08 Similarly, almost all appellate cases are handled by
these salaried staff lawyers. Finally, conflict cases across the state are
assigned to private lawyers paid on an hourly basis.'09
While the salaried lawyers handling death penalty cases and the
appellate lawyers who work for the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System
generally provide competent representation, the quality of
representation provided by the contract lawyers varies from adequate to
abysmal. Quite simply, a lawyer being paid less than $100 a case
cannot realistically be expected to-nor generally will-provide clients
effective representation. "0
Representation provided to indigent defendants in Oklahoma
mirrors that of many underfunded jurisdictions. As Nancy Gist,
formerly the Director of the United States Department of Justice's
Bureau of Justice Assistance, observed, "[I]t would be fair to say that
the level of quality representation provided indigent defendants is
uneven and frequently abysmal.""'
The quality of defense services in a jurisdiction is not primarily a
product of the delivery system used in that jurisdiction. Rather, quality
is largely a function of the adequacy of the time and resources at
defense counsel's disposal." 2  In Virginia, for example, indigent
108. SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION, supra note 102, at 13.
109. Id.
110. Justice Brennan suggested that "a party whose counsel is unable to provide
effective representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all."
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). In many respects, the defendant with an
ineffective lawyer who has done no investigation may be in worse shape than an
unrepresented defendant because many of the former simply plead guilty and it is
extremely difficult for a defendant who had counsel to get relief following a guilty plea.
For a further discussion of this point, see Margaret H. Lemos, Note, Civil Challenges
to the Use of Low-Bid Contracts for Indigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1808, 1821-
22 (2000).
111. Berlow, supra note 68; see also GIDEoN's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
10, at 7-9, 21-22 (reporting that a number of jurisdictions were inadequately funded and
had a fragmented, uneven delivery system that failed to provide competent
representation to the majority of indigent defendants). For an unflattering assessment
of the quality of representation in Oklahoma, see The SPANGENBERG GROUP, CAPITAL
POST-CONVICTION REPRESENTATION IN OKLAHOMA: A STATUS REPORT 3 (1996),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ok-
postconvictnarrative.pdf ("The per capita and per case funding for representation in
non-capital trial representation ranks as one of the worst in the nation.").
112. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 9, 17-18. Defense
counsel's training, level of experience, and talent also affect the quality of
representation provided. See id. at 17. Unfortunately, studies show that underfunded
jurisdictions with heavy caseloads often provide little or no training and tend to have
high turnover. See id. at 11. Thus, lawyers coping with these very heavy caseloads
are often inexperienced and poorly trained. See, e.g., SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA,
supra note 85, at 27-33. But see SPANGENBERG GROUP, MISSOURI, supra note 64, at 7
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defendants in some counties are represented by salaried public
defenders while, in others, court-appointed counsel provide
representation to indigent defendants." 3 Unfortunately, the local public
defenders' offices are so woefully underfunded that staff lawyers handle
caseloads that are far above national standards." 4  For example in
Winchester County, each lawyer handled an average of 674 cases in
2002."' Given such a workload, jail visits to interview or counsel
clients occur in only the most serious cases." 6 In Fairfax County, each
lawyer averaged 160 to 170 open files. 1 17  With such a caseload,
lawyers concede that "we let things slide. We cannot help it. We
don't have time for investigation or research."18 This refrain is echoed
by public defenders across the state. Excessive caseloads translate into
case processing because there is no time for performing legal research,
filing motions, interviewing the client, or locating witnesses.
Moreover, the young, inexperienced lawyers who take these low-
paying jobs are inadequately supervised and receive little or no
training. ",
Indigent defendants represented by court-appointed lawyers in
Virginia fare no better. As of 2004, court-appointed lawyers in
Virginia were entitled to a maximum of $112 for handling a
misdemeanor or juvenile case, $1,096 for a felony charge with a
possible sentence of more than twenty years in prison, and $395 for all
other non-capital felony matters.120 These non-waivable caps are the
lowest in the nation. 2 Needless to say, with caps this low, defense
counsel cannot afford to devote much time to investigate or prepare the
defendant's case. Rather, defense counsel has an economic incentive to
process the case as quickly as possible. As a result, many court-
(noting that despite the excessive caseloads, low pay, and retention problems, the public
defender training program is excellent).
113. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 20.
114. Seeid. at 20, 27-32.
115. Id. at 28.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 28-29.
119. Id. at 32-33; see also SPANGENBERG GROUP, MISSOURI, supra note 64, at
5-6 (decrying the extremely high turnover of staff lawyers that leaves inexperienced
attorneys to carry very heavy caseloads without enough supervision).
120. SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 46-47.
121. Id. at 45-46.
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appointed lawyers only meet their clients moments before their court
appearance and enter guilty pleas on their behalf that same day. 22
Case processing also tends to occur in jurisdictions in which
indigent defendants are represented by a lawyer or group of lawyers
who contract with the county or state to provide representation to some
or all indigent defendants in that jurisdiction, especially when the
contract is for a fixed amount and awarded to the lowest bidder. 23
Low-bid or fixed contracts have been widely condemned because they
encourage defense counsel to minimize time spent in representing
clients in order to maximize counsel's own economic gains. 24
Similarly, in this delivery system, defense counsel is discouraged from
using investigators or experts because their cost is usually borne by
counsel.1 25  Even in jurisdictions in which defense counsel ostensibly
can apply to the court for appointment of an expert or investigator,
contract lawyers rarely do so. 126  Although this system is favored by
cost-cutting politicians, defendants generally do not fare well under a
low-bid contract system. 1
27
122. Id. at 44, 57-58. Given counsels' economic incentives, it is not surprising
that jury trials accounted for less than 2 percent of the dispositions in Virginia in fiscal
year 2002. Id. at 73.
123. See, e.g., Bright, supra note 83, at 788-89 (citing the example of attorney
Bill Wheeler in McDuffie County, Georgia who routinely pleads defendants guilty after
meeting them for the first time in open court); THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, REVIEW OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN NORTH DAKOTA 13-14 (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/northdakotarepo
rt.pdf (detailing the extremely low rate of jury trials-ranging from 0.2 to 1.6 percent
of all cases cleared-as demonstrative of the lack of incentive for contract lawyers to
take cases to trial) [hereinafter SPANGENBERG GROUP, NORTH DAKOTA]. For a case
study of the pitiful representation provided by another Georgia contract lawyer, Jason
Shwiller, that highlights the deficiencies of this type of system, see Green, supra note
83, at 1169, 1171-73.
124. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381-82 (Ariz. 1984); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES Standard 5-3.1 cmt.
43-48 (3d ed. 1992); LEFSTEIN, supra note 58, at 49-55; RICHARD WILSON, NLADA,
CONTRACT BID PROGRAMS: A THREAT TO QUALITY OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES
(1982); Meredith Anne Nelson, Quality Control for Indigent Defense Contracts, 76
CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1988).
125. See Smith, 681 P.2d at 1382.
126. SPANGENBERG GROUP, NORTH DAKOTA, supra note 123, at 15-16
(reporting that contract lawyers rarely request investigators or experts and that in
twelve years, the court administrator in Bismark had seen only one expert request); see
also infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 110, at 1808-09, 1822-42 (describing
inadequate representation provided by a low-bid contract lawyer in McDuffie County,
Georgia and detailing structural problems with the use of low-bid contracts); Berlow,
supra note 68 (describing the popularity of low-bid contracts among politicians in spite
of the poor quality of the representation provided to indigent defendants); Adele
Bernhard, Take Courage.- What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal
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The case of Jimmy Ray Bromgard illustrates an all too common
example of the quality of representation provided by defense counsel in
a low-bid system.128 When he was eighteen years old, Bromgard was
accused of the rape of an eight-year-old girl. 12 9  In addition to the
uncertain testimony of the victim, the only other evidence connecting
Bromgard to the crime was the questionable-but unchallenged-claim
that the scalp and pubic hairs found at the scene were likely his.130 Not
only did defense counsel not object to the dubious testimony offered by
the State's expert, he failed to undertake any investigation, challenge
the victim's identification, do an opening statement, prepare a closing
argument, or file a timely appeal. 13' Not surprisingly, Bromgard was
convicted and sentenced to forty years in prison.32 Fifteen years later,
Bromgard was exonerated based on DNA evidence.'33
Like defendants who can afford only to pay counsel a small
retainer, defendants in those jurisdictions that poorly fund defense
services often are provided counsel with only limited time to spend on
their cases.' Realistically, defense counsel carrying a huge caseload
can only allocate limited time to most clients. As the Supreme Court of
Louisiana observed in State v. Peart,135 a case challenging the indigent
delivery system in Orleans Parish, a poorly funded system that
produced crushing caseloads:
We know from experience that no attorney can prepare for
one felony trial per day, especially if he has little or no
investigative, paralegal, or clerical assistance. As the trial
Defense Services, 63 U. Pirr. L. REV. 293, 307 (2002) (attributing the greatest
problems of inadequate defense counsel to low-bid, fixed-price contract systems).
128. Bromgard's case is described in Barry C. Scheck & Sarah L. Tofte,
Gideon's Promise and the Innocent Defendant, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 38, 39-
40; see also Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Jimmy Ray Bromgard,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/displayprofile.php?id= 11 (last visited Mar. 1,
2006).
129. Scheck & Tofte, supra note 128, at 39.




134. See GIDEoA~s BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 19 (noting that
witnesses from a number of states said that "in many cases, indigent defense attorneys
fail to fully conduct investigations, prepare their cases, or advocate vigorously for their
clients at trial and sentencing"); see, e.g., State v. Bell, 2004-1183, p. 5-6 (La. App. 3
Cir. 3/2/05); 896 So. 2d 1236, 1240-41 (holding that a lawyer who spent only eleven
minutes with the defendant before trial and testified that she was unprepared for trial
did not render ineffective assistance of counsel absent a factual showing of what she
would have done given more time).
135. 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
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judge put it, "[n]ot even a lawyer with an S on his chest could
effectively handle this docket." We agree. Many indigent
defendants in Section E are provided with counsel who can
perform only pro forma, especially at early stages of the
proceedings. They are often subsequently provided with
counsel who are so overburdened as to be effectively
unqualified. 136
Undeniably, defendants like Jimmy Ray Bromgard or Leonard
Peart have only limited access to the rights provided to the wealthy or
to an indigent defendant in a jurisdiction that adequately funds indigent
defense services. In an underfunded system, defense counsel has far
too many cases to conduct legal research, vigorously pursue
constitutional issues, interview witnesses, conduct factual investigation,
hire experts, file briefs, or perform the other activities that are required
if Counsel is to provid c a com.peten.- defe.ense.' 3 7  TOO ,,ftn, a harried
defense counsel only has time to interview the defendant briefly, read
the police reports, and then to try to facilitate a guilty plea through plea
bargaining. For some defendants, particularly those who are clearly
guilty, a plea bargain may be exactly what they want.'38
Unquestionably, some defendants benefit from an under-resourced,
plea-bargain-driven system of justice.'3 9  Indeed, some guilty
136. Id. at 789. The record showed that at the time Peart's public defender,
Rick Teissier, was assigned to his first-degree murder case, Teissier already was
handling seventy active felony cases and that his clients were routinely in jail for thirty
to seventy days before he first met with them. Id. at 784. The court went on to find
that:
In the period between January 1 and August 1, 1991, Tessier represented
418 defendants. Of these, he entered 130 guilty pleas at arraignment. He
had at least one serious case set for trial for every trial date during that
period. OIDP has only enough funds to hire three investigators. They are
responsible for rendering assistance in more than 7,000 cases per
year .... In a routine case Teissier receives no investigative support at
all. There are no funds for expert witnesses. OIDP's library is inadequate.
Id.
137. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993) (setting forth the tasks defense counsel must
perform in order to render competent assistance to a client charged with a crime). Yet
the reality in many jurisdictions is that "[riesources for indigent criminal defense are
also capped at such ludicrous levels that adequate trial preparation is a statistical rarity
and a sure route to financial ruin." Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks:
Professionalism, 52 S.C. L. REv. 458, 463-64 (2001).
138. Alschuler, supra note 70, at 933.
139. See id. at 932-35.
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defendants may reap undeserved benefits from such a system and will
not suffer at all from the limited representation they receive."
Yet other defendants, especially those who are innocent, are likely
to suffer significantly at the hands of a lawyer without the time or
resources to provide an adequate defense. Too often these defendants,
like the working poor, are left with a very restricted right to counsel.
The defendant is presented with only one viable option: accept the
proffered plea bargain that counsel has negotiated. In theory, of
course, the defendant has an alternative: risk a more severe sentence-
and sometimes the threat of more chargesl'-by going to trial with a
lawyer who is reluctant to do so.142 Realistically, however, this option
is of little utility when counsel's lack of preparation renders him or her
unable to really subject the government's case to the searching
adversarial testing our system purports to demand.
Ronald Williamson was one indigent defendant who had no choice
but to go to trial with an attorney who was woefully unprepared to do
so.' His attorney, W.B. Ward, was a sole practitioner appointed to
defend Williamson in a capital murder case.'" His appointed co-
counsel withdrew shortly before trial so Ward tried the case alone.
45
He did not receive any investigative or expert services and was paid a
total of $3,200 for his efforts.'46 Ward explained to the trial judge that
he had to make a living and could not spend any more time than was
140. See RALPH ADAM FINE, ESCAPE OF THE GUILTY 42, 48-50 (1986)
(discussing examples of cases in which defendants received arguably unwarranted
leniency).
141. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 359, 364 (1978) (stating that
the prosecutor could threaten to prosecute the defendant as a habitual offender despite
the fact that the threat was being used to attempt to coerce the defendant to plead guilty
to the charged felony).
142. At times, defense counsel is more than just reluctant. Sometimes counsel
will threaten to withdraw if the defendant insists on going to trial. ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-
5.2 cmt. at 201-02 (3d ed. 1993). Although counsel is permitted to use fair persuasion
to counsel a defendant to accept a plea bargain, undue pressure is not appropriate. Id.
Standard 4-5.2 cmt. at 201. Most commentators agree that counsel's threatening to
withdraw to coerce a guilty plea is improper. See AMSTERDAM, supra note 41, § 201;
Alschuler, supra note 69, at 1310. But see Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102
(5th Cir. 1987) (stating that counsel has the right to request permission to withdraw if
the client refuses to plead guilty and insists on going to trial when counsel sees the
choice as "foolhardy").
143. Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
144. Id. at 1510, 1512.
145. Id. at 1512.
146. Id. at 1522.
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necessary on this case. "' Unfortunately, the time Ward spent
investigating Williamson's case was far from adequate. Despite being
aware of some of Williamson's psychiatric history, Ward failed to
investigate his mental condition.' Had he done so, he would have
discovered that Williamson had a long history of mental illness that left
him delusional with a distorted perception of reality.' 49  Although
Williamson's dream confession to the police was a major part of the
prosecution's case, Ward failed to challenge it and the jury never
learned of Williamson's mental condition. 5' Nor did the jury learn that
another man, Ricky Simmons, confessed to the crime. 5' Based on his
dream confession, the testimony of a jailhouse informant, and some
questionable hair comparison testimony, the jury convicted Williamson
at trial and sentenced him to death.'52
Five days before Williamson was to be executed, the federal
district court issued a stay and subsequently overturned his
conviction.'53 Based on counse's inept performance, die Teiiuii Ciicutt
Court of Appeals agreed that Williamson's conviction should be
reversed and ordered a new trial.'54 While he was awaiting retrial,
Williamson's DNA was tested and he was cleared of any involvement
in the murder. '
D. Brenton Butler. The Indigent Defendant Represented by Zealous
Counsel
Unquestionably, there are jurisdictions where indigent defendants
are represented by defense lawyers with the skill, time, and resources
to mount an effective defense. Commentators have identified systems
and offices that do provide representation similar to that available to
wealthier defendants and consistent with the kind of representation
encouraged by the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
147. Id. at 1512. The record revealed that he spent 21.5 hours preparing for
the preliminary hearing, thirty-two hours at the hearing, fourteen hours on trial
motions, 43.5 hours preparing for trial, and forty-five hours at trial. Id.
148. Id. at 1513.
149. Id. at 1514-16, 1519.
150. Id. at 1512, 1520.
151. Id. at 1520-21.
152. Id. at 1510.
153. BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 188
(2003); see Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1576 (E.D. Okla. 1995).
154. Ward, 110 F.3d at 1523.
155. Williamson's case and that of another man, Dennis Fritz, who also was
wrongly convicted of the murder of Debra Carter, are discussed at length in SCHECK,
NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 153, at 163-203.
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Justice.156 Many defendants in these adequately funded jurisdictions,
therefore, receive the benefits of the constitutional rights accorded all
citizens.
Yet, even in these more adequately funded jurisdictions, not all
defendants reap the benefits of a competent lawyer. Wisconsin, for
example, is one of the states that spends a relatively high amount on the
defense of indigent persons accused of crimes. 157  It has a highly
regarded state public defender system with good training for its lawyers
and relatively good access to investigators and expert witnesses.158
Nevertheless, because the financial eligibility threshold in Wisconsin is
set at only 33 percent of the federal poverty guidelines, thousands of
people living well below the poverty level each year are deemed
ineligible for indigent defense services by the State. 159 Some of these
defendants have defense counsel appointed for them at the county's
expense. Others will either represent themselves and plead guilty or
pay a modest amount to hire a lawyer to provide limited
representation.'60
Nonetheless, in Wisconsin and in a number of jurisdictions across
the United States, a significant number of indigent defendants will, in
fact, be provided a zealous advocate with the time and resources to
raise an effective defense. 16' Fifteen-year-old Brenton Butler certainly
156. See infra note 161. For the most comprehensive set of standards for
counsel defending a criminal case, see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993). In Strickland v.
Washington, the Court recognized that the ABA Standards reflect the prevailing norms
of practice and are guides to what can be reasonably expected of effective counsel. 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
157. In 2004, Wisconsin spent $83,839,372 on indigent defense services,
which represented the fourth highest amount of the twenty states with a fully state-
funded defense system. Of the twenty, Wisconsin ranked fifth in cost-per-capita
spending. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, MISSOURI, supra note 64, app. B.
158. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, CASELOAD/WORKLOAD STUDY FOR THE
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER OF WISCONSIN, FINAL REPORT (1990).
159. See Zahn & McBride, supra note 58 (observing that a person earning $248
a month would be ineligible for public defender representation and finding that
thousands of such defendants are denied any lawyer); see also Veldzquez-Aguili, supra
note 48, at 196 (relating stories of defendants in Wisconsin who were denied public-
defender services even when earning as little as $200 a week).
160. Zahn & McBride, supra note 58 (describing the significant inconsistencies
in obtaining county-funded counsel and observing that many defendants denied a public
defender simply plead guilty).
161. For examples of model programs, see Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras,
New Frontiers in Public Defense, 17 CRIM. JUST. 51 (2002) (discussing the Bronx
Defenders, Georgia Justice Project, and the Neighborhood Defender Services of
Harlem); GIDEOmS BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 37 (identifying the Defender
Association of Seattle-King County as an office that provides meaningful defense
representation); Parker, supra note 58 (listing Colorado, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
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benefited from the zealous representation provided him by two assistant
public defenders, Pat McGuinness and Ann Finnell. 62 Butler was
charged with first degree murder for the shooting of a tourist, Mary
Ann Stephens, that occurred on May 7, 2000 at a motel in Jacksonville,
Florida.'63 Stephens was shot in front of her husband, James, who
positively identified Butler when the police brought the youth to the
scene and asked Stephens if he was the shooter."6 After his arrest,
Butler signed a confession admitting he shot the woman.1
65
Butler subsequently testified that he was beaten by several officers
who threatened that they would continue to beat him unless he signed a
confession."t6 Three officers testified at trial that Butler was not beaten
or threatened, but freely confessed. 167  Nevertheless, Butler's defense
lawyers were ultimately able to persuade the jury that his signed
confession was coerced and that the facts did not support the conclusion
that Butler was the killer. 16  Absent the tireless investigation of
McGuinness and Finnell, aided by their investigator Michelle Smith, it
is highly unlikely that they would have been able to effectively
challenge James Stephens' eyewitness testimony and overcome Butler's
alleged confession. 16
9
Oregon as states having quality programs). In states such as Wisconsin and Colorado,
which provide better funding for indigent defense, public defenders have more
manageable caseloads. They also are more likely to have the assistance of an
investigator and access to expert assistance if it is needed. Nonetheless, even in these
states, mounting budget pressures mean even higher caseloads requiring defense
lawyers to do more with less.
162. Florida has twenty elected public defenders for the state's twenty judicial
districts. Salaried public defenders, funded by the State, staff the offices in each
district, although counties are responsible for funding overhead expenses. See
SPANGENBERG GROUP, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, supra note 64, at 7.
163. Butler's case was the subject of an award-winning documentary, Murder
on a Sunday Morning, directed by Jean-Xavier De Lestrande. MURDER ON A SUNDAY
MORNING (Centre Nationale de la Cinematographie 2001).
164. Paul Pinkham, Butler Case Spotights Interrogations, FLA. TIMES-UNION
(Jacksonville), Feb. 23, 2001, at Al. The Supreme Court and many commentators
have condemned one-on-one show-ups as unduly suggestive. See, e.g., Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (stating that "the practice of showing suspects singly
to persons for the purpose of identification, and not part of a lineup, has been widely
condemned," but finding no due process violation under the totality of the
circumstances); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures.-
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 630-31
(1998) (expressing "grave concerns" about the use of show-ups).




169. Following Butler's acquittal, his attorney Pat McGuinness learned that
another man, Juan Curtis, was talking about the killing. See Paul Pinkham, Police
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Like Brenton Butler, there are many defendants in more
adequately funded jurisdictions who receive the benefits of the
protections afforded by the Constitution. Many of these defendants will
eventually decide to waive most of their rights and plead guilty. On the
other hand, if one of these defendants chooses to go to trial, that
defendant does so with counsel who is ready, willing, and able to
challenge the prosecution's case. Thus, it is well-represented, innocent
defendants who should be least afraid of going to trial. In theory, if the
adversarial system works as it should, the innocent defendant will be
acquitted. As the next section demonstrates, however, even a good
lawyer may not be enough to prevent a wrongful conviction.
II. THE LARRY YOUNGBLOOD SAGA-DELAYED JUSTICE
A. The Arrest and Prosecuton of Larry Youngblood
On December 9, 1983, Larry Youngblood, a thirty-year-old black
man, was arrested by the Tucson police for the abduction and rape of a
ten-year-old boy, David Leon.1 70 Youngblood was a chronic paranoid
schizophrenic who previously had been convicted of aggravated assault
and armed robbery.' 7' At the time of his arrest, Youngblood had been
receiving psychiatric counseling for several years.1 72 Unable to afford
counsel, Youngblood was found indigent and appointed a public
defender, Carol Wittels.173 Wittels had worked for the Pima County
Public Defender's Office since 1979.74 At the time, Arizona did not
have a statewide public defender office but, instead, a patchwork
indigent defense system with county-funded public defender offices in
only Pima and Maricopa Counties. 175 Indigent defendants in the rest of
Charge 2 in May Tourist Slaying, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Mar. 13, 2001, at
Al. McGuinness relayed this information to the police who subsequently arrested
Curtis for the murder of Mary Ann Stephens. See id. Curtis' fingerprint was found on
a document in the victim's purse. Id. He and an accomplice, Jermel Williams, were
convicted of Stephens' murder. See Rich Tucker, Last Sentence in Slaying, Butler
Debacle, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 1, 2003, at B3.
170. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 53 (1988); State v.
Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759, 761 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
171. Youngblood, 790 P.2d at 765 n.2.
172. Id.
173. See Thomas Stauffer, DNA Test Clears Tucsonan Convicted in
Molestation, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Tucson, Ariz.), Aug. 9, 2000, at 1.
174. E-mail from Shelley Kroska, Admin. Servs. Manager, Pima County
Public Defender Office, to author (Feb. 13, 2006, 12:21 CST) (on file with author).
175. For a more detailed look at the uneven nature of Arizona's indigent
defense system in 1984, see State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that
2006:739 767
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the state were represented either by contract lawyers or a lawyer
assigned on a rotating basis. 176 Thus, Youngblood was fortunate in that
he was arrested in Tucson. He also was fortunate to have Wittels, an
experienced public defender with a large but not unmanageable
caseload assigned to his case.
David Leon was kidnapped from a carnival on October 29, 1983,
and then brutally assaulted and sodomized repeatedly by an unknown
middle-aged black man.' David's ordeal lasted about an hour-and-a-
half before his assailant returned him to the carnival.' 78 Despite the
man's threats to kill him if he talked about the attack, David told his
mother about the assault and she promptly took him to the hospital.'79
At the hospital, a physician treated David for rectal injuries and
collected evidence using a sexual assault kit. 8 ° The physician took
rectal and throat smears and samples of David's saliva, blood, and
hair.' 8 ' The physician did not examine the samples but rather gave the
samples to the police who stored them in a secure refrigerator at the
police station. 8 ' Additionally, the police took David's underwear and
t-shirt, but they were not frozen or refrigerated.' 83
David, who would later be described as "a very observant
youngster," 8 4 provided a description both of his attacker and of the
attacker's car. According to David, the assailant's car was a two-door,
medium-sized white sedan, with a trashy interior and a noisy muffler. 85
He would later testify that the car started with an ordinary ignition key
and that country music was playing on the car radio.8 6 According to
the low-bid contract system in place in Mohave County created an excessive caseload
that raised an inference of inadequate representation of counsel).
176. See id.




181. Id. at 53.
182. Id.
183. The police did not follow their standard procedure. Instead, a reserve
officer placed the underwear in a storage locker at room temperature. See Jim
Erickson, DNA Test Can Work with Little Evidence, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Aug. 10,
2000, at 1. Because of the failure to refrigerate the clothing, the semen on the clothing
was beyond forensic usefulness by the time Youngblood was arrested. Brief for
Respondent at 5-6, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (No. 86-1904). That
reserve officer, John Leavitt, is now an Assistant Chief of Police for the Tucson Police
Department. Tucson Police Dep't, Organization, http://www.ci.tucson.az.us/police/
Organization/organization.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
184. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 592 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
185. Id. at 593.
186. Brief for Respondent at 2, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)
(No. 86-1904).
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the Arizona Court of Appeals, David described his assailant as a
middle-aged black man of medium height and weight. 187
Nine days after the assault, a detective came to David's school and
falsely told David that they had arrested the man who raped him. 188
The detective then asked him to pick his attacker out of a photographic
lineup. 8 9  The Arizona Court of Appeals described the lineup
identification process in this fashion:
Three of the photographs had the left eye whited out, and
three had the right eye whited out. David's optometrist
testified at trial that David had an astigmatism and "was
instructed to wear glasses whenever he was in school [or]
doing close work, [or watching] T.V." He was not wearing
glasses the night of the incident nor when he first viewed the
photographic lineup. After looking at the pictures by holding
them very close to his face, David picked Youngblood as his
assailant, saying he was "pretty sure." Later, David
identified another man in the lineup as the possible
assailant. "
On November 8, 1983, the day after David made his
identification, a police criminologist examined the sexual assault kit and
187. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 592. Other sources indicate that David's initial
description may have been more detailed. See Brief for Petitioners at 8-9, Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1998) (No. 86-1904) (stating that David's description led to
a composite sketch that described the assailant as a black male, twenty-five to thirty,
approximately five foot eleven, 170 pounds, with black hair, dark eyes, a medium
build, medium complexion, and one eyeball that was almost white); Stauffer, supra
note 173 (reporting that David's attacker was identified as black, five foot seven, 150
pounds, with one eye displaying an impairment such as a cataract).
188. The Arizona Court of Appeals stated that a police detective came to the
victim's school and "told him they had arrested the man who raped him, and asked him
to pick the assailant out of a photographic lineup." State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d
759, 762 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). In the petitioner's brief to the Supreme Court, the
prosecution never disputed the false statement about the arrest but emphasized that
Detective Lingle testified at trial that, when conducting the photographic lineup, he told
David that "the person who assaulted him may or may not be in the pictures." Brief
for Petitioners at 10, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1998) (No. 86-1904)
(citing testimony of Detective Lingle).
189. Youngblood, 790 P.2d at 762.
190. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 594. In the petitioner's brief to the Supreme
Court, however, the prosecution claimed that David never identified anyone but Larry
Youngblood as his attacker. Brief for Petitioners at 11, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488
U.S. 51 (1998) (No. 86-1904). The trial record supports the Court of Appeal's finding
that David did pick another photo out as possibly that of the attacker. Telephone
Interview with Dan Davis, Attorney for Youngblood on Appeal, in Tucson, Ariz. (Jan.
4, 2006).
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found semen on the rectal smear.191 After concluding that sexual
contact had occurred, the criminologist declined to perform any other
tests and placed the kit back in the refrigerator."9 At this point, he did
not test to identify any blood group substance or test David's
clothing.' 93
Based on David's identification, Youngblood was arrested about
four weeks later. 194  He was charged with child molestation, sexual
assault, and kidnapping. 95 Youngblood was held in jail, unable to
make bail, until December 13, 1984 when he went to trial for the first
time." The first trial ended in a hung jury. 97 The second trial began
on February 5, 1985 and the State's case again rested almost
exclusively on David's testimony.'98  At trial, David identified
Youngblood as his attacker. 99 He described his assailant as "a black
man named Damian or Carl who had greasy grey hair, facial hair, no
facial scars, and whose right eye, to David's best recollection. was
almost completely white." 2°6 He also testified that his assailant wore
brown leather or plastic loafers.2"' The evidence produced at trial,
however, showed that Youngblood was thirty years old with dry black
hair, a scar on his forehead and a bad left eye.2"2 Moreover, because of
a foot injury suffered as a child, Youngblood wore cloth-laced shoes
191. Brief for Petitioners at 4, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1998)
(No. 86-1904).
192. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 53 (1988).
193. Id. The State did not explain why David's clothing was not tested or why
the police criminologist did not perform an ABO blood group test at this time. The
criminologist did an ABO blood group test in October 1984 and did a P-30 protein test
in January 1985. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51
(1998) (No. 86-1904). The State explained that it failed to conduct the P-30 test earlier
because the Tucson police lab only started using that test in January 1985. Id. at 6.
194. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 53.
195. Id. at 51.
196. During that time, Youngblood's competency was challenged and it was
not until August 1984 that the court determined he was competent to stand trial. Brief
for Petitioners at 5, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1998) (No. 86-1904).
197. State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). The jury
ultimately deadlocked at six to six. SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 153, at
334.
198. See Brief for Petitioners at 4-7, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,
(1998) (No. 86-1904).
199. Patty Machelor, DNA Clears Man in Sex Case After 15 Years, TuCSON
CITIZEN, Aug. 9, 2000, at IA.
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and walked with a noticeable limp. 2° 3 Youngblood also always wore
glasses in public. 2°
On the evening of the crime, a police artist drew a composite
sketch of the assailant based on David's description. 2 5 Although David
initially was satisfied with the accuracy of the sketch, 2° he admitted at
trial that it did not resemble Youngblood.0 7 The sketch showed the
assailant with a straight hairline, while Youngblood had a widow's
peak.208 Moreover, the sketch failed to depict sunglasses or a scar on
the assailant's forehead, when Youngblood had such a scar and always
wore sunglasses. 2
Youngblood and others also testified about significant
discrepancies between his car and the car David described to the
police.210 Youngblood owned a 1964 Chrysler Imperial that the police
seized from his girlfriend's house six weeks after the assault.21 The
car had four doors, not two, and more importantly, because of
electrical problems, Youngblood and his witnesses claimed the car was
not driveable on October 29, 1983, the day of the assault.212 The car
ran quietly when last driven and the radio had not worked since
Youngblood purchased the car.21 3 Moreover, it did not start with a
key, but had to be started with a screwdriver.2"4
When the police seized Youngblood's car, they dusted for
fingerprints and looked for hair fibers. 25  Despite David's testimony
that the assailant had held him by the hair and continually was pushing
his head down, no hair fibers, fingerprints-except for Youngblood's-
or any other evidence was found in the car.216 Unfortunately, the police
disposed of the vehicle without notice to Youngblood or his defense
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Brief for Respondent at 3, Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)
(No. 86-1904).
206. Id. (citing the testimony of Officer Cody).
207. Id. (citing the testimony of David Leon).
208. Id.
209. Although the Arizona Court of Appeals noted that Youngblood always
wore glasses, the actual trial testimony referred to sunglasses. Id. at 3-4.
210. State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 593-94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
211. Id. at 593.
212. Id. at 593-94.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 593.
216. Id. at 594.
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counsel.2 7 Prior to doing so, the police did not determine if the radio
worked, if the muffler was noisy, or if the ignition switch worked with
a key.2"' Nor was a determination made that the car was even driveable
at that point.
219
Youngblood testified at trial and denied that he was the attacker.220
Youngblood insisted he was asleep at his girlfriend's house, where he
was living at the time, when the attack occurred.22' Youngblood's
girlfriend corroborated his story, claiming she arrived at her home
when the ten o'clock news was coming on the television.222 The
defense contended that Youngblood was the victim of a mistaken
identification. 223  The State countered by questioning Youngblood's
credibility in light of his prior convictions and that of the defense
witnesses because of their friendship to Youngblood.224 In the end, the
jury took only forty minutes to reach a guilty verdict on all three
charges. 225  Youngblood was subsequently sentenced to a ten-and-one-
half-year prison term.2
2 6
B. The Appellate Process
Youngblood appealed, arguing that his conviction should be
reversed and the case against him dismissed because the State failed to
properly preserve critical evidence that might have exonerated him.227
217. Youngblood was not the registered owner of the car, so after it was
impounded, only the actual owner received notice. State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d
759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). When that owner failed to claim the car, the towing
company dismantled it. Id.
218. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 593.
219. Admittedly, the condition of the car six weeks after the crime would not
clearly establish the car's condition on the night of October 29, 1983. Nonetheless,
given the information David supplied the police about the car, the officers' failure to
carefully examine the car is inexcusable. In light of limited investigative resources, it
is not surprising that the defense did not immediately check out Youngblood's vehicle.
Unquestionably, however, a defendant with adequate financial resources would have
had the car promptly examined, which would have greatly aided the defense.
220. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 592.
221. Id. at 594.
222. Youngblood, 790 P.2d at 762.
223. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 592.
224. Alice Whigham, the woman Youngblood lived with, testified that he was
with her on October 29, 1983, but she was impeached because of her initial statement
to the police. See id. at 594.
225. Tim O'Brien, Reasonable Doubt and DNA, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2000,
at A25.
226. See Stauffer, supra note 173.
227. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 592.
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The Arizona Court of Appeals agreed. 228 The court noted that both
criminalists who testified at trial agreed that, if the semen samples had
been preserved and additional tests run, Youngblood may have been
excluded as the attacker. 229 Thus, by failing to refrigerate or freeze
David's clothes, to promptly test the clothing, or to perform a timely
quantitative test on the rectal swab, the State permitted the destruction
of material evidence that prejudiced Youngblood. 230 According to the
Arizona Court of Appeals, there was "no doubt" that Youngblood was
prejudiced as a result of the State's inaction.23'
In deciding on the appropriate remedy, the Arizona court looked to
another recent Arizona case, State v. Escalante,23 2 stressing that in
cases in which identification is at issue and evidence has been lost or
destroyed that could eliminate the defendant as the perpetrator,
dismissal is warranted unless "the evidence against the defendant is so
strong that a court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the destroyed
evidence would not have proved exonerating. "233 The Youwgblood
court also quoted approvingly from a decision by the California
Supreme Court, People v. Natio/,234 a sexual assault case in which
identification was at issue and where the police failed to properly
preserve a semen sample. The California Supreme Court found that
requiring the police to take reasonable measures to preserve evidence
that might wholly exonerate the defendant not only protects the
defendant's due process rights, but it "enhances the reliability of the
trial process: if an accused is convicted of rape when available evidence
would have exonerated him, not only is he unjustly incarcerated but the
actual rapist remains at large. "
235
In reaching the conclusion that dismissal was appropriate, the
Arizona Court of Appeals discussed other cases in which the
destruction of evidence did not warrant such a drastic remedy.236 The
court emphasized, however, that the defense in Youngblood was not to
blame for the defendant's predicament nor did the defense have an
effective way to combat the loss of the potentially exculpatory




232. Id. at 596 (citing State v. Escalante, 734 P.2d 597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)).
233. Escalante, 734 P.2d at 603.
234. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 596-97 (citing People v. Nation, 604 P.2d 1051,
1052-53 (Cal. 1980)).
235. Nation, 604 P.2d at 1055.
236. Youngblood, 734 P.2d at 594-95 (citing, among other cases, State v.
Mitchell, 683 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Fierson, 705 P.2d 1338 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1985)).
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evidence.237 The court insisted that, in dismissing the case against
Youngblood, it was not implying any bad faith on the State's part in
failing to preserve the evidence.238 The court was not seeking to punish
the State but rather ensuring that the defendant received a fair trial.239
Indeed, the court's description of the incident, the car, the
identification, and the alibi indicated that the Arizona Court of Appeals
was not convinced that the evidence against Youngblood was so strong
that it could safely conclude that the lost evidence would not have
exonerated him.2"
The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the State's petition for
review24' and the State then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and ultimately reversed the Arizona Court of Appeals.242 In
doing so, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, expressed
an unwillingness to impose on the police "an undifferentiated and
absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of
conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. "243
The Court held instead that a failure to preserve potentially useful
evidence constitutes a denial of due process only if the defendant can
show bad faith on the part of the police.2  Such a bad faith
requirement limits the extent of the police's obligation to "reasonable
bounds" and "that class of cases where the interests of justice most
clearly require it. For the Rehnquist majority, that class of cases
was restricted only to those where the bad faith conduct on the part of
the police indicated that evidence could form a basis for exonerating the
defendant. 24
Applying the test in this case, the Court noted that there was no
suggestion that the police acted in bad faith.2 47 In failing to refrigerate
the clothing or to perform tests on the semen samples, the police were
237. 734 P.2d at 596 ("This is not a case where the samples were available for




241. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759, 762 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
Review was denied on March 27, 1987. Seeid.
242. Arizona v. Youngblood, 485 U.S. 903 (1988); Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988).
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at worst "negligent. , 248 In reaching this result, it is obvious that the
majority did not share the Arizona court's concern-or that of Justice
Blackmun and his fellow dissenters-that in the context of this case, the
destruction of this potentially exculpatory evidence was prejudicial.249
Remarkably, the only evidence connecting Youngblood with the crime
was the testimony of a ten-year-old victim of a different race.250 Yet,
no mention was made in the majority's opinion of the significant
inconsistencies between the victim's description of the assailant and his
car with that of Youngblood and his car. Nor did the majority note that
Youngblood had an alibi. Moreover, in contrast to the Arizona Court
of Appeals' discussion of the problems with the identification
procedures employed, Rehnquist stated only that "the police asked the
boy to pick out his assailant from a photographic lineup. The boy
identified respondent as the assailant."25' Indeed, the majority's
summary treatment of the facts of the case strongly suggests that the
majority harbored no doubt that the Youngblood was guilty. It is
hardly surprising, then, that the majority refused to let a person they
considered guilty escape justice simply because the constable
blundered, particularly when they viewed the lost evidence as so
speculative.
More surprising, perhaps, is Justice Stevens' concurring
opinion.252 Stevens did not join in the majority's opinion because he
concluded that the bad-faith test demanded too much of a defendant.253
Rather, he opined, there may be cases in which the defendant could not
show bad faith but where the loss or destruction of evidence was so
critical as to make the trial fundamentally unfair. 211 Stevens confidently
proclaimed, "[t]his, however, is not such a case."255
For Justice Stevens, three factors persuaded him that the loss of
the evidence did not render Youngblood's trial fundamentally unfair.
First, at the time the police failed to refrigerate the clothing, they were
still investigating the case.256 Thus, the police still had a strong
incentive to preserve the evidence because it was more likely to be
248. Id.
249. Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250. As Justice Blackmun's dissent noted, children are more likely to make
mistaken identifications than adults, and cross-racial identifications are less likely to be
accurate than those involving a victim and perpetrator of the same race. Id. at 72 n.8.
251. Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
252. Id. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
253. Id. at 61.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 59.
2006:739 775
HeinOnline  -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 775 2006
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
useful to the State than to the defendant.257 Second, after noting it was
impossible to know what the lost evidence would have revealed,
Stevens opined that it was unlikely that Youngblood was prejudiced by
the State's omission. 258 He reached this conclusion by first noting that
the defense counsel stressed in her examinations and closing argument
the significance of the lost evidence.59 Because the jury was provided
an instruction regarding the lost evidence that allowed the jurors to
infer the true fact against the State, then to Justice Stevens, Youngblood
actually had an advantage. 2' The fact that no juror decided to draw
that inference proved to Justice Stevens that the lost evidence was
"immaterial. "261 Indeed, in rejecting counsel's argument and the
permissive instruction, the jurors indicated that the evidence "was so
overwhelming that it was highly improbable that the lost evidence was
exculpatory., 262 For Justice Stevens, if the case presented "a closer
question as to guilt or innocence, the jurors would have been more
ready to infer that the lost evidence was exculpatory., 5 3
On remand, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued a second opinion,
including the identical factual summary set forth in its first opinion.26
Disagreeing with the Supreme Court's bad faith requirement, the
Arizona court concluded that the Due Process Clause of the Arizona
Constitution provided greater protection than its federal counterpart. 265
Looking again to State v. Mitchell,26 the court observed that law
enforcement officers had a clear duty under state law to preserve and
refrigerate the semen samples and the failure to do so violated
Youngblood's right to a fair trial. 67 Agreeing with the thrust of Justice
Blackmun's dissent, the court stressed that a reasonable police officer
should have known of the obvious potential exculpatory value of the
lost evidence. 268  The evidence that was not preserved was very
relevant, not only because it might have exculpated the defendant, but
because there was no other comparable evidence available to the
257. Id. But see ifrFa notes 307-13 and accompanying text.
258. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 59.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 60. But see infra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
263. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 60. Justice Stevens also ignored the fact that at
the first trial the jury was deadlocked, suggesting that the evidence was far from
overwhelming. SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supFa note 153, at 334.
264. State v. Youngblood, 790 P.2d 759 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989).
265. Id. at 762.
266. 683 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
267. Youngblood, 790 P.2d at 763.
268. Id. at 764.
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defense. 269 Thus, the State's destruction of this evidence mandated a
dismissal because the defendant could no longer receive a fair trial.27°
Unlike the Rehnquist majority and Justice Stevens, the Arizona court
clearly did not view this as a case where the evidence against
Youngblood was overwhelming. 27'
Unfortunately for Youngblood, the State appealed and, this time,
the Arizona Supreme Court granted the petition for review.272 The
court emphasized that under the circumstances of this case, the
unpreserved evidence might have been either exculpatory or
inculpatory.2 73  The court concluded, therefore, that there was no
showing of prejudice, but only speculation that the defendant might
have been prejudiced.274  Citing State v. Willits,275 the court was
satisfied that in a situation where evidence that only might have been
exculpatory was lost or destroyed-and where there was no bad faith
conduct-Arizona law only required a jury instruction.276  Given the
absence of bad faith, and because Youngblood asked for and received a
jury instruction regarding the State's failure to preserve potentially
exculpatory evidence, the court held that he had received due process
under Arizona law. 277  Accordingly, the judgment of the court of
appeals was reversed and Youngblood's conviction was reinstated.27 s
C Youngblood's Exoneration
This is not, however, the end of the story. After being released
from prison in 1987, Youngblood went back to prison in 1993 and was
released again in 1998.279 In November 1999, he was arrested and
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. The Arizona court also considered Youngblood's claim that the
destruction of his car without notice violated his due process rights. Id. at 764. The
court rejected this claim finding that the defendant was able to adequately argue the
car's exculpatory value despite its destruction. Id. The court did note, however, that
the defendant may have a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because of
defense counsel's puzzling failure to call a number of important defense witnesses at
trial. Id. at 764-65. The court did not need to reach the issue because of its ruling on
the destruction of evidence issue. Id. at 765.
272. State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Ariz. 1993).
273. Id. at 1156.
274. Id.
275. 393 P.2d 274 (Ariz. 1964).
276. Youngblood, 844 P.2d at 1157.
277. Id. at 1158.
278. Id.
279. When Youngblood's conviction was reinstated by the Arizona Supreme
Court in January 1993, he was awaiting trial on an unrelated aggravated assault charge.
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jailed for failing to register as a sex offender.28° Once again, Carol
Wittels was assigned to defend him.28' Aware of technological
advances in DNA testing since his trial in 1985, she asked the Tucson
Police Department crime lab to perform DNA testing on the rectal swab
from the Leon case.2"2 The testing demonstrated unequivocally that the
semen could not have been Youngblood's.283  Contrary to the
"overwhelming evidence," Youngblood was, in fact, innocent. In
custody since November because he was unable to post bail,
Youngblood's conviction was vacated and he was finally released on
August 9, 2000.284
Not only did the DNA test exonerate Youngblood, but it also led
the police to the actual attacker. The police identified Walter Cruise as
the man who sexually assaulted David Leon because his DNA matched
that found on the cotton swab. 2 5 Cruise, who was twenty-six at the
time he assaulted David, had a bad eye, just as David had described.286
Unfortunately, because of the system's overreliance on eyewitness
identification evidence and the police department's negligent handling
of physical evidence, it took the criminal justice system nineteen years
to get it right.
He received a five-year sentence on that charge, and also was ordered to serve the
balance of the sentence for his three convictions arising out of the Leon incident.
Stauffer, supra note 173.
280. Joyesha Chesnick, Man Cleared by DNA Test Faces New Charges,
TUCSON CITIZEN, Oct. 17, 2000, at lA.
281. Patty Machelor, DNA Clears Man in Sex Case After 15 Years, TucSON
CITIZEN, Aug. 9, 2000, at IA.
282. In February 1999, Wittels asked the Tucson police to test the remaining
swab. Inger Sandal, Freed Man Plans to Sue; Had Signed Waiver Not To, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Aug. 10, 2000, at 13. When the police indicated that there might only be
enough DNA for one test, she and her client faced a dilemma: whether to have the
Tucson Police Department do the testing or have an independent lab do the testing. Id.
Wittels advised Youngblood to have the Tucson crime lab perform the test because she
feared that the sole remaining sample might get lost or destroyed when it was sent to
the lab in California, or that the Arizona authorities might not accept the results and
there would be nothing left to retest. 1d. Youngblood had to sign a release, however,
agreeing not to sue various police agencies before the Tucson lab would agree to do the
testing. Id. Although Youngblood contemplated filing a lawsuit against the Tucson
police, no lawsuit was ever filed. E-mail from Dan Davis, Attorney for Youngblood
on Appeal, to author (May 9, 2006, 17:40 CST) (on file with author).
283. Erickson, supra note 183.
284. See Sandal, supra note 282, at 13.
285. Joseph Barrios, 24-Year Term Imposed for '83 Sex Crime, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, Aug. 20, 2002, at 1.
286. Id.; see Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Larry Youngblood,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=66 (last visited Apr. 20,
2006).
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Ironically, even though he was the victim of a misidentification
and of the State's failure to preserve and properly test all of the
evidence in his case, Larry Youngblood was still fortunate. He was
fortunate in that some DNA evidence was actually collected and that a
sample was still available for testing years later. z7 For many DNA
exonerees, they were simply lucky that evidence or samples still existed
that allowed for subsequent testing that, in turn, led to their
exonerations.288 For many other defendants, however, there is no DNA
or forensic evidence that can prove unequivocally whether or not they
committed a particular offense.289 Most of these defendants will have to
rely on the skill and preparation of defense counsel to demonstrate their
innocence. Given the sorry state of defense representation in many
jurisdictions, an innocent defendant will often find it extremely difficult
to prove his or her innocence.
III. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY:
UNPACKING SYSTEMIC MYTHS
A. Myth: Every Defendant Receives the Effective
Assistance of Counsel
What lessons can be learned from the cases of Leonard Peart,
Larry McVay, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, Ronald Williamson, and Larry
287. The victim's briefs and one of two cotton swabs were tested in 1983, but
produced unreadable results. Erickson, supra note 183. Fortunately for Youngblood,
there was still a single cotton swab left to be tested in July 2000. Id. Police forensic
experts feared, however, that there was only enough DNA left for one test. Id. Had
the remaining cotton swab been tested in 1983 or not preserved after Youngblood's
conviction was affirmed, his innocence would never have been established.
288. See Kristin Gelineau, Lab Worker Paved Way to Freedom for Innocent
Man, KANSAS CrrY STAR, Oct. 9, 2005, at A3 (discussing Mary Jane Burton, a forensic
scientist in the Virginia State crime lab, whose practice of saving a snippet of every lab
test she ran resulted in DNA material being available many years later for testing,
leading to the exoneration of three men imprisoned for over twenty years); Peter J.
Boyer, DNA on Trial; The Test Is Irrefutable, So Why Doesn't It Always Work?, NEW
YORKER, Jan. 17, 2000, at 42 (reporting that it was only happenstance that the evidence
that later exonerated a wrongfully convicted man was not thrown away).
289. See Hugo Adam Bedau et al., Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases:
Criteria, Evidence, and Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 602 (2004) (stating that
DNA evidence can only help settle questions of guilt or innocence in a fraction of
cases). According to Steve Hinsely, Director of the Missouri Highway Patrol State
Crime Lab, the patrol investigated eighteen thousand cases in 2004, and DNA evidence
was involved in only 5 to 7 percent of those cases. Hearing on H.B. 558 and S.B. 397
Before the Subcomm. on DNA Issues, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. 9-10 (Mo. 2005)
(Statement of Steven Hinsely, Director, Mo. Highway Patrol State Crime Lab).
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Youngblood? First, no one can seriously claim that all indigent
defendants in this country are provided the assistance of competent
counsel.2"° Indeed, the right to counsel for poor defendants too often
means little more than the right to have a lawyer stand next to them
while they plead guilty or sit next to them at trial, unprepared to
meaningfully challenge the prosecution's case.29' Although in principle
every criminal defendant stands equal before the law, in practice,
defendants stand on very uneven footing given the tremendous variation
in the quality and resources of the lawyers standing next to them. For
Leonard Peart, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, and countless other defendants,
the right to compulsory process or to call defense witnesses, for
example, is of little value without the assistance of counsel with the
time to locate, interview, and subpoena those witnesses. 2" Simply put,
the denial of the effective right to counsel renders many of a
defendant's other constitutional rights virtually meaningless.293 Thus, if
equal access to competent counsel is a myth, then so too is the notion
that there is equal justice under the law.
290. Despite the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, courts have
frequently found subpar representation to be constitutionally adequate, usually because
the defendant did not demonstrate that he or she was prejudiced by counsel's deficient
performance. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970); infra notes
342-44, 355 and accompanying text. Indeed, given the holding in Strickland v.
Washington, a criminal defendant is not constitutionally entitled to competent counsel.
466 U.S. 668 (1984). As Judge Alvin Rubin noted:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the
accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective
counsel.... Consequently, accused persons who are represented by "not-
legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die when the same
accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the
clemency of a life sentence.
Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
291. For the clients of Eduardo Falla, the chief contract lawyer in Flathead
County, Montana, the right to counsel meant little more than his assistance in pleading
guilty. See Berlow, supra note 68. From 1994 to 1997, Falla did not take a single case
to a jury, file any suppression motions, or get any cases dismissed. Id.; see also
GIDEOAS BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 16 (recounting examples of jurisdictions
where defendants routinely plead guilty the first time they meet defense counsel). For
other defendants, counsel may have been present at trial but did little to earn the
meager amount he was being paid. See, e.g., Tippens v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687
(2d Cir. 1996) (affirming the lower court finding that a court-appointed lawyer who
slept through a substantial portion of trial was ineffective); Burdine v. Johnson, 262
F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that an appointed counsel who slept through a
substantial part of the trial provided ineffective assistance of counsel).
292. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
293. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) ("Without
counsel the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through
counsel that the accused secures his other rights." (citations omitted)).
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Second, the reality for many indigent defendants and the working
poor who have retained counsel is that they will have little or no
investigation done on their cases .294 These clients cannot afford to pay
for an investigator and counsel generally fail to secure the appointment
of one. 295  Any investigation will have to be conducted by the
overburdened lawyer.296 Even in adequately funded public defender
offices, investigative services are rationed to the most promising cases
and to the most serious ones.297  A defendant like Youngblood was
fortunate, therefore, that his lawyer even had access to investigative
assistance.298
294. See GIEov's BROKEN PROMISE, supra note; 10, at 10-11, 19. In Virginia,
"investigators are reserved for only the most serious cases, thus the vast majority of
cases receive no investigative work." SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA, supra note 85,
at 38. Similarly, in Lake Charles, Louisiana, "the public defender office has only two
investigators for the 2550 new felony cases and 4000 new misdemeanor cases assigned
to the office each year." Press Release, NLADA, supra note 58, at 2. Not
surprisingly, appellate decisions routinely recount cases in which attorneys have done
little or no investigation even in capital cases. See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362 (2000).
295. GmEoMs BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 19.
296. Not only does an overburdened attorney have little time to try to track
down and interview witnesses, but it is also problematic for counsel to interview a
hostile witness without the assistance of a third person. "Unless defense counsel is
prepared to forgo impeachment of a witness by counsel's own testimony as to what the
witness stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to
present such impeaching testimony, defense counsel should avoid interviewing a
prospective witness except in the presence of a third person." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.3(e)
(3d ed. 1993). Thus, a defense counsel who acts as his or her own investigator risks
compromising the effective impeachment of witnesses and ultimately the successful
defense of a client's case. See id. Standard 4-4.3 cmt. at 187-88.
297. As John Mitchell observes, all lawyers have to ration, but the
representation of indigent clients involves practicing triage that ultimately demands a
more focused rationing. John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth Amendment, 67 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1215, 1243-48 (1994). Given the limited funding available for indigent
defense services, Darryl Brown argues that indigent defenders must adopt default rules
that enable them to allocate scarce resources in a manner that maximizes protection of
the innocent. Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801 (2004). As Brown
recognizes, however, some jurisdictions are so underfunded that no meaningful
rationing can occur. Id. at 815. Although I agree with Brown that more discussion of
intelligent rationing is warranted, I am skeptical that we can craft useful default rules
that will, in fact, enable defenders to efficiently concentrate on those defendants who
are innocent and still preserve the value of client confidentiality. A full exploration of
the merits and problems with Brown's proposed approach is, however, beyond the
scope of this Article.
298. I worked at the public defender office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin in the
early 1980s. We had six investigators for about forty lawyers. That meant each lawyer
could use an investigator only on selected cases-those that were most serious and most
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Similarly, few indigent defendants actually get access to expert
assistance. In Ake v. Oklahoma,299 the Supreme Court recognized that
"a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an
indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw
materials integral to the building of an effective defense." 3"u Thus, to
ensure that indigent defendants can present their claims fairly within the
adversary system, the Court held that the "basic tools" of an adequate
defense be provided at state expense for defendants who cannot afford
them.3°" Despite the promise of Ake, however, access to critical expert
assistance is very uneven and largely illusory. °" A few indigent
defendants, like Youngblood, do receive the assistance of an expert.
But most do not .303 In short, for many defendants-without
investigative or expert assistance and with a lawyer too busy to work on
their case-the claim of equal justice rings hollow.
B. Myth: The Police Properly Collect, Handle, Preserve, and
Analyze Forensic Evidence
Although Larry Youngblood did have access to an expert, that
expert assistance came too late. Indeed, one of the lessons of
Youngblood is that good police work is necessary to ensure that the
likely to be tried. In underfunded jurisdictions, access to investigators is even more
restricted. See inf-a notes 125-26, 136.
299. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
300. Id. at 77.
301. Id.
302. See, e.g., GDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 10-11 (citing
reports from observers in a number of states attesting to very restricted access to expert
witnesses); Burnett et al., supra note 48, at 630-40 (reporting a lack of access to
necessary experts and investigators for many Texas indigents).
303. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 19 (reporting that in a
study of 1867 felony cases from four Alabama judicial circuits, no motion to appoint an
expert or investigator was filed in 99.4 percent of the cases); SPANGENBERG GROUP,
VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 2, 59-66 (reporting that a lack of access to experts for
indigent defendants is "pervasive and long-standing" in Virginia, and that expenditures
for experts were made in less than 1 percent of all cases); JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GA.,
REPORT OF CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON INDIGENT DEFENSE PART 1 (2002),
available at http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/press/idc/idchearings/idcreport.doc
(reporting the lack of funding for experts and investigators). Similarly, many
defendants who scrape up enough money to retain counsel cannot afford to retain an
expert. For example, Brian Piszczek managed to hire an attorney but could not afford
DNA testing before his trial. James F. McCarty, Wrongly Convicted, Now Free:
DNA Testing Clears Man Jailed for 4 Years in Rape Case, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Oct. 7, 1994, at 1-B. Based on the victim's positive identification, Piszczek was
convicted and sentenced to fifteen to twenty-five years in prison. Id. Four years after
his rape conviction, his mother was able to raise $5,000 for DNA testing that
exonerated him. Id.
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innocent are not wrongly convicted and that the guilty are promptly
apprehended. Good crime scene investigation is the first step in a
process whereby critical evidence is properly collected, preserved, and
then analyzed. If evidence is never recovered, or if it is lost or
destroyed, it may be impossible to overcome the damage. The tragedy
is two-fold. Not only does an innocent defendant spend needless years.
in custody if forensic evidence is never found or mishandled, but the
person who actually committed the crime may never be brought to
justice.
Unfortunately, partly as a result of CST" Crime Scene
Investigatioz°4  and similar television shows, many people
misunderstand the difficulty of obtaining reliable forensic evidence. In
real life, rarely are the police or the crime labs as good as they are on
television.3 °5 Sometimes errors in the collection or handling of physical
evidence result from inadequate training or limited police resources."
Sometimes inept police work is to blame. Other times, crime scenes
are contaminated, regardless of the care exercised by the police.
Whatever the causes, there are a host of criminal cases in which
potentially valuable physical evidence is never recovered or lost.
Ultimately, the reliability of our criminal justice system is compromised
by our inability to gather and analyze such critical evidence. Yet
misperceptions about forensic science abound and those misperceptions,
together with the other myths described in this Article, obscure the
need for reform in this area.
Contrary to Justice Stevens' conclusion in Youngblood, 7 the
police do not always have a strong incentive to collect, preserve, and
test potentially critical evidence. Perhaps in theory they do, but in
304. CSI. Crime Scene Investigation (CBS television broadcast). Prosecutors
worry that the "CSI effect" places a heightened burden on them to produce forensic
evidence. See Litigators Offer Trial Practice Tips for Defending White Collar Clients,
78 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 68, 68-69 (Oct. 12, 2005) (describing the "CSI effect" among
jurors). Consequently, some prosecutors use voir dire to attempt to blunt the impact of
their lack of forensic evidence. See id. Recently, I was called to jury duty in a murder
case in Columbia, Missouri and heard jurors questioned about CS" Crime Scene
Investigation and their familiarity with the gap between television and the reality of
forensic evidence.
305. See Paul C. Giannelli, The "Science" of Wrongful Convictions, CRIM.
JUST., Spring 2003, at 55 (2003); SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 153, at 206-
07, 221; GREG W. STEADMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SURVEY OF DNA CRIME LABORATORIES, 2001 (2002), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sdnaclOl.pdf.
306. See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal
Cases: The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 439,
474-76 (1997).
307. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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practice, police officers respond to a host of conflicting pressures and
incentives. Surely, any reasonably competent police officer would have
recognized the importance of refrigerating the clothing in the
Youngblood case, especially right after the crime, when police had no
suspect. Despite the obvious importance of the evidence in catching the
perpetrator, however, the police failed to preserve this evidence.
Although the Youngblood majority cavalierly characterized the
inexplicable failure to refrigerate the clothing after semen had been
detected on it as, at worst, "negligent,"30 ' this failure directly led to an
innocent man going to prison for a crime he did not commit.
Moreover, the police bungling allowed the man who actually assaulted
David Leon to go freely about his sordid business. Understandably, the
Youngblood court did not want to micro-manage police investigations
or mandate how all evidence should be handled. Nevertheless, the
Youngblood test fails to adequately protect the due process rights of
innocent citizens who may later face criminal charges." As Justice
Blackmun observed in dissent:
[D]ue process requires something more. Rather than allow a
State's ineptitude to saddle a defendant with an impossible
burden, a court should focus on the type of evidence, the
possibility it might prove exculpatory, and the existence of
other evidence going to the same point of contention in
determining whether the failure to preserve the evidence in
question violated due process.3"'
In addition, Justice Stevens failed to acknowledge that the
incentives for the Tucson police changed over time. It was significant
that the police criminologist was not asked to test the rectal swab until
the day after Youngblood was picked out in a lineup.3 ' Although he
examined a smear from the rectal swab under a microscope and
determined that sexual contact had occurred, the criminologist did not
perform any other tests.312  That decision is not surprising. At that
point the Tuscan police already had their man-a convicted felon who
308. Id. at 58 (majority opinion).
309. Dr. Edward Blake, one of the nation's foremost forensic scientists
specializing in DNA, criticized the Youngblood ruling for undermining the mandate to
the law enforcement community to collect, maintain, and properly preserve evidence
and generally lowering the standards of evidence collection. See Barbara Whitaker,
DNA Frees Inmate Years After Justices Rejected Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2000, at
A12.
310. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 69 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 53 (majority opinion).
312. Id.
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had been positively identified by the victim. Additional testing might
have produced more conclusive proof. Given the positive
identification, however, the overworked police criminologist with a
backlog of pressing cases had an incentive to move on to the next
case.3 13  Similarly, in the Brenton Butler case, the police failed to
process a fingerprint found on a document in the victim's purse.314 The
police had an eyewitness and the defendant's confession.
Consequently, they had little incentive to waste precious resources
processing a fingerprint. Ultimately, that fingerprint led to the
conviction of the real murderer. 35 Absent the zealous representation of
Butler's attorneys, however, the lack of thoroughness by the police may
well have led to the conviction of an innocent man.
Contrary to the image created by CSI.- Crime Scene Investigation
and related shows, the crime labs in this country are not well-oiled,
infallible operations.316 Rather, the vast majority of crime labs are
staggering under a crush of cases and are unable to keep up with the
demands for their services.317 The lack of resources and manpower
creates backlogs, and encourages shortcuts. Additionally, some
criminologists lack adequate training or supervision."3 As a result,
quality control in many labs is questionable.
313. See People v. Bravo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48 (1993). In Bravo, a serology
test placed the defendant within the 1.5 percent of the population who could have been
the source of the sperm. Id. at 51. Given the victim's positive identification, the
prosecution did not utilize DNA testing. See Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Mark
Diaz Bravo, http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/displayprofile.php?id=03 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2006). Three years later, DNA exonerated the defendant. See id.
314. See Tucker, supra note 169.
315. See id.
316. See Reasonable Doubt: Can Crime Labs Be Trusted (CNN television
broadcast Nov. 5, 2005) (highlighting cases of forensic error and misconduct in
wrongful convictions). The Houston Chronicle ran a series of articles in the fall of
2003 detailing the incompetence, mismanagement, and scandalous performance of the
Houston Police Department crime lab. See Lise Olsen & Roma Khanna, DNA Lab
Analysts Unqualified, Review Finds Education, Training Lacking, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 7, 2003, at Al. For a further look at the "biggest forensic science scandal in
U.S. history," see Innocence Project, Houston, We Have a Problem,
http:www.innocenceproject.org/dnaews/index.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
317. In Missouri, the State Highway Patrol crime lab is "inundated" with such
a large backlog of samples that it might take three to five years to catch up. Bill Bryan,
A Real Life "Cold Case, " ST. Louis DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 2005, at C1. The huge
backlog in DNA cases across the country is only part of the problem facing under-
resourced crime labs. See STEADMAN, supra note 305.
318. See, e.g., Olsen & Khanna, supra note 316 (documenting problems with
the Houston Police crime lab DNA unit in which none of the scientists were qualified
by education or training to do the job properly).
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Sloppy labs not only generate mistakes, but they lose, fail to
preserve, and destroy evidence.319 Sometimes, of course, the loss of
evidence is not the fault of the police or the criminologists.32 At other
times, however, forensic error is a function of more than just
ineptitude. Occasionally, criminal defendants are victimized by
criminologists who knowingly submit false results.32" '
One of the significant systemic costs of the failure to provide
defendants with effective defense counsel with access to expert
assistance is the extent to which most forensic evidence goes
unchallenged. Pressed for time and without an expert to carefully
review or test the findings of the State's expert, many criminal defense
lawyers have no meaningful ability to controvert the State's forensic
evidence. This, in part, explains how a rogue criminologist like Fred
Zain was able to escape detection for years before his misconduct was
uncovered.322 Additionally, overly zealous prosecutors have exploited
questionable scientific evidence to pressure defendants into guilty pleas
because most defendants are unwilling to risk trial in the face of such
319. It is not only state or local crime labs that have problems. An eighteen-
month investigation of the FBI forensic laboratory revealed significant deficiencies.
See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN
EXPLOSIVES (1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/index.htm
(select "Table of Contents" hyperlink for the report listed under the "1997" heading).
320. For some of the many stories regarding the contamination or destruction
of evidence in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the attendant problems for the
criminal justice system, see Jennifer Latson, New Orleans After the Storm: City's
Criminal Trials Are on Hold, Jail Fills; Prosecutors Fear Evidence Is Lost, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Oct. 18, 2005; Susan Finch, Orleans Judge Holds Court in Gonzales:
Prosecutors Work in Borrowed Space, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 26,
2005, at A2.
321. In recent years, numerous cases of forensic misconduct by state and
federal crime lab employees have surfaced. The most infamous case is that of Fred
Zain, the former head serologist of the West Virginia State Police crime laboratory,
who falsified test results in scores of criminal cases between 1979 and 1989. See In re
Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501 (1993). For an
extensive discussion of Zain's misconduct and other crime lab fraud, see George
Castelle & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Misinformation and Wrongful Convictions, in
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 17, 27-28 (Saundra D.
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); Giannelli, supra note 306, at 442-49.
For an equally troubling account of the Oklahoma crime lab scandal involving Joyce
Gilchrist and the extent to which Oklahoma County prosecutors condoned her
misconduct, see MARK FUHRMAN, DEATH AND JUSTICE (2003); Mitchell v. Gibson, 262
F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001) (reversing a death sentence in a case in which
Gilchrist provided testimony that "she knew was rendered false and misleading by
evidence withheld from the defense"); see also Roma Khanna & Steve McVicker,
Crime Lab Faked Results in 4 Cases, Probe Finds, Hous. CHRON., June 1, 2005, at
Al.
322. See Giannelli, supra note 306, at 445-47.
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evidence.323 Similarly, some prosecutors have taken advantage of
defense counsel's lack of preparation or familiarity with scientific
evidence and have distorted or exaggerated the significance of certain
scientific evidence thereby obtaining questionable convictions.324
C. Myth: Cross-Examination Produces the Truth
It is a common myth that cross-examination is the greatest engine
for truth.325  Undoubtedly, cross-examination is a powerful weapon
when wielded by a well-prepared, skilled practitioner. Without proper
preparation, however, even a good lawyer may be unable to effectively
undermine the testimony of a prosecution witness. Moreover, an
unskilled advocate will find it exceedingly difficult to conduct an
effective cross-examination. In practice, given the time pressures that
confront many defense lawyers, inadequate preparation is common.
Consequently, cross-examination often is done poorly and without
meaningfully testing the accuracy or veracity of the prosecution's
witness.326 It is foolish, therefore, to place much confidence in the
power of cross-examination to ensure the reliability of most criminal
trials.
In addition, cross-examination can, in some instances, be used to
defeat the truth. It is perfectly appropriate for defense counsel to cross-
323. MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 326-28, 330-33 (3d ed. 2004). For a look at one type of the so-called scientific
evidence that has now been discredited, see Michael J. Sniffen, FBI Drops
Controversial Bullet Tests, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://www.whistleblowers.org/FBI DropsControversialBullet Tests.htm (reporting
an FBI announcement that it would no longer perform tests that matched bullets by lead
content given criticism of the accuracy of such tests by the National Academy of
Sciences); Charles Piller, FBI Abandons Controversial Bullet-Matching Techtique,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A38 (criticizing the FBI's use of this inaccurate test for
the past twenty-five years and its unreliable testimony based on such testing).
324. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text (reporting the case of
Jimmy Ray Bromgard); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Convicted by a Hair, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 18, 1999, § 1, at 1 (recounting a number of cases of prosecutorial misuse
of junk science to secure convictions); FUHRMAN, supra note 321. For a compelling
account of the prosecution's use of a pubic hair comparison and defense counsel's
failure to effectively attack the State's impeachable scientific evidence in the case of
Roger Coleman, a man executed despite considerable doubt about his guilt, see JOHN C.
TUCKER, MAY GOD HAVE MERCY (1997).
325. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367
(James H. Chadbourn ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1974) (1940).
326. See, e.g., Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1, 9-12 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that
inept cross-examination actually played into the prosecutor's hands and bolstered the
prosecution's theory of the case); TUCKER, supra note 324, at 64-80 (describing
generally ineffective cross-examination by two inexperienced and underprepared
defense lawyers that contributed to the controversial conviction of Roger Coleman).
HeinOnline  -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 787 2006
788 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
examine a witness counsel knows is telling the truth in an effort to
undermine the witness's credibility.327 Unquestionably, some guilty
defendants have benefited from counsel's skilled cross-examination and
been acquitted.32 Although ethically and strategically appropriate, it is
hard to square such a result with the claimed role of cross-examination
as the greatest engine for truth.
Perhaps even more importantly, Larry Youngblood's case and
those of numerous other defendants victimized by a mistaken
identification speak to the limits of cross-examination in guaranteeing
that truth will be achieved at trial.329  Admittedly, effective
impeachment based on a thorough examination of the crime scene and
of the circumstances surrounding the identification of the defendant,
can make a tremendous difference in some cases. In other cases,
however, cross-examination may do little to shake the confidence of the
mistaken but very credible witness.33 It is not surprising that mistaken
327. In describing defense counsel's role in our adversarial system, Justice
White emphasized that:
If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a
disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its
proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what
he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly, there are some limits
which defense counsel must observe but more often than not, defense
counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he
can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt
to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part) (citations omitted); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-7.6(b) (3d ed.
1993) ("[D]efense counsel's belief or knowledge that the witness is telling the truth
does not preclude cross examination."). But see Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Defense
Lawyers' "Different Mission". Reflections on the "Jight" to Present a False Case, 1
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
328. Some commentators have suggested that O.J. Simpson's acquittal, in no
small measure, was a result of skilled cross-examinations conducted by Johnnie
Cochran, Barry Scheck, and other members of the defense team. See Boyer, supra
note 286, at 45; Fiandaca, supra note 25.
329. Indeed, nearly 90 percent of the first seventy DNA exonerations involved
misidentifications. Karin Brulliard, Va. Urges Police Lineup Changes to Curb
Mistakes, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2005, at C7. Over two-thirds of the first 130
postconviction DNA exonerations involved a mistaken eyewitness identification. See
Innocence Project, Causes and Remedies of Wrongful Convictions,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
330. See, e.g., Amy Bradfield & Dawn E. McQuiston, When Does Evidence
of Eyewitness Confidence lnflation Affect Judgments in a Criminal Trial?, 28 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 369 (2004); Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Thomas E. Stuve,
Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identiication Cases, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41
(1988); James M. Doyle, No Confidence: A Step Toward Accuracy in Eyewitness
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identifications are the major cause of wrongful convictions and a
common feature of DNA exonerations. T3 In the end, even a skilled
cross-examiner may find it impossible to convince a jury to disregard
the powerful impact of a positive identification of the defendant.
Moreover, as the Youngbloodcase demonstrates, the more horrific
a crime, the harder it becomes for a jury to give the defendant the
benefit of a reasonable doubt in the face of a victim's positive
identification. In Youngblood, the defense not only was able to show
significant inconsistencies in David's description of the assailant
compared to the defendant, but also major inconsistencies in David's
description of the attacker's car with that of Youngblood's car.332 In
addition, the defense had the "advantage" of the jury instruction
regarding the unpreserved evidence and the testimony of Youngblood's
friends that he was with them at the time of the attack.33 3 Nevertheless,
the jury found no reasonable doubt about Youngblood's guilt. 3 34
To Justice Stevens, the jury's verdict, especially in light of the
instruction regarding the unpreserved evidence, demonstrated that the
evidence against Youngblood was overwhelming. 335  To the contrary,
the jury's erroneous finding of guilt illustrates once again the fallibility
of eyewitness identification testimony. It is a lesson that the Supreme
Court should have learned years ago when Justice Brennan warned
"[t]he vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals
of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."
36
Seemingly oblivious to the power of identification testimony to mislead
a jury, Justice Stevens and the Rehnquist majority ignored the
discrepancies in the victim's testimony and leapt to the unwarranted
conclusion that Youngblood was not really harmed by the State's
negligence. 337 The assumption underlying Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
Trials, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 12, 12-17, 73; Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler,
Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 817 (1995); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, "Good,
You Identified the Suspect" Feedback to Eyewitness Distorts Their Reports of the
Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360 (1998); Gary L. Wells, R.C.L.
Lindsay & Tamara J. Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence and Juror Perceptions in
Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440 (1979).
331. Wells & Bradfield, supra note 330, at 360 ("The identification of innocent
persons from lineups and photo spreads is the primary cause of wrongful conviction,
accounting for more convictions of innocent persons than all other causes combined.").
332. See supra notes 170-226 and accompanying text.
333. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 54 (1988).
334. See id.
335. See id. at 59-61 (Stevens, J., concurring).
336. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
337. Compare Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 56-59, with id. at 71 & n. 8-9
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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and that of Justice Stevens' concurrence, was that the lost evidence
would only have confirmed what the jury ultimately found-that
Youngblood was guilty.3"' Youngblood and other DNA exoneration
cases, however, represent a powerful rebuttal to the unwarranted
confidence that too many judges and others have in the ability of our
criminal justice system to screen out the innocent.339
D. Myth: Jury Instructions Cure Trial Error
The Youngblood case also exposes the limited effects of curative
jury instructions. The Arizona Supreme Court found that due process
was satisfied by an instruction that permitted the jury to infer that the
lost evidence would have been unfavorable to the State. 34° Yet what
value did that curative instruction really have? Clearly, the jurors did
not draw any negative inference from the State's inexcusable failure to
preserve the evidence. Certainly they did not infer that testing would
have exonerated Youngblood. In the end, despite the inconsistencies in
David's testimony, the alibi evidence proffered by the defense, and the
jury instruction, the victim's identification carried the day. Thus, it is
difficult to believe that the jurors gave any weight whatsoever to the
State's negligent handling of this potentially exculpatory evidence in
reaching the guilty verdict.
Such a result is not surprising to scholars and psychologists who
have studied jury behavior. Research demonstrates that most jurors fail
to understand most of the jury instructions they receive.341
Additionally, research indicates that jurors often find it extremely hard
to disregard powerful evidence, despite instructions to the contrary.342
338. Federal Judge David L. Bazelon acknowledged that federal judges had
"the belief-rarely articulated, but ... widely held-that most criminal defendants are
guilty anyway. From this assumption it is a short path to the conclusion that the quality
of representation is of small account." David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 26 (1973). For an insightful discussion of the
widespread presumption of guilt that applies to all defendants brought to trial, see
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1326 (1997).
339. See infra notes 437-51, 525-42 and accompanying text.
340. State v. Youngblood, 844 P.2d 1152, 1156-58 (1993).
341. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Maing Legal
Language Understandable.- A Psycholnguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 1306 (1979); Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science
Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 589
(1997).
342. See Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB.
L. REv. 744, 754 (1958); Thomas R. Carretta & Richard Moreland, The Direct and
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Consequently, jurors use evidence of a prior conviction on the issue of
guilt despite an instruction against doing SO 3 " and use impeachment
evidence to decide liability in the face of limiting jury instructions. 3"
Similarly, research shows that curative instructions do not effectively
counter the prejudicial effects of negative pretrial publicity."' Because
jurors have a tendency to accord greater weight to eyewitness testimony
than is often warranted, especially when a witness exudes confidence in
an identification, 34 judicial reliance on a jury instruction to balance the
detrimental effect of the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence is
unfounded.
E. Myth: Innocent People Don't Confess to Crimes
They Didn't Commit
Yet another myth that warrants reexamination in view of the DNA
exonerations is the belief that people do not confess to crimes that they
did not commit. Most people find it hard to fathom that anyone would
confess to a serious crime-like murdering a parent-unless the person
actually committed the act.347 The reality, however, as the case of
David Vasquez dramatically illustrates, is that the pressure placed on
suspects during custodial interrogations can, and does, produce false
confessions. 348
Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 291, 305-08
(1983).
343. Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43-47 (1985).
344. Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The
Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 Soc.
BEHAV. 165, 177-81 (1987).
345. Christina A. Studebaker & Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity. The
Media, the Law, and Common Sense, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 428, 442-43
(1997).
346. See Wells & Bradfield, supra note 330, at 374; Wells et al., supra note
164, at 620-21.
347. John B. Wefimg, Wishful Thinking by Ronald J. Tabak: Why DNA
Evidence Will Not Lead to an Abolition of the Death Penalty, 33 CONN. L. REV. 861,
884 (2001). For a compelling account of Derrick Prillman's false confession to his
father's murder, see Tom Schoenberg, Family Tragedy, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at
1; Tom Schoenberg, When the Innocent Confess, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at 1.
348. The Vasquez case is one of twenty-six cases highlighted in the Department
of Justice report of persons convicted of crimes but later exonerated by science. NAT'L
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL (1996).
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While investigating the rape and murder of Carolyn Hamm in
Arlington, Virginia, the police learned that a man named David
Vasquez was seen walking by Hamm's house on the evening of the
murder and then again two days later.349 Vasquez had lived in Hamm's
neighborhood but had moved to Manassas, Virginia about eight months
earlier.35° Two Arlington detectives picked up Vasquez in Manassas
for questioning and, when he denied being in Arlington on the day of
the murder, concluded he had something to hide. 35' Within thirty
minutes of questioning, the detectives were able to convince Vasquez to
change his story by falsely telling him that he was seen climbing
through Hamm's window and that his fingerprints were found in her
house.352 For Vasquez, a thirty-seven-year-old with a GED, who was
described as having "'borderline retarded/low normal' intelligence," it
was unfathomable that his fingerprints were there. 5
The detectives pressed the distraught and crying Vasquez by
insisting that the only real question was why hie was at Hamm's
house.354 Vasquez suggested he might have helped Hamm move
something. From there, the police fed Vasquez details of the crime and
encouraged him to confirm those details. When his answers did not fit
the facts of the case, the detectives yelled at him.3 5 Although during
this first interrogation Vasquez admitted to hanging Hamm, by the end
of this first session, he denied even being at her home. He stated that
he was admitting all this "because you tell me my fingerprints were
there." 356  At the end of a second interrogation, Vasquez began to
recount a "horrible dream. , 357 In that dream, he admitted to the facts
that he learned during his first interrogation. 358  The following day,
Vasquez gave a shorter version of this dream confession. 359  Based
largely on his three confessions, Vasquez was charged with capital
349. Dana Priest, At Each Step, Justice Faltered for Va. Man, WASH. POST,
July 16, 1989, at Al.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id. Priest's newspaper account is based on a review of the tapes and
transcripts of the three interrogations of Vasquez. Id.
353. Id. Friends also said Vasquez was easily flustered under pressure and






359. Years later Vasquez would say that the police "put words into my
mouth .... I was repeating everything they were saying." Brooke A. Masters,
Lucky Release from a Life Behind Bars, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2000, at A23.
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murder, rape, and burglary. To avoid the death penalty, Vasquez
ultimately entered an Aiford plea to second-degree murder and was
sentenced to twenty years on that charge, along with fifteen years for
the burglary. 3' Five years later, Vasquez was pardoned when Hamm's
real killer was caught following a killing spree.361
Few laypeople appreciate the coerciveness of the interrogation
process.362  Many mistakenly believe that the Miranda warnings,
including the right to the presence of counsel, offer suspects
considerable protection from police overreaching. In practice,
however, few defendants request counsel and those that do are rarely
allowed to see counsel, at least not until the police have had an
opportunity to secure a confession.3 63 Police are permitted to lie about
incriminating evidence 3' and to bring a variety of psychological
360. See Priest, supra note 349 (describing Vasquez's decision to enter an
Alford plea). Recognized first in North Carolina v. Alford, an Alford plea enables a
defendant to enter a guilty plea despite continuing to maintain his or her innocence.
400 U.S. 25 (1970).
361. Masters, supra note 359.
362. As Chief Justice Warren observed after detailing examples of police
interrogation techniques: "[W]ithout proper safeguards, the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
467 (1966). For an extended look at common interrogation techniques, see FRED E.
INBAU, JOHN E. REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND
CON7ESSIONS (3d ed. 1986). Some prosecutors are quite skeptical, however, that a
suspect can be induced to falsely confess. "Innocent people do confess
sometimes .... But the idea that somebody can be induced to falsely confess is
ludicrous. It's the Twinkie defense of the 1990s. It's junk science at its worst." Mark
Hansen, Untrue Confessions, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 50, 52 (quoting Joshua Marquis,
Clatsop County, Oregon, District Attorney). Research and the DNA exoneration cases
demonstrate, however, that the use of certain techniques can cause even an innocent
person to falsely confess. See, e.g., Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social
Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False
Confessions, in 16 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 189 (1997); Richard A.
Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions, in WRONGLY
CONVICTED, supra note 321.
363. See Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious
Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1211, 1246 (2001); see also infra notes 291-
95 and accompanying text.
364. Police misrepresentations regarding evidence do not automatically
invalidate a confession but will be considered in determining whether a defendant's
statement is voluntary. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (holding that, under
the totality of the circumstances, the fact that police falsely stated that an accomplice
had already confessed did not render the defendant's statement involuntary); Beasley v.
United States, 512 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 1986) (finding that misleading statements
regarding witnesses and the presence of the defendant's fingerprints in the decedent's
car did not make the defendant's confession involuntary). But see State v. Cayward,
552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that the police stepped over the line
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pressures to bear to get at the truth.365 The problem, unfortunately, is
that in their zeal to get the truth, law enforcement agents may only get
the defendant to acquiesce to the officer's version of events."
Once law enforcement officers are satisfied that the defendant has
confessed, a defendant's fate is usually sealed. It is exceedingly
difficult for a defendant to successfully refute an officer's claim that he
or she confessed. Few jurisdictions mandate that interrogations be
electronically recorded.36 Moreover, some police departments that do
of permitted deception by falsely fabricating two scientific reports tying the defendant
to the crime). In Great Britain, on the other hand, concerns that police deception leads
to false confessions have prompted courts to rule inadmissible confessions secured after
the police made false statements about evidence or witnesses. See Ian K. McKenzie,
Forensic Investigative Interviewing, in HANDBOOK OF INTERVIEWING RESEARCH:
CONTEXT AND METHOD 431, 443-45 (Jaber F. Gubrium & James A. Holstein eds.,
2002).
365. It is difficult to know how common it is for the police to use physical
force to secure a confession, as in the Butler case. See supra notes 162-69, 314-15 and
accompanying text, infra note 434 and accompanying text. Certainly there are police
officers-particularly in some departments-who use physical force to obtain statements
from suspects. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, A Tortured Path to Death
Row, CHI. TRm., Nov. 17, 1999, § 1, at 1 (detailing the physical abuse and torture
used by members of the Chicago Police Department to extract confessions); M.L.
Elrick & Ben Schmidt, U.S. Plans to Oversee Detroit Cops, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June
11, 2003, at 1A (discussing the prospective oversight of the Detroit Police Department
because of the abuse of suspects during interrogations). Usually, however, the
suspect's claims of abuse fall on deaf ears because there is no other evidence to rebut
the officer's denial of any such abuse. It is revealing that about 27 percent of the DNA
exonerations studied by the Innocence Project involved so-called confessions and in
many of these cases, the defendants reported either that they had confessed as the result
of beatings or never made the statement attributed to them. See SCHECK, NEUFELD &
DWYER, supra note 153, at 120-21. Even if no physical force is employed, police will
make threats or promises that may induce a suspect to say what the police want, even if
it is not true. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 362, at 212.
366. As in the Vasquez case, the police in Williamson v. Ward secured several
dream confessions from a mentally ill defendant. 110 F.3d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir.
1997). Finding that these dream confessions "were likely given great weight by the
jury, which was unaware that Mr. Williamson was mentally ill with a disorder that
distorted reality and produced delusions," the court reversed Williamson's conviction.
1d. at 1520; see also supra notes 143-55 and accompanying text. It is not only mentally
limited defendants who falsely confess. See, e.g., Bryan, supra note 317 (reporting
that police said that the drifter who falsely confessed to a rape he did not commit could
offer no explanation for his confession).
367. Two state courts have imposed a videotaping requirement. See State v.
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994); Stephan v State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently imposed a videotaping requirement in all
custodial interrogations of juveniles. In re Jerrell C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145,
699 N.W.2d 110; see also Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 518
(Mass. 2004) (expressing a preference for taping but holding that in any case in which a
confession is not recorded, cautionary jury instruction will be given). But see State v.
Cook, 847 A.2d 530 (N.J. 2004) (rejecting the argument that due process requires
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videotape confessions do not record all of the interrogation. 36" Thus, it
is generally the defendant's word against that of a law enforcement
officer or officers as to what happened and what was said during the
interrogation.
For the defendant represented by an incompetent lawyer or
overworked or underpaid counsel, it is almost impossible to rebut a
claim that he or she confessed. If counsel is severely strapped for time,
defendants who have confessed are least likely to receive counsel's
limited time or energy. It is unlikely that a suppression motion will be
filed, much less litigated. It also is unlikely that the scene will be
visited or fact-witnesses interviewed. Indeed, defense counsel may well
be skeptical of the defendant's claim that he or she never confessed and
is actually innocent. Not surprisingly, a defendant represented by a
skeptical defense lawyer who does not have the time to adequately
prepare is unlikely to risk trial.
Moreover, even if the defendant is represented by able counsel
who disbelieves the confession, counsel is still very likely to encourage
the defendant to accept a plea bargain.369 Defense lawyers recognize
that a defendant faces long odds of beating a charge to which the
defendant allegedly has confessed. For most jurors, a defendant's
confession constitutes a powerful piece of evidence that is very difficult
to ignore.37 Not only does it take an exceptionally good lawyer to
electronic recording but setting up a committee to make recommendations regarding
such recording of custodial interrogations). Three states and the District of Columbia
have mandated electronic recording by legislation. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/103-2.1 (West Supp. 2005) (providing for taping all custodial interrogations of
suspects in homicide cases); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(K) (Supp.
2005) (requiring taping of all suspects in serious cases); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.22 (Vernon 2005) (mandating taping in all custodial interrogations); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 5-116.01 (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring taping of all custodial interrogations of
persons suspected of committing a crime of violence).
368. In Manhattan, for example, after the police secure a confession, the
District Attorney's Office attempts to get the suspect to repeat that confession on
videotape. As the infamous case of the Central Park Jogger demonstrates, the practice
of only taping the final confession and not the entire interrogation process does little to
prevent false confessions or police coercion. See Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich,
Heeding the Lessons of History. The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police
Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52
DRAKE L. REv. 619, 645-46 n. 157 (2004); see also Bryan, supra note 317 (reporting
that a suspect's videotaped confession to a brutal rape turned out to be false when DNA
exonerated him and two years later led police to the actual perpetrator).
369. In the Vasquez case, for example, faced with the dream confession and a
possible death sentence, Vasquez' lawyers persuaded him to enter an Alford plea. See
Masters, supra note 359.
370. Drizin & Reich, supra note 368, at 637-39. Indeed, an examination of
wrongful conviction cases reveals that defendants who falsely confessed, recanted, and
then went to trial, were convicted in about four of every five cases. See Steven A.
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effectively neutralize a claim that the defendant admitted his or her
guilt, 371 even the best lawyers will usually be unable to do so. As a
result, innocent people can be convicted largely based on their own
purported confessions.372
F. Myth: Innocent People Don 't Plead Guilty
The difficulty of overcoming so-called confessions and of
successfully attacking a positive eyewitness identification are just two
of a host of factors that may push a defendant into a guilty plea
regardless of his or her actual innocence.373 Nonetheless, the myth
persists that innocent defendants simply do not plead guilty.374
Surprisingly, even Supreme Court Justices labor under the
misperception that our system only allows the guilty to enter guilty
Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,
82 N.C. L. REv. 891, 960 (2004); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The
Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429,
482 (1998).
371. An expert can help. Hansen, supra note 362, at 53 (describing the role
that the expert witness, Richard Ofshe, played in a high-profile murder case in San
Diego). Very few defendants, however, will have access to such an expert. Thus, it
will be the rare case in which the defense counsel will be able to persuade a jury that
the defendant gave a false confession to stop the police from beating or psychologically
abusing him. The case of Brenton Butler represents that rare case. See supra notes
162-69, 314-15, infra note 434 and accompanying text.
372. For example, Gary Gauger was convicted of the double murder of his
parents based on statements Gauger allegedly made to the police, even though no
physical evidence linked him to the crime. Gauger's conviction was reversed and he
was not retried after members of a motorcycle gang were convicted of his parents'
murders. See STATE OF ILL., REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 8 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/
conmission report. For a look at some of the many articles documenting proven cases
involving purported confessions of persons who subsequently were exonerated, see Leo
& Ofshe, supra note 370; Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAW., May 1993, at
58; Leo, supra note 362, at 36-37; Drizin & Reich, supra note 368, at 634-36;
Associated Press, $2.25 Million Awarded for Policeman's Fakery, KAN. CITY STAR,
May 6, 2006 at A5.
373. See Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective
Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 CLIN. L. REv. 73, 77-78 (1995).
374. As the prosecutor in the HBO movie Criminal Justice insisted, "innocent
people don't take upstate time." CRIMINAL JUSTICE (HBO Films 1990). In 2002, St.
Louis City Prosecutor Jennifer Joyce set up a program in her office to review cases
from St. Louis prior to 1994 of all inmates still incarcerated to determine if any of
those inmates were appropriate for DNA testing. At the Access to Equal Justice
Conference held at Washington University in February 2002, Ms. Joyce advised me
that only defendants who had consistently maintained their innocence would be
appropriate for testing and that persons who pled guilty would not be.
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pleas. During oral arguments in United States v. Ruiz,3 75  Justice
Scalia reacted vehemently to defense counsel's argument that our plea-
bargain-driven system provided incentives for innocent people to plead
guilty by claiming:
No. I - I object to that. I - I don't think our system ever
encourages or, indeed, even permits an innocent person to
plead guilty. Our rules require the judge to - to interrogate
the person pleading guilty to make sure that, indeed, the
person is guilty. There is nothing in our system that
encourages or even allows an innocent person to - to plead
guilty. And I would be horrified if - if there were something
like that.376
Contrary to Justice Scalia's protestation, however, the Court itself
has recognized the right of a defendant who continues to profess his
innocence to enter a guilty plea.3 77  Every day in this country,
defendants enter Alford pleas or no contest pleas because they decide,
for a variety of reasons, that the costs of going to trial in pursuit of an
acquittal are simply too high.37  Astonishingly, Justice Scalia's
comment suggests that he is totally unaware of this common
phenomenon.
Justice Scalia apparently also failed to appreciate the pressure
pretrial detention puts on defendants, including those who are innocent.
Many states deny counsel to indigent defendants at bail hearings,
resulting in lengthy detention for many defendants before counsel is
375. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622
(2002) (No. 01-595).
376. 1d.
377. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (holding that the trial
judge can accept a guilty plea from a defendant despite the defendant's continued claim
of innocence). Most state courts also permit a defendant to plead guilty while
maintaining his or her innocence. See Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A
Necessary But Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 IowA L. REv. 1063,
1067-69 (1987). A few states, however, have specifically rejected Alford. See, e.g.,
Ross v. State, 456 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. 1983).
378. See HARLOW, supra note 14, at 8 (reporting that 17 percent of state
inmates and 5 percent of federal inmates entered an Alford plea or no contest plea).
The case of David Vasquez is illustrative. See supra notes 349-61 and accompanying
text. Charged with murder and rape, Vasquez faced the death penalty. See Priest,
supra note 349. He gave three confessions to the police, witnesses put him in the
neighborhood, and hair evidence found at the scene was consistent with his hair. Id.
To avoid the death penalty, Vasquez entered an Alford plea and was sentenced to
thirty-five years. Id. He was pardoned five years later after the real killer was
identified. See Masters, supra note 359.
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finally appointed.3 79  Moreover, the heavy caseloads of many indigent
defenders mean that defendants languish in jail for extended periods
without ever seeing defense counsel.3' Because the consequences of
pretrial incarceration are often very significant and, for some
defendants, far outweigh the ultimate punishment for the crime
charged, even innocent defendants choose to plead guilty simply to get
out of jail.381 Simply put, pleading guilty to time served is often much
more attractive than the unlikely prospect of a not guilty verdict at
some unknown point in the future.
Equally remarkable, Justice Scalia's comment suggests a stunning
lack of recognition of the coercive power of a plea bargain. Virtually
all defendants are told that if they go to trial and lose they will likely
receive a harsher sentence.32 Indeed, sometimes the threat is quite
explicit, at times including a threatened sentence of life in prison or
even death.383 Moreover, the prosecutor's ability to threaten additional
charges with even more enhanced penalties only intensifies the pressure
on a defendant to plead guilty.3"
379. Colbert, supra note 48, at 1; see also Press Release; NLADA, supra note
58, at 2 (reporting that indigent defendants in Lake Charles, Louisiana typically meet
their public defender for the first time 281 days after their arrest).
380. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 58 (reporting cases from various
jurisdictions where defendants represented by overworked public defenders spent
lengthy periods in jail before trial, including James Thomas who was jailed eight-and-a
-half years waiting for trial); see also Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn
Bushway, Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of
Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1719, 1729 (2002).
381. See Colbert, supra note 48, at 6; MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); see also infra
notes 540-41 and accompanying text. After languishing for almost six months in jail
without seeing a lawyer, Ramiro Games pleaded guilty to simple possession of cocaine,
a misdemeanor, despite having no attorney and no understanding that he was even
pleading guilty. Ruben Castaneda, Without English, Inmate was Trapped, WASH.
POST, Apr. 10, 2006, at Al. Circuit Court Judge Vincent Femia, who accepted
Games' plea, admitted: "My object in this case was not criminal justice. My object
was to get him the hell out of jail." Id, For an excellent overview of the serious
consequences of pretrial detention, see generally Colbert et al., supra note 380.
382. Indeed, "[t]he threat of differential punishment, whether phrased in terms
of rewarding a plea of guilty or of penalizing the exercise of the right to trial, is the
essence of the plea bargaining process." Alschuler, supra note 70, at 952.
383. Not only did Christopher Ochoa falsely confess to assisting his roommate
Richard Danziger in a murder that neither were involved in, but he pleaded guilty to
avoid the death penalty, even though it also meant testifying against his roommate.
Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Christopher Ochoa, http://www.innocence
project.org/case/displayprofile.php?id=84 (last visited Feb. 28, 2006). After another
person later confessed, DNA evidence inculpated that person and exonerated Ochoa and
Danziger. Id. Both men were released after serving twelve years. Id.
384. A recent high-profile case involving a Kansas University basketball player
highlights the pressure that can be brought to bear upon a defendant. Jeremiah
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Thus, even with competent counsel, going to trial can be
incredibly risky business. Take, for example, a high school teacher
and basketball coach accused by one of his female players of fondling
her. Charged with sexual assault and suspended from school, the
defendant, if convicted, faces not only serious prison time but also the
loss of his teaching license. Although the teacher insists that he is
innocent, defense counsel can find nothing to discredit the testimony of
the complaining witness. Thus, the trial ultimately will turn on the
jury's assessment of the credibility of the two parties. If the defendant
is offered probation-albeit resulting in the loss of his teaching
license-should he turn down the plea bargain because he trusts the jury
will reach the correct result and vindicate him? Or should the
defendant cut his potential losses and plead guilty rather than risk a jury
verdict that could result in a prison sentence of up to twenty years?3 .
Realistically, many innocent defendants caught in this dilemma choose
to plead guilty.
Some innocent defendants learn the hard way that they will not
necessarily be vindicated should they decide to go to trial. Consider,
Croswell was beaten badly by a group of ten to twelve men in the parking lot of a
Lawrence, Kansas nightclub after an altercation in that club. Jason King, Croswell
Placed on Probation, KAN. CITY STAR, Nov. 2, 2005, at D5. One of Croswell's
assailants was J.R. Giddens, a star player on the Kansas basketball team. Id. Facing a
misdemeanor charge of battery for allegedly hitting Giddens inside the bar, Croswell
claimed he acted in self-defense and was prepared to go to trial. Id. Prosecutors told
Croswell that if he refused their plea agreement they would add felony charges and with
his criminal background, he would face twenty-three to 230 months in prison if
convicted. Id. As Croswell's attorney, Billy Rourke, observed,
It's unfortunate they put us in that position. I would have gone to trial in a
heartbeat, because I truly believe he is innocent. But you don't want to put
your life in the hands of 12 people (a jury) who weren't there. You never
know what they'll do.
I would have put on a good defense, but there's no way to guarantee that
Jeremiah wouldn't have been found guilty. And if he was found guilty, he
would have paid a major price and been victimized even more. It wasn't
worth the gamble.
Id. Accordingly, despite insisting he never hit Giddens, Croswell pleaded no contest
and was placed on probation for twelve months. Id.
385. This example is taken from a case that I consulted on in Oklahoma. If
convicted, the defendant faced up to twenty years in prison. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1123 (West Supp. 2006). Given jury sentencing in Oklahoma, it is very difficult for
counsel to predict how many years a defendant would actually receive if found guilty.
Oklahoma juries, however, are well-known for meting out harsh sentences in sexual
assault cases, especially when the victim is a minor. Moreover, the defendant would
serve at least 85 percent of the sentence imposed. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 13.1
(West 2002).
HeinOnline  -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 799 2006
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
for example, the decision Arthur Lee Whitfield faced.3 86 Whitfield was
accused of raping and robbing one woman and then, less than an hour
later, raping a second woman.38 7 Both women positively identified
Whitfield."' Whitfield went to trial on the first case, claiming that the
women had misidentified him.389 Although both victims said the rapist
had no facial hair, Whitfield and his family testified he had a beard the
night of the attacks and was home that night.3" Notwithstanding this
testimony, Whitfield was convicted and sentenced to forty-five years in
prison."'
Whitfield knew that the jury had gotten it wrong. Facing a second
trial, Whitfield now had to decide whether to trust a second jury or to
accept a guilty plea and limit his exposure to additional time in
prison." Although he knew he was innocent-and twenty-two years
later DNA evidence proved him right393-Whitfield also was painfully
aware of the long odds he faced in going to trial. It should not be
surprising that Whitfield elected to plead guilty despite his innocence.394
Whitfield received an eighteen-year sentence which was to run
consecutively to the original forty-five-year sentence.395
Justice Scalia's misguided notion that nothing in our system
encourages or allows an innocent person to plead guilty also ignores the
plight of defendants like Larry McVay who appear for trial
unrepresented and are offered the choice of accepting a proffered plea
bargain or having their bail revoked and returning to jail until the next
trial date.3 96 Nicholas Souder faced a similar predicament when he
appeared for trial unrepresented by counsel. Souder was eighteen
years old when he was charged with two counts of aggravated assault
and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a
386. Whitfield's case is described at Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Arthur
Lee Whitfield, http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=150 (last







393. See Brulliard, supra note 329.
394. See id.
395. See Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Arthur Lee Whitfield, supra note
386.
396. For a compelling look at the systemic deprivation of the right to counsel
of many of the poor in Wisconsin and the corresponding pressure on unrepresented
defendants to plead guilty, see Zahn & McBride, supra note 58.
397. E-mail from Mike Mears, Dir. of the Ga. Public Defender's Council, to
author (Oct. 21, 2005, 15:58 CST) (on file with author).
800
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crime.39 Unable to make bond, Souder had been in jail for over six
months before his trial date. 3 His appointed counsel died and no one
was appointed to replace him.4° After Souder entered a guilty plea to
three charges, the trial judge asked Souder if he had been promised
anything to get him to plead guilty. " Souder replied, "No. I ain't got
a lawyer."402  The judge then asked if anybody forced him to plead
guilty and Souder responded, "Why not if I ain't got no lawyer to help
represent me.4°3 I can't fight this, I don't know nothing about this." 4
The judge then remarked, "Put him on trial, had to have somebody to
try anyway."4 5
After this colloquy, Souder talked with the judge off the record.0 6
At this time, the defendant was told that if he went to trial and was
found guilty he would be sentenced to forty-five years in prison.' To
an eighteen-year old with a sixth-grade education, the prospect of going
to trial without a lawyer and without any wimesses in the face of the
threat of forty-five years in prison was overwhelming.'
Understandably, Souder pleaded guilty and received a ten-year prison
sentence. It would take six years for Souder, aided by competent
counsel, to undo that guilty plea and secure an acquittal at trial.
409
Persistence and good lawyering ultimately paid off for Nicholas
Souder. For a defendant who meets his lawyer for the first time on the
night before trial, however, it is hard to resist the pressure to plead.4 0
Few appreciate the frustration and sense of hopelessness that confronts
the defendant who has had little to no contact with the state-paid lawyer
398. Transcript of Guilty Plea Proceedings at 2, State v. Souder, No. 99R-705
(Spalding County, Ga. Super. Ct. Feb. 21, 2000).
399. E-mail from Mike Mears, supra note 397.
400. Id.
401. Transcript of Guilty Plea Proceedings at 4, Souder, No. 99R-705.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id at 4-5.
405. Id. at 5.




410. See GIDEOms BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 12 (describing the case
of an innocent defendant represented by a contract lawyer who met the client the night
before trial and convinced him to plead guilty to save his co-defendant wife). Five
years later the client was released after the post-conviction investigation established his
innocence. Id. For other accounts of jurisdictions in which "meet 'er and plead 'em"
representation is commonplace, see id. at 16; Geri L. Dreiling, "Meet-and-Greet
Pleas" Not Good Enough, ABA J. EREPORT, June 24, 2005, available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/jn24plead.html.
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assigned to represent him. For many innocent defendants, the option of
going to trial with a virtual stranger, who is urging them to plead
guilty, is far too risky. It is unrealistic to expect that all or most
innocent defendants will resist the pressure applied by defense counsel,
family members, the prosecutor, and the judge to plead guilty and
instead go to trial.41 Not surprisingly, many innocent defendants
succumb to the pressure to plead guilty, especially when the defendant
is aware that defense counsel has spent so little time preparing the
defendant's case." 2
G. Myth: Guilty Defendants Escape on Tecmuicalities Because They
Are Protected by Too Many Rights
Most importantly of all, a popular misperception persists that
criminal defendants are blessed with too many rights.4 3 Critics rail
against the exclusionary rule and point to Miranda4 4 and its progeny as
proof that judges overprotect the rights of criminals to the detriment of
the public. 415 Lambasting the majority in Brewer v Williams, 4 16 Chief
Justice Burger echoed the sentiments of many Americans:
411. This is especially true in misdemeanor cases where the process costs are
often more than the punishment. See Alschuler, supra note 70, at 952-56. For a look
at how the system pressured an innocent man to plead guilty after spending six months
in a Georgia jail without being charged or seeing a lawyer, see Monroe Freedman, For
the Poor, Criminal Defense a Matter of Third World Justice, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 11,
1991, at 34. For a more extended look at the various systemic pressures on a defendant
to plead guilty, see Uphoff, supra note 373.
412. For a case that highlights the difficulty of establishing innocence even with
favorable DNA evidence, see State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992). Ricky
C. Hammond's conviction was reversed because, in light of DNA evidence, the
appellate court had doubts about his guilt in light of the DNA evidence. CHRISTOPHER
REINHART, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMB., OLR RESEARCH
REPORT: EXONERATIONS (2005-R-0381) (2005), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/
2005/rpt/2005-R-0381.htm. He ultimately pled guilty to two misdemeanors for time
served despite continuing to insist he was innocent because the prosecutor threatened to
retry him and Hammond did not want to risk conviction and a harsh sentence. Id.
Additional DNA testing confirmed Hammond's innocence. Id. For more about the
case of Ricky C. Hammond, see the Center for Public Integrity, Harmful Error,
Connecticut, http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/states.aspx?st=CT (last visited Apr.
13, 2006).
413. See Diane Carroll, Death Won't Be Sought for Appleby, KAN. CITY STAR,
Nov. 3, 2005, at Al (reporting that the father of a murdered girl complained of the
DA's decision not to seek the death penalty, protesting that defendants have too many
rights).
414. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
415. STEVEN R. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE 4 (1977); Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387,
390 (1996); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
802
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The result in this case ought to be intolerable in any society
which purports to call itself an organized society. It continues
the Court-by the narrowest margin-on the much-criticized
course of punishing the public for the mistakes and misdeeds
of law enforcement officers, instead of punishing the officer
directly, if in fact he is guilty of wrongdoing. It mechanically
and blindly keeps reliable evidence from juries whether the
claimed constitutional violation involves gross police
misconduct or honest human error.
Today's holding fulfills Judge (later Mr. Justice) Cardozo's
grim prophecy that someday some court might carry the
exclusionary rule to the absurd extent that its operative effect
would exclude evidence relating to the body of a murder
victim because of the means by which it was found. In so
ruling, the Court regresses to playing a grisly game of "hide
and seek," once more exalting the sporting theory of criminal
justice which has been experiencing a decline in our
jurisprudence."'
Yet, the reality of the impact of Miranda is a far cry from the
claims of its detractors. Most observers agree that the police have not
been unduly restricted in their ability to obtain confessions.418 Despite
the fears of Miranda's critics, many defendants continue to give
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION 125-27 (1986),
reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437, 439 (1989).
416. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
417. Id. at 415-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
418. Based on a survey of judges, prosecutors, and police officers, as well as a
number of empirical studies, a special committee of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section
concluded that Miranda posed no significant problems for law enforcement. ABA
SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOC., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 28
(1988). There have been a host of commentators who have concluded that the Miranda
decision has not hampered the ability of the police to secure confessions. See, e.g.,
White, supra note 363, at 1246 (stating that an overwhelming majority of suspects
waive Miranda rights and talk to the police); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical
Effect.: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.
500, 501-03 (1996) (finding that Miranda has virtually no adverse affect on law
enforcement); Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-
First Century, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1000, 1011 (2001) (exploring Miranda's impact and
finding it "negligible"). But see Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the
Cops? A Thirty- Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1055 (1998) (arguing that Miranda has had long-term negative effects
on law enforcement effectiveness). For an excellent summary of a series of articles
debating the impact of Miranda in practice, see YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 673-75 (1 1th ed. 2005).
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statements to the police and only rarely are those statements
suppressed.419 Even in those instances when a statement is suppressed,
the prosecution can often still go forward with its case and ultimately
secure a conviction. In the famous "Christian Burial Speech" case,
Brewer v. Williams,42 for example, the decision to suppress the
defendant's confession because of the officer's purposeful violation of
the defendant's rights did not prevent the prosecution from eventually
convicting the defendant.42'
Moreover, limitations on Miranda, together with exceptions to the
exclusionary rule, substantially blunt Miranda's impact.422 Even if a
judge rules that the police deliberately failed to warn a defendant as
Miranda requires, evidence or witnesses discovered as a result of an
unwarned but voluntary statement can still be used against the
accused.423 Similarly, practical considerations severely limit the extent
to which Miranda hampers the police or protects suspects from police
overreaching. Generally, most jurisdictions do not have any
mechanism in place to promptly honor a defendant's request for
counsel.424 Thus, even if a person does request counsel after being
419. See, e.g., George C. Thomas III, Stories About Miranda, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 1959, 1998-2000 (2004) (concluding that most suspects waive their rights and
almost always lose suppression motions).
420. 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977).
421. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (recognizing an inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule and reversing the court of appeals'
decision overturning Williams' conviction).
422. For example, in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Court
held that a defendant's statement following inadequate Miranda warnings could still be
used to impeach the defendant's testimony at trial. See also New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984) (carving out a public safety exception to Miranda). Numerous
commentators have discussed the extent to which subsequent decisions have severely
curtailed Miranda's impact. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99
MICH. L. REv. 975 (2001); Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on
the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1436, 1442 (1987).
423. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 642 (2004) (stating that the
"fruit of the poison tree" doctrine does not apply to evidence obtained as a result of a
statement made in violation of Miranda (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963)).
424. In underfunded jurisdictions, especially those without a public defender
office, where counsel is not assigned until after a court appearance, no counsel would
be available to come to the police station even if a police officer actually wanted to
provide one for the suspect. Even in states with statewide public defender offices, it
would be rare to find an established system set up to provide counsel to an indigent
suspect who asked for counsel at a preindictment interrogation.. The public defender
programs in Wisconsin and Missouri have mechanisms in place to make counsel
available if a suspect requests counsel. Only in the rarest of instances has a public
defender ever been called. E-mail from Cathy Kelly, Training Dir., Mo. State Pub.
Defender Sys., to author (Sept. 27, 2005, 12:19 CST) (on file with author) (stating that
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advised of the right to a lawyer,425 the officer will rarely stop the
interrogation and call an attorney. The officer is more likely to advise
the suspect that an attorney will not be provided until the accused gets
to court.42 6 Even if some system is established to make counsel
available, it is extremely unlikely that police would break off an
interrogation and locate counsel to come to the defendant's aid.
Rather, law enforcement officers either wait until the defendant initiates
contact to resume questioning the suspect4 27 or simply ignore the
defendant's request and continue their interrogation.428
Indeed, despite continued public criticism of Miranda, the law
enforcement community has found it quite easy to evade the protections
Miranda supposedly provides.429 Some police departments have trained
their officers to ignore the defendant's request for counsel.430 Other
officers have been trained to delay giving Miranda warnings until they
it is rare for a sheriff or police officer to call the public defender looking for counsel
and that she has only been called once in twenty years); E-mail from Neil McGinn,
Assistant Wis. State Pub. Defender, to author (Jan. 3, 2006, 15:15 CST) (on file with
author) (stating that his office has been ready to respond with an answering service or
beeper system, but that the police never call). McGinn reports that, in Milwaukee, not
only are public defenders never called by the police to speak to a suspect, but the police
make it impossible for public defenders to gain access to their clients in police custody
until the clients are transferred to the county jail or released. E-mail from McGinn,
supra. Despite calls from family members indicating that a spouse, child, or relative is
in custody and wishes to speak to a lawyer from the public defender's office, public
defenders are denied access to these persons. Id. According to McGinn, the police
claim that they do not have a secure room in the main police department building for
in-custody suspects to meet with an attorney. Id.
425. Assuming, that is, that the request is unambiguous. Officers are free to
ignore an ambiguous request for counsel and continue interrogating the suspect. Davis
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
426. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203-04 (1989) (holding that
Miranda does not require that attorney be producible on call, and that a statement by an
officer that an attorney would be appointed when the suspect went to court was
sufficient).
427. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that a suspect who
has invoked the right to counsel may not be subjected to further interrogation unless the
suspect initiates further communication with the police).
428. Missouri v. Siebert, 542 U.S. 600, 610 n.2 (2004) (recognizing that
police are trained to deliberately ignore a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel).
429. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda:
Modern Interrogators' Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84
MINN. L. REV. 397 (1999). For a look at how the Baltimore police manage to get so
many suspects to incriminate themselves, see DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE
KILLING STREETS 193-207 (1991).
430. For a disturbing look at the manner in which police officers are trained to
ignore requests for counsel and evade Miranda, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving
Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109 (1998).
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secure a confession.43 1 Others have knowingly exploited the fact that,
even if the confession is suppressed, evidence seized or witnesses
discovered as a result of the illegally obtained confession may still be
used against the defendant.432 Not surprisingly, therefore, few in the
law enforcement community were upset when Miranda was upheld in
Dickerson.433 Unlike the general public, the police fully recognize the
limited protection Miranda really offers.
Nonetheless, people continue to mistakenly believe that, as a result
of having so many rights, a sizeable number of guilty defendants are
getting off scot-free, especially on legal technicalities. Certainly
prosecutors and the police-and talk show pundits-can point to cases
where defendants have gone free despite their fervent beliefs that the
defendants were guilty.434 Undoubtedly, there are cases in which the
guilty have gone free, but rarely because of some technicality. In fact,
only a limited number of cases are dismissed on procedural grounds or
because of suppression motions based on constitutional violations."'
431. Siebert, 542 U.S. at 609 (describing the training provided to Rolla,
Missouri police officers to withhold giving Miranda warnings, and noting that national
police training organizations provided similar training).
432. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that the Wong Sun
fruits doctrine does not extend to a prosecution witness discovered as a result of a
statement taken in violation of Miranda).
433. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). For a look at why
the police generally support Miranda and do not wish it overruled, see Leo, supra note
418, at 1021-23.
434. See Boyer, supra note 288, at 42-43, 50-51 (describing the belief of
prosecutors and police in two cases that men freed by DNA were actually guilty); John
Gibeaut, Murderer Freed-Because He Intended To Do It, ABA J. REP., Dec. 9, 2005,
http://www.abanet.org/joumal/ereport/d9murder.html (reporting a "disturbing case" in
which a convicted murderer walked free on appeal because the jury convicted him of
one of two inconsistent theories that were submitted to the jury and the evidence did not
fit that theory). But see supra notes 162-69, 314-15 and accompanying text (discussing
the Brenton Butler acquittal). Prosecutors and the police continued to maintain after the
Butler verdict that a guilty person had gotten off. See Jim Schoettler & Paul Pinkham,
Sheriff State Attorney Want Their Agencies Probed, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville),
Feb. 27, 2001, at Al. It was only after evidence led to two other men that the police
and prosecutors apologized for arresting and prosecuting Butler. Id. The police
continued to deny striking or threatening Butler and claimed to have no idea why Butler
confessed to something he had not done. Jim Schoettler & Paul Pinkham, 2 Men
Linked to Murder After Teen Acquitted, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 22,
2001, at Al. Similarly, in the case of Rolando Cruz, the lead prosecutor and police
involved in the case continued to insist that Cruz was involved in the crime even after
DNA evidence exculpated Cruz and inculpated another convicted murderer who had
earlier confessed to killing the victim Cruz allegedly murdered. See Berlow, supra note
28, at 66-68. For a further look at the Cruz case, see NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra
note 348, at 44-46; SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 153, at 226-32.
435. See, e.g., Steven Duke, Making Leon Worse, 95 YALE L.J. 1405, 1406-
09 (1986) (discussing the reasons for the rare success of suppression motions); The Jury
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Generally, most cases are dismissed, or acquittals occur, because of an
absence of physical evidence or credible witnesses, not as a result of
some legal technicality. Although this is how the adversary system is
supposed to work, it is often hard for victims and the general public to
appreciate that justice has been done when a not-guilty verdict is
returned. Yet in the end, despite the panoply of defendants' rights, the
vast majority of defendants plead guilty or, if they go to trial, are
convicted.436
To much of the public and many of the regular players in the
criminal justice system, the fact that the overwhelming majority of
defendants plead guilty or are found guilty at trial demonstrates that the
system generally works as designed.437 They presume that virtually all
defendants are guilty, so if a defendant enters a guilty plea or goes to
trial and loses, it is to be expected.438 This presumption of guilt is
based on the widely held, but unwarranted, assumption that police and
prosecutors effectively screen out innocent people during the arrest and
charging process.43 9 They believe that, in the rare instances in which
the State does go forward with charges against an innocent person,
defense counsel will normally bring forward the appropriate evidence to
correct the mistake.
Given this perspective, if a defendant's case is dismissed based on
a suppression motion or the defendant is acquitted at trial, it is
understandable why such outcomes are often met with skepticism or
and the Search for Truth: The Case Against Excluding Relevant Evidence at Trial:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 143 (1995) (statement of
Thomas Y. Davies) (reporting that there is a "virtual consensus" that only a tiny
number of all arrests are lost because of the inadmissibility of seized evidence); Thomas
Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the Costs
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NI Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 611, 617 (finding that only about 1 percent of felony
prosecutions were lost due to the suppression of physical evidence); Donald Dripps,
The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 20-22 (2001)
(noting that studies consistently show that successful suppression motions are quite rare
and mostly occur in minor cases).
436. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & HELEN A. GRAZIADEI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCING IN THE STATE COURTS, 1992,
at 9 (1995) (reporting that about 92 percent of all felony state convictions are the result
of guilty pleas); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM
OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 (reporting that 78 percent of defendants who
exercised their right to trial were convicted).
437. Givelber, supra note 338, at 1326-34.
438. For an insightful discussion of the presumption of guilt and the
corresponding assumption that the innocent are rarely convicted, see id. at 1317-34.
439. See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1964) (describing the presumption of guilt and the operation of
screening mechanisms in the Crime Control Model).
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even outrage. Despite the homage paid to the presumption of
innocence, the public has been conditioned to believe that whenever
charges are filed, the defendant is, in fact, guilty.' 4 Consequently, a
dismissal or a not-guilty verdict is often seen as a system failure." 1
Indeed, even judges tend to view an acquittal as a failure of proof and
not an exoneration of an innocent person."
Not only does this presumption of guilt fly in the face of our
deeply rooted commitment to presuming all defendants innocent until
proven guilty, but it rests on a flawed premise that police and
prosecutors efficiently and effectively separate the guilty from the
innocent during the arrest and charging processes. Although some
police departments and prosecutor's offices are excellent, there are too
many examples of police and prosecutorial incompetence and
corruption to realistically assume that, in the overwhelming percentage
of cases, only the guilty are charged." 3 Moreover, even the best police
officers can be misled into arresting and initiating charges against a
suspect identified by an honest, but wrong, eyewitness. Given the fact
that many cases turn on eyewitness identification testimony, the
potential for innocent persons to be caught up in the system is
frighteningly real.
Contrary to this presumption-of-guilt perspective, it is often
difficult to know whether a not-guilty verdict represents a failure by the
440. See William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV.
329, 334 (1995) (citing to articles and cases discussing the pervasive presumption of
guilt once a defendant is arrested).
441. Daniel Givelber makes a similar observation. See Givelber, supra note
338, at 1317, 1328-36.
442. This tendency to view not-guilty verdicts primarily as the system's failure
to convict the guilty follows from the widely held judicial belief that most defendants
are guilty. Bazelon, supra note 338, at 26; see also supra note 227 and accompanying
text. Given this perspective, it is not surprising that courts permit conduct resulting in
a not-guilty verdict to be used against a person in a subsequent case. United States v.
Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (allowing the sentencing court to take into
consideration a defendant's past acquittal to enhance punishment as long as the charged
conduct could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence). On the other hand,
some judges are willing to instruct the jury that "[the government always wins when
justice is done," regardless of whether the verdict is guilty or not. City of Fayetteville
v. Edmark, 801 S.W.2d 275, 281 (1990) (quoting EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B.
BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 15.01 (3d ed. 1977)); see
also MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) Instruction 2-5 cmt. (Matthew
Bender & Co. Inc. 2005) (regarding "The Government as Party").
443. For a damning indictment of the justice system in Oklahoma County, see
FUHRMAN, supra note 321. For a sampling of other reports and articles documenting
police and prosecutorial misconduct, see Terry McDormott & Rafael Perez, The Road
to Rampart, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, at Al; Corey Kilgannon, Abuse by
Prosecutors Is Alleged in Queens, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 2006, at BI; Armstrong &
Mills, supra note 365.
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prosecutor to marshal enough evidence to convict the guilty or the
vindication of an innocent person who was wrongly accused. A recent
review of a sample of cases of inmates in Virginia revealed a 6 percent
rate of wrongful convictions.' 4 This review was of a small group of
cases in which there was a DNA sample that had not been previously
tested, but when tested showed that the defendant's conviction was
erroneous." 5 In each of these cases, the police, prosecutors, and the
jury were convinced-albeit erroneously-that the defendant was
guilty." 6 Admittedly, this is a small sample. Nevertheless, in light of
this review, of the realities of the criminal justice system, and of the
growing number of DNA exonerations nationally, the assumption that
not-guilty verdicts generally are failures of proof is simply not
warranted.
Those who cling to the notion that our criminal justice system
minimizes wrongful convictions by offering defendants too many rights
also fail to appreciate the bleak reality of the right to counsel for many
Americans. Many defendants have no meaningful right to counsel,
thereby rendering many of their rights superfluous. Not only are police
and prosecutors under-resourced and prone using shortcuts, but the
overworked public defender or contract lawyer does not have the time
to do the investigation needed to remove innocent defendants from the
system. Ironically, too often it is counsel's lack of preparation-or
blunders-that deprives a defendant of a meaningful opportunity to
obtain justice." 7  With no meaningful way to challenge the
prosecution's case, defendants like Richard Heath" 8 and Nicholas
444. Editorial, Errors of Justice, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. ED., Dec. 26,
2005-Jan. 8, 2005, at 24.
445. Id.
446. See id.
447. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (stating that
Coleman's lawyers filed a document three days late thereby causing a procedural
default that blocked federal habeas review despite the claim of actual innocence);
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) (holding that the defendant was barred from
calling witnesses because counsel failed to provide timely notice to the prosecution);
Heath v. State, 601 S.E.2d 758, 762 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (allowing the defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea because defense counsel's representation "did nothing to
preserve a meaningful adversarial atmosphere" and his deficiencies prejudiced the
defendant).
448. Richard Heath's contract lawyer conducted no factual or legal
investigation into the charge that Heath caused serious injury by a vehicle. See Heath
v. State, 601 S.E.2d 758, 759-60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). Heath was told he was a drunk
and his only option was to plead guilty. See id. A year later, without any further
meetings with his lawyer, Heath pled guilty and received fifteen years in prison. Heath
v. State, 574 S.E.2d 852, 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). Ultimately, as a result of
counsel's woeful performance, Heath was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
Heath, 601 S.E.2d at 762.
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Souder"9 simply plead guilty. Alternatively, if they go to trial like
Jimmy Ray Bromgard or Ronald Williamson, they are convicted.45
Once convicted, procedural rules frequently bar defendants from
litigating certain issues and may even prevent them from establishing
their innocence.45' In the end, given the realities of the criminal justice
system, the peril of convicting the innocent looms much larger than the
danger of letting the guilty go free.
IV. BARRIERS TO SYSTEMIC REFORMS
A. Entrenched Attitudes
Despite lofty rhetoric, the American criminal justice system does
not ensure all criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Rather, defendants across the country are afforded
representation that varies dramatically from excellent to laughable.
Laughable, that is, except for the sad reality that a defendant's liberty-
and, in some instances-life, depends on the defense mounted by
defense counsel.452 The aspirational goal of equal justice rings hollow
to the many defendants who are provided incompetent counsel or an
overworked and underpaid lawyer who lacks the time and resources to
prepare a defense.
449. See supra notes 397-409 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 113-40 and accompanying text.
451. In re Wilson, 433 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging the harsh
result in a death penalty case involving a prima facie showing of mental retardation but
denying authorization to file a successive habeas petition because counsel missed the
one-year deadline under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act [AEDPA]);
see also infra note 468 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of the
procedural hurdles a defendant must overcome to establish his or her innocence, see
Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Pisoners and Newly
Discovered Evidence in State Courts, 47 Aiz. L. REv. 655 (2005).
452. As Stephen Bright has observed, the protracted judicial debate as to
whether Joe Cannon, the lawyer who admittedly slept through substantial portions of a
capital murder case, provided effective assistance of counsel would, to many people, be
quite humorous were it not for the fact that Cannon's client was on trial for his life.
Stephen Bright, Dir. of the S. Ctr. for Human Rights, Crime, Prison, and the Death
Penalty: The Influence of Race & Poverty, Address at the Washington University
School of Law (Nov. 2, 2005). For a look at the controversy over Cannon's
representation of Calvin Burdine, see Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001)
(en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002). Cannon's inept representation drew
attention to the problem of incompetent lawyering. See, e.g., Alert: Snoozing Lawyer
Ruling Mocks Assistance of Counsel Right, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 2, 2000, at A36
(observing that the panel decision in Burdine meant that "an attorney merely must have
passed the bar and have a pulse to meet a defendant's constitutional right to counsel").
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Yet for many Americans, particularly politicians, this observation,
at least initially, is unlikely to generate any serious concern. The
problem is that many Americans have deeply held attitudes about crime
and the criminal justice system that are, at least in part, a function of
misconceptions or misunderstandings about both the theory and actual
workings of the system. Since Gideon and the Warren Court's
expansion of defendants' rights, there has been a heated debate in this
country about whether courts are coddling criminals and handcuffing
the police or placing appropriate limits on governmental power.453
Politicians and some critics have been quick to blame activist judges for
overprotecting defendants and creating rights where none had
previously existed.454 Law enforcement and prosecutors frequently
have joined in on the attack against "liberal," "soft-on-crime"
judges .455 The rhetoric at times has been quite shrill. 4 6 The fear of
crime-and, in the case of politicians, of being labeled soft on crime-
has for years adversely affected society's ability to rationally discuss
crime and the criminal justice system.457
The American public's fascination with high profile criminal trials,
a fascination fueled by the popular press, talk radio, and cable
television "analysts," has contributed to the perpetuation of myths
about the system and distorted the dialogue about needed reform.
Moreover, cases like those of O.J. Simpson and Kobe Bryant458 have
453. Much of the disagreement has focused on the exclusionary rule and the
merits of allowing the guilty to go free because the constable has blundered. For a
helpful overview of the debate over the exclusionary rule, see Dripps, supra note 433,
at 5-11.
454. See, e.g., Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement.-
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 90th Cong. (1967); Abner J. Mikva, Is Judicial Independence in
Danger?, Impeachment Talk Is Bound to Affect Judges' Decision-Making, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta, Ga.), June 3, 1997 (commenting on attacks on the
judiciary, including calls for impeachment, because judges took antimajoritarian
positions including protecting defendants in criminal cases).
455. See, e.g., Paul English, Bar Panels Seek Ban on DAs in Judicial Races,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 1999 (reporting on district attorneys campaigning
against soft-on-crime judges).
456. See, e.g., Editorial, More Judicial Nitpicking, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 30,
1988, at 8 (criticizing Judge Parks for reversing another conviction and "siding with
defendants").
457. For a look at a few of the many scholars who have discussed the politics
of crime and the apparent need of virtually all American politicians to take "tough-on-
crime" positions, see, for example, MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE
AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004). See also Gershowitz, supra
note 50, at 595-98; Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political,
Social Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing Development of
(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRiM. L. REV. 23 (1997).
458. See People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624 (Colo. 2004).
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only served to reinforce in the minds of many people a number of
commonly held myths: that criminal defendants are afforded too many
rights; that criminal defense lawyers engage in unsavory practices to
free guilty clients; that many guilty defendants get off on technicalities;
and that prosecutors and police are outmatched by defense lawyers who
trick naive jurors into acquitting their guilty clients. Lost in the endless
discussions about these high-profile cases, and what they tell us about
justice in America, is the fact that such cases offer little insight into the
actual workings of the system. Such cases are outliers because only a
tiny fraction of Americans can muster the resources to mount the type
of defense that was available to O.J. Simpson. Such cases distort,
rather than illuminate, because they do not accurately portray the
circumstances that confront the overwhelming number of criminal
defendants or the manner in which the vast majority of cases are
handled in the system.
For much of the public, sensational decisions like Brewer v.
Williams459 foster an attitude of resentment toward federal judicial
intervention in the operation of the state criminal justice systems. Few
people respond favorably to a federal decision overturning a state court
conviction that appears to allow a brutal child murderer to go free.
Predictably, police, prosecutors, and even state court judges frequently
complain about federal judicial meddling.' Once again, the popular
tendency is to blame liberal judges for allowing the guilty to escape
justice at the expense of victims and in the face of the valiant efforts of
local law enforcement officials."
459. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
460. For example, Alabama Supreme Court Associate Justice Tom Parker
blasted his colleagues for missing an opportunity "to actively resist" the
unconstitutional opinion of liberal activists on the United States Supreme Court when
the Alabama court removed a man from death row who had been a minor at the time of
his crime. Tom Parker, Letter to the Editor, Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial
Activism, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006, at 4B.
461. See, e.g., Robert Boczkiewicz & Diana Baldwin, Death Sentences
Stricken; Chemist's Testimony Cited in Appeals Court Ruling, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Aug. 14, 2001, at 1A (reporting that the father of a murder victim chastised appellate
judges for reversing the conviction, calling them "pin-headed people"); Nolan Clay,
Faded Memories, Missing Witnesses May Hamper New Trial, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Feb. 3, 1986, at Al (reporting that the jury foreman found the reversal of the murder
conviction based on withholding of exculpatory evidence impossible to understand and
a technicality that leaves jurors wondering why they wasted their time); FINE, supra
note 140, at 15 (criticizing plea bargaining for allowing the guilty to escape appropriate
punishment).
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B. Legislative and Judicial Indifference
Perception, of course, matters. Myths or popular misconceptions
about the operation of the criminal justice system affect behavior,
especially that of elected officials. The legislative and executive
branches regularly react to popular opinion by seeking to roll back
defendants' rights. 462 Complaints about lengthy appeals and the lag
between conviction and execution led to the elimination of funding for
death penalty resource centers and the passage of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.6 3 This legislation was passed
despite the fact that 68 percent of all death penalty verdicts from 1973
to 1995 were reversed because of serious error.46 To Congress, the
politically expedient solution was to restrict the ability of defendants to
effectively raise claims of error and the jurisdiction of the federal courts
to do anything about such errors, rather than address the problem of
widespread error in death penalty cases. Even now, in the face of
numerous DNA exonerations, when it is obvious that overburdened,
underfunded state criminal justice systems need to be fixed, not sped up
or immunized from challenge, some continue to clamor for shortening
the appeals process or further restricting habeas review.'
462. For example, in the wake of sharp criticism of the Miranda decision,
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501. Paul G. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot.
18 U.S.C § 3501 and the Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REv 175, 194-96
(1999). Indeed, Senator McCellan, the primary sponsor of the measure that would
become § 3501, called the bill "my petition for [a] rehearing" on Miranda. Id. at 195.
The Senate Committee report that accompanied McCellan's bill proclaimed the need for
such legislation because "crime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals who
have voluntarily confessed their crimes are released on mere technicalities." S. REP.
No. 90-1097, at 37 (1968). The report concluded that "the rigid and unflexible
requirements of the majority opinion in the Miranda case [were] unreasonable,
unrealistic, and extremely harmful to law enforcement." ld. at 46. Given Miranda's
unpopularity, it is not surprising that politicians were eager to attack it. As Adam
Gershowitz observed, "elected officials typically have little or no interest in protecting
the rights of criminal defendants." Gershowitz, supra note 50, at 599.
463. See Bright, supra note 83, at 799-801 (discussing the politics of
eliminating funds for the death penalty resource centers and passing the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1) (2000)), despite the fact that the resource centers
had established the innocence of at least three men sentenced to death).
464. See LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 12.
465. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona and his supporters introduced S. 1088, the so-
called Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, which would strip federal courts of
essentially all authority to review state convictions and sentences. Marcia Coyle, More
Fuel Added on Fire Over Federal Habeas Bill, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 17, 2005, at 1. The
Judicial Conference and the American Bar Association oppose the bill. Editorial,
Blinding Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2005, at A30 (arguing that the Streamlined
Procedures Act will take away important protections and make the system less fair and
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Just as hard cases make bad law, '  highly publicized criminal
cases routinely lead to short-sighted, poorly crafted legislation or ill-
advised judicial decisions. 67  As a result of the furor over O.J.
Simpson's acquittal, for example, lawmakers introduced numerous
pieces of legislation, not only in California, but around the country. 6
Although such corrective legislative measures are often very popular
with their constituents, legislators tend to overreact when initiating
systemic changes in response to a sensational case. 469 As a result, the
rights of many may be restricted in an understandable, but often vain,
attempt to prevent further tragedy.
In the end, state legislatures "consistently have failed to address
defects in the criminal process, even when they rise to crisis-level
proportions."47 State legislatures have, for the most part, failed to
adopt measures to improve the workings of the criminal justice system
or fill the gaps left by Supreme Court decisions that specifically reserve
regulation to the legislative branch7' Most importantly, by failing to
adequately fund indigent defense services, legislators severely curtail
more likely to convict the innocent); Editorial, No Airtight Case for Death,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 10, 2005, at 8A. (criticizing the death penalty system as
costly, arbitrary, and a threat to innocent people, but noting that some prosecutors and
politicians continue to blame lengthy delays for dampening the effectiveness of the
death penalty).
466. Exparte Long (1854) 3 W.L.R. 18 (Q.B.).
467. See, e.g., Nichols v. District Court, No. PR-2001-446 (Okla. Crim. App.
July 11, 2001) (affirming the trial court ruling denying Terry Nichols' motion to
dismiss based on double jeopardy, and stating that the court will no longer permit
interlocutory appeal of a double jeopardy motion).
468. See, e.g., Eric C. Johnson, Public Law Research Inst., Proposed Reforms
to the Criminal Justice System as a Reaction to the Simpson Verdict,
http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/fa195tex/simpson.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006)
(detailing a host of legislative initiatives); Maura Dolan, Key State Panel to Consider
Major Changes for Trials, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al (discussing proposed
legislation in light of the O.J. Simpson case); Stephen Labaton, Lessons of Simpson
Case Are Reshaping the Law, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 6, 1995, at Al (discussing the extent
to which the Simpson case generated calls across the country for overhauling various
aspects of the criminal process).
469. See Associated Press, Man Guilty in Car Wash Abduction and Killing,
USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 2005, at 3A (noting that the killing of Carlie Brucia, whose
abduction was captured on videotape and shown on national television, "spurred the
introduction of federal and state legislation to crack down on probation violators"); see
also Marie Price, Slain Teen's Mother Touts Bail Bill, TULSA WORLD (Okla.), Dec. 9,
2005, at A13 (describing proposed legislation including "Caitlin's Law" and some
restrictive bail provisions following the abduction and murder of a sixteen-year-old by a
man free on bond).
470. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure:
Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1, 45 (2001).
471. See id. at 45-46.
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the extent to which most defendants can actually utilize the rights that
have been given to them.472 Legislative indifference to fixing the
criminal justice system reflects political reality. Those persons most
likely to be erroneously convicted or shortchanged by the criminal
justice system have the least political clout-poor, young minority
men.4 73 Consequently, systemic reform, if it is to come at all, is more
474likely to come from the courts.
Unfortunately, as cases such as Illinois v Fishe?75 and United
States v Ruiz, 476 demonstrate, the U.S. Supreme Court has for some
time been disinclined to use its supervisory powers or to invoke due
process to regulate the police or to check prosecutorial power.4 77 In
part, the Court's reluctance to exercise more control over the police
and prosecutors reflects a judicial philosophy far different from that of
Justices Warren, Brennan, Marshall, and others who forged Gideon,
Miranda, Wade, and similar decisions. Some on the current Supreme
Court clearly believe that crafting measures to control the players
within the criminal justice system is largely within the province of the
legislative branch.478 Yet, the failure on the part of at least some on the
Court to appreciate the true workings of the system may also contribute
to the current Supreme Court's unwillingness to act more decisively to
addressing systemic problems.4 79 Although some members of the Court
472. See Stuntz, supra note 40, at 9-11; Brown, supra note 297, at 806.
473. See Stuntz, supra note 40, at 28-29, 51 n. 167.
474. Other commentators have made this observation. See, e.g., Dripps, supra
note 468, at 46; Gershowitz, supra note 50, at 594-98.
475. 540 U.S. 544 (2004) (per curiam).
476. 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
477. See, e.g., United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (holding that
supervisory power could not be invoked to reverse a conviction in order to discipline
offending prosecutors because the offending conduct was harmless in the case); United
States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding that the government's intentional
exploitation of the standing doctrine did not justify exclusion of evidence because the
defendant's own Fourth Amendment rights were not violated); see also Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 432 (1992) ("[Slupervisory
power increasingly has been viewed as an unwarranted judicial intrusion into the
exclusive domain of a coordinate branch of the government.").
478. For a forceful presentation of this view, see Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428, 449-65 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Stuntz, supra note 40, at
76 (opining that the judicial reluctance to impose restraints on the criminal process
"seems to have been motivated by a desire not to trench on the prerogatives of the
politicians").
479. See the discussion of Ruiz, supra notes 395-410 and accompanying text.
It may also reflect, as Christopher Slobogin suggests, the Court's unfair pro-
prosecution bias. Christopher Slobogin, Having It Both Ways: Proof That the U.S.
Supreme Court Is "Unfairly" Prosecution-Oriented, 48 FLA. L. REV. 743 (1996).
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acknowledge that too many defendants receive subpar representation,4"'
the Court generally has applied Strickland v. Washington's8 1 stringent
standard to determine ineffectiveness of counsel claims narrowly. 482
Thus, despite widespread horrific lawyering, the Supreme Court and
other federal appellate judges routinely invoke the prejudice prong of
Strickland, harmless error, or the procedural default doctrine483 to
sustain convictions even though the State's proof may not have been
subjected to meaningful challenge.
The Supreme Court's indifference to the plight of the many
defendants, including the innocent, caught up in our under-resourced,
plea-bargain-driven criminal justice system is distressing. It is
particularly worrisome, for example, that the Supreme Court still does
not recognize that the test it fashioned in Youngblood not only fails to
protect the rights of many innocent citizens, but it in fact sanctioned the
prolonged incarceration of an innocent man. In llinois v. Fisher,84
however, the Court reaffirmed the test created in Youngblood, holding
that the State's destruction of potentially useful evidence does not
violate due process absent a showing of bad faith by the police or the
480. See Justice John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States, Address at the ABA Thurgood Marshall Awards Dinner Honoring Abner
Mikva (Aug. 6, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/sp_08-06-05.html (observing that a significant number of defendants in capital
cases have not been provided with fully competent counsel and that there are "serious
flaws in our administration of criminal justice"); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills,
O'Connor Questions Fairness of Death Penalty: Justice Rethinling the Law She
Shaped, CHI. TRm., July 4, 2001, § 1, at 1 (reporting that Justice O'Connor
acknowledges that criminal defendants often receive inadequate representation).
481. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
482. As interpreted, the "ineffective assistance doctrine tolerates a very low
activity level by defense attorneys." Stuntz, supra note 40, at 20; see, e.g., Mitchell v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for
refusing to grant certiorari and give life to the Strickland standard in a capital case in
which court-appointed counsel failed to interview any potential mitigating witnesses or
present any mitigating evidence despite the existence of extensive mitigating evidence).
For an extended discussion of the extent to which the Strickland standard inadequately
safeguards the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, see William S.
Geimer, A Decade of Strickland 's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of
the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91 (1995); Meredith J. Duncan, The
(So-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform,
2002 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 12-29; Bright, supra note 83, at 828-32; COLE, supra note 11,
at 78-79.
483. See, e.g., LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 12 (finding that
reviewing courts do not effectively keep serious error from recurring nor do courts
catch all serious error in part because of stringent rules limiting reversals even in cases
marred by error); see also Bright, supra note 83, at 796-832 (describing the difficult
struggle facing indigent defendants trying to establish error in post-conviction
proceedings).
484. 540 U.S. 544 (2004).
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State. 48 5  The fact that Fisher specifically requested that particular
physical evidence be produced did not eliminate his need to show bad
faith on the part of the police. 46 Because the defense did not make any
such showing, the Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Court of
Illinois that had overturned Fisher's conviction.4"7
The Fisher court reiterated that the Youngblood bad faith
requirement applied regardless of the centrality of the contested
evidence to the prosecution or the defense. 48  Thus, even if the
destroyed or lost evidence is a defendant's "only hope for exoneration"
or "essential to and determinative of the outcome of the case," due
process is violated only if bad faith can be shown. 489 This nearly
insurmountable test virtually insulates the police from any judicial
oversight with respect to the collection and handling of forensic
evidence. It encourages, or at least tolerates, an unacceptable level of
carelessness in the face of the growing number of DNA exonerations
and other cases of wrongful convictions. Indeed, as Youngblood's own
saga dramatically demonstrates, police mishandling of critical evidence
compromises the pursuit of justice. The wrong person can be arrested,
prosecuted, and convicted while the guilty person goes free. Given all
of the other problems highlighted by this Article, the Court's continued
reliance on a flawed, overly broad test is inexcusable. In the face of
the growing awareness of the importance of forensic evidence in
ensuring the reliability and accuracy in the criminal justice system, the
Court should adopt the more nuanced test proposed by Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Youngblood.49°
Refreshingly, some state courts have rejected Youngblood and held
the police in their states more accountable.4 91  In spite of popular
485. Id. at 549.
486. Id. at 545.
487. Id. at 548-49.
488. Id. at 549.
489. Id. at 548-49 (citations omitted).
490. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 61 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion in Fisher, continued to distance
himself from the bad faith requirement, insisting that in some cases, even without a bad
faith showing, the loss of critical evidence would render a trial fundamentally unfair.
See Fisher, 540 U.S. at 549 (Stevens, J., concurring). Not surprisingly, Justice
Stevens did not find that the destruction of the cocaine that Fisher wanted retested was
critical because it had already been tested four times. See id. at 545 (majority opinion);
id. at 549 (Stevens, J., concurring). What is surprising is that Stevens equated Fisher's
case with that of Youngblood, implying that he still maintained that the loss of
Youngblood's evidence was not critical. See id. Perhaps Justice Stevens remains
unaware that Youngblood was, in fact, innocent.
491. Daniel R. Dinger, Note, Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance to
Prosecute?." State Rejections of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v.
2006:739 817
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opinion and negative editorials, some state courts have continued to
render decisions affording defendants broader protection than provided
by the United States Constitution.492 Moreover, some state courts have
required the police to institute measures-such as videotaping
interrogations493-designed to improve the operation of the criminal
justice system. In addition, some state courts have sought to address
inadequate funding for indigent defendants by declaring certain
systemic practices invalid and ordering that remedial action be taken by
the State.494 As a result of upholding the rights of criminal defendants,
some elected state court judges have drawn considerable fire, including
being voted out of office.495
On the other hand, many state courts have followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court and have refused to interpret their own
constitutions to provide broader protection to the citizens of their states.
These courts have marched in lockstep with the Supreme Court and
have recognized doctrines like the good faith exception that limit the
impact of the exclusionary rule.496 So too, many state courts have
adopted and strictly applied an ineffective assistance of counsel standard
that, like Strickland, rarely offers a defendant relief despite counsel's
inept performance.497 Like the Supreme Court, too many state courts
Youngblood, 27 AM. J. CuM. L. 329, 348 n. 127 (2000) (noting that, as of January 1,
2000, thirteen states had ruled that a bad faith requirement was not a prerequisite to a
successful challenge to the state's loss or destruction of evidence).
492. See, e.g., Stringer v. State, 491 So. 2d 837, 841 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson,
J., concurring) (declining to adopt the good faith exception announced in United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD &
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS
§ 34.02(c) (4th ed. 2000).
493. lI re Jerrell, C.J., 2005 WI 105, 283 Wis. 2d 145, 699 N.W.2d 110
(mandating videotaping of all custodial interrogations of juveniles).
494. See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993); Arnold v.
Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Ark. 1991); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal
Appeals, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1139 (Fla. 1990); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla.
1990); Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 849 (Kan. 1987); State v. Smith, 681 F.2d
1374 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Robinson, 465 A.2d 1214, 1217 (N.H. 1983).
495. Abner J. Mikva, Judcial Pest Control, 148 N.J. L.J. 1059 (1997) (noting
that Chief Justice Rose Bird of California was denied a second term by the voters
because of negative publicity based on her decisions in several death penalty cases).
496. See, e.g., McCary v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 637, 644 (Va. 1984)
("We embrace the recently announced 'good faith' exception to the exclusionary
rule.").
497. Matthew J. Fogelman, Justice Asleep Is Justice Denied. Why Dozing
Defense Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and Should Be Deemed Per Se
Prejudicial, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 67, 81 (2002) ("The states have almost uniformly
adopted the Strickland standard.. .. "); COLE, supra note 11, at 76-81 (lamenting the
extent to which Stricklandand its state equivalents tolerate abysmal defense lawyering);
Green, supra note 83, at 1189-90 (describing Heath v. State, 574 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct.
818
HeinOnline  -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 818 2006
Convicting the Innocent
tolerate systemic shortcomings that increase the likelihood of wrongful
convictions.
C. The Narrow Perspective of Some Stakeholders
There are other stakeholders in the criminal justice system with
interests and attitudes that may be incompatible with needed reform.
Increasingly, victims' groups have an active voice in debates about the
criminal justice system. Although victims have a strong interest in
seeing the right person brought to justice, victims' groups, along with
the public, have been conditioned to believe that the system's problems
lie in overprotecting defendants and underprotecting crime victims.
Given the myths and misperceptions discussed in this Article, it may be
difficult to persuade victims that measures designed to increase
procedural protections for defendants will actually increase the
accuracy and reliability of the fact-finding process.
Other stakeholders may have narrower interests. For example,
following a successful bail project operated by the University of
Maryland Access to Justice Clinic, legislation was introduced in
Maryland to provide representation at the initial hearing when bail was
set.49 s This reform measure would have reduced jail overcrowding by
increasing the number of defendants released on bail pending trial.
Unnecessary pretrial incarceration works a hardship on many low-
income defendants and their families. It is particularly problematic for
innocent defendants whose cases are eventually dismissed. Yet, in spite
of the merits of this bail reform measure, the bail bond industry in
Maryland played a leading role in frustrating legislative action."'
Similarly, the growth of private prisons in America has introduced
another voice in the debate on crime and criminal justice reform.
Private prisons make more money when cells are full. Those who run
and own stock in private prisons have an economic interest that may
conflict with the best interests of society. Good sentencing policies and
practices may be trumped in the process.
App. 2002), rev'd, 588 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. 2003) as "the rare and welcome exception" to
the usual judicial toleration of deficient defense representation). Although this decision
was reversed and remanded by the Georgia Supreme Court, State v. Heath, 588 S.E.2d
738 (Ga. 2003), the Court of Appeals subsequently reinstated its decision allowing
Richard Heath to withdraw his guilty plea because defense counsel's deficient
representation prejudiced him. Heath v. State, 601 S.E.2d 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
498. See Colbert et al., supra note 380, at 1749-63.
499. Id. at 1741,1763-64, 1770.
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D. The Failure to Appreciate the Need for Change
Given widespread concerns about crime and the attendant
popularity of tough-on-crime positions, most policymakers are reluctant
to promote systemic reform that might be criticized as pro-defendant.
Moreover, those who call for systemic change must overcome the
entrenched attitudes that most Americans have about crime and the
criminal justice system. For most Americans, our system of justice is
the best in the world and only rarely, if ever, convicts the innocent. If
we err, it is in freeing the guilty because we are too protective of
defendants' rights and too lenient on criminals. It is understandable,
then, why the lessons of Youngblood and of other DNA exonerations
are so difficult for many to absorb. In light of all of the protections
built into our system, news accounts of innocent persons serving years
in prison seem almost incomprehensible.
For some defenders of the system, the answer is to simply deny
that there is a serious problem.) ° In their view, isolated cases of rogue
cops or prosecutors are the explanation for these tragic mistakes, but
there are no widespread problems or structural deficiencies. Many
defenders of the status quo fail to admit or acknowledge the
significance of the flaws in our system; they hope that, by minimizing
the problems, attention is diverted elsewhere.'O°
For others, the response is to politicize the situation. For
example, former Illinois Governor Ryan's decisions to impose a death
penalty moratorium and then to issue a blanket commutation converting
all death sentences to life without parole were criticized as merely
political maneuvers designed to divert attention from his own
misdeeds. 502 Similarly, the Daily Oklahoman criticized death penalty
foes for improperly twisting Ryan's moratorium and then exploiting the
500. See, e.g., Joshua Marquis, We Shouldn't Believe Death Row Is Full of
Innocents, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 2002, at 5J (insisting that number of
wrongfully convicted is "tiny"); Berlow, supra note 28, at 70 (noting that John Justice,
the former president of the National District Attorneys Association, and fellow
supporters, claim that wrongful death sentences are aberrations); Maurice Possley &
Steve Mills, Clemency for All; Ryan Commutes 164 Death Sentences to Life in Prison
Without Parole, CHI. TRrB., Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 1 (reporting Governor Ryan's
observations that state prosecutors deny that the system is broken or say that the
problem is small).
501. Adam Liptak, Prosecutors See Limits to Doubt in Capital Cases, N.Y.
TiMES, Feb 24, 2003, at Al (reporting the claims of some prosecutors that the number
of actual innocent persons being exonerated has been inflated).
502. See Possley & Mills, supra note 500 (interviewing family members and
friends of murder victims); David E. Rovella, Execution Ban Deemed Moot, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 21, 2000, at A 1; Eric Zorn, Ryan's Sincerity Hard to Doubt If You Do the
Math, CHI. TRn., Jan. 9, 2003, § 2, at 1 (citing a letter received from a local reader).
820
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misdeeds of police chemist Joyce Gilchrist to promote their agenda of
abolishing the death penalty.5°3 Still others charge that incidents of
wrongful convictions are overblown and represent nothing more than
the continued meddling of liberal judges bent on helping criminal
defendants .
Much of the difficulty in securing agreement about the need for
systemic change is the competitive, contentious nature of the
adversarial system of criminal justice. The regular players in that
system-the police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, correctional officials
and judges-frequently are locked in bitter battles that do not inspire
cooperation or communication. 5 Not surprisingly, the perspective of
players in the system about the need for change is shaped by the extent
to which they perceive that the likely change will adversely affect their
ability to carry out their particular role. Constructive discussions about
systemic reform are often hampered, therefore, because of excessively
adversarial positions taken by systemic players who tend to look at
suggested reform only from their own perspective. This is especially
true of some prosecutors and the law enforcement community, who
503. Editorial, Debating Death; Halt to Executions a Troubling Idea, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 21, 2000; Editorial, Innocent by Association; Groupthink Drives
Death Row Debate, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 2, 2001.
504. In practice, it is hard to identify these so-called liberal judges, especially
elected ones, who will go out of their way to "help" guilty defendants. Most judges are
reluctant to grant suppression motions, particularly in serious cases and especially when
doing so will derail the prosecution's case. Even federal judges draw unwanted
criticism by granting suppression motions. For a highly publicized example of the ire
that a judge may generate by granting a suppression motion, see U.S. v. Bayless, 201
F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Federal District Judge Harold Baer, Jr. granted a suppression
motion that unleashed a firestorm of controversy, including a letter sent to President
Clinton signed by over two hundred members of Congress asking him to join them in
calling for Judge Baer to resign. Id. at 122-23. Presidential candidate Bob Dole joined
in the controversy by stating that if Judge Baer did not resign, he should be impeached.
Id. at 123. Judge Baer subsequently granted the government's motion to reconsider and
reversed his suppression ruling. Id. The Second Circuit affirmed his decision, holding
that Judge Baer's decision not to recuse himself in the face of the adverse publicity was
not plain error. Id. at 120.
505. However, some commentators have noted that the criminal justice system
is marked by a high degree of cooperative behavior among the regular players. See,
e.g., Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game:
Organizational Co-optation of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 15, 20-21 (1967).
Plea bargaining does drive the system and requires certain cooperation that works to the
benefits of the regular players. Nonetheless, jurisdictions vary markedly in how
adversarial or cooperative the relations are between the regular players. Moreover,
cooperating in plea bargaining does not translate into similar attitudes regarding needed
reform. For a discussion of the tendency of the players in the criminal justice system to
take sides and the difficulty of securing cooperation to improve the system, see Peter
Loge, How to Talk Crimey and Influence People: Language and the Politics of
Criminal Justice Policy, 53 DRAKE L. REv. 693, 704-09 (2005).
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frequently see most reform as aiding the guilty at the expense of their
power to successfully fight crime. Thus, some in the system are
willing to go to great lengths to defend it and deny the need for any
significant change for fear that acknowledging the need for change will
benefit the other side.5 °6
As already discussed, the police have vigorously resisted judicial
efforts to rein them in. Similarly, prosecutors have reacted
aggressively to claims of prosecutorial misconduct and have sought to
insulate themselves from judicial or third-party control. 7  Some
prosecutors willingly strike "foul blows" in order to secure the
convictions of defendants they believe are guilty."' Renouncing the
506. See Liptak, supra note 501 (discussing prosecutorial resistance to DNA
testing and the Missouri Attorney General's argument that it would be constitutionally
proper to execute an innocent person). Similarly, Ohio prosecutors' organizations have
opposed making a postconviction DNA testing program permanent, arguing that two
years was enough time for inmates to seek such testing and that the police should not
have to save evidence "forever." Editorial & Comment, Hope for the Inmocent,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 7, 2005, at 8A (criticizing prosecutors for their opposition
and urging that the DNA testing program be continued); see also infra notes 496-501
and accompanying text. For an extensive look at the professional, psychological, and
personal factors that explain prosecutorial resistance to post-conviction claims of
innocence, see Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal., Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-
Conviction Claims of Innocense, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134-48 (2004).
507. For example, Attorney General Richard Thornburgh and his successor,
Janet Reno, took the position that the U.S. Attorney General could, by rule, exempt
federal prosecutors from state ethics provisions. See Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of
Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the
Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 460, 473-77 (1996). Subsequently, the
Department of Justice filed suit to challenge a disciplinary action lodged against an
Assistant U.S. Attorney who acted in violation of the state version of Model Rule 4.2.
State and federal courts have rejected the Department's position. In re Doe, 801 F.
Supp. 478 (D.N.M. 1992); United States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964 (D.D.C. 1993),
aff'd, 54 F.3d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997) (per
curiam). For a detailed look at this controversy, see Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K.
Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors.: The Controversies Over the Anti-
Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PIrrT L. REv. 291 (1992).
508. "[The government lawyer] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-
indeed, he should do so. But, while he make strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Unfortunately, not
all prosecutors heed this directive. See ifra notes 567-73 and accompanying text.
James S. Liebman found that prosecutorial misconduct was a recurring problem in his
extensive study of death penalty cases. See LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra
note 12, at 20. Indeed, Liebman and his fellow authors noted that 17 percent of the
cases in their study that were reversed involved the suppression of exculpatory
evidence. Id. at 5. For an extended look at the role of prosecutorial misconduct in
wrongful convictions, see Steve Weinberg, The Center for Public Integrity, Anatomy of
Misconduct (June 26, 2003), http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/report.aspx?aid=33.
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vision of prosecutor as a minister of justice,5" some prosecutors believe
that they are justified in doing whatever it takes to win because they are
locked in a noble war against an enemy who will do anything to secure
a dismissal or acquittal.51° This warrior mindset inspires attacks against
judges who rule against them51 and the pursuit of a legislative agenda
that maximizes sentences, increases prosecutorial discretion, and limits
procedural protections for defendants.
The competitive nature of the system, however, does not just
adversely affect prosecutors. Some defense lawyers purposefully
engage in dilatory tactics that benefit their clients. Other defense
lawyers, particularly those representing wealthier clients, file numerous
motions or take advantage of little-used procedural measures to make
life miserable for the prosecutor. 2 Indeed, some criminal defense
509. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 3-1.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1993); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004).
510. See Martin H. Belsky, On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U.
L. REv. 1485, 1491-94 (1984) (reviewing DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION (1982), which reflects the authors' view that prosecutors are
engaged in a war against crime that demands they play a warrior role); Abbe Smith,
Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355,
376-91 (2001) (describing the pressure to win for prosecutors and the corrupting
influences of that perspective). For a chilling account of Bob Macy, the legendary
district attorney of Oklahoma County, who boasted that he had sent more defendants to
death row than any other prosecutor in the country, see FUHRMAN, supra note 321. As
Fuhrman's book documents, Bob Macy epitomized the warrior prosecutor, whose win-
at-any-cost mentality led him to withhold exculpatory material, to knowingly
misrepresent evidence, to condone and tolerate false testimony, and to routinely engage
in improper arguments. Id. For a similar portrayal of Macy, see Ken Armstrong,
'Cowboy Bob' Ropes Wins-But at Considerable Cost, CHI. TRIn., Jan. 10, 1999, § 1,
at 13.
511. See, e.g., Paul English, Prosecutors Urge Voters to Oust Appeals Judge,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 13, 1994 (reporting that the Oklahoma District Attorney
Association led the fight to unseat Oklahoma Appellate Court Judge Charles Chapel).
In Oklahoma County, District Attorney Bob Macy openly campaigned to defeat judges
who drew his ire. See Ed Godfrey, Two Ousted Judges Make No Apologies, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 5, 1998, at 12; Paul English, Bar Panels Seek Ban on DAs in
Judicial Races, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 1999; FUHRMAN, supra note 321, at 30.
512. Attorney Dick DeGuerin's creative use of motions in his defense of Tom
DeLay has included a successful motion to recuse the presiding judge, Bob Perkins,
claiming that the judge's past contributions to national and local Democrats raised an
appearance of impropriety. Sylvia Moreno, Defense Wins New Judge in DeLay Case,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A3. Moreno also reported that DeLay's legal defense
costs were at least $260,000 in the third quarter of the year alone. Id. As William
Stuntz has observed, the constitutionalization of criminal procedure raises the cost of
prosecuting wealthier defendants because their lawyers can litigate so many issues. See
Stuntz, supra note 40, at 4, 27-31. Busy prosecutors are understandably reluctant to
support any change that they fear may make it more difficult and costly to secure
convictions.
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lawyers resort to blatantly unethical tactics to help their clients win.513
Just as prosecutors may be reluctant to support systemic changes,
defense lawyers also may be cautious about supporting systemic change
fearing that such change is likely to further dilute the rights of criminal
defendants.
Nevertheless, win-at-any-cost prosecutors, together with those
police officers who see judges as the gullible protectors of the guilty,
are least likely to respond enthusiastically to calls for systemic reform.
Indeed, the resistance to the reform measures called for by the Ryan
Commission in Illinois has been led by prosecutors." 4 Amazingly,
some prosecutors have aggressively blocked defendants' efforts to
obtain DNA testing. 15 Additionally, in a number of cases, prosecutors
have fought to uphold convictions despite DNA results that were clearly
exculpatory.516
513. See, e.g., Att'y Grievances Comm'n v. Kent, 653 A.2d 909 (Md. 1995).
Kent was representing a defendant in a murder case and went to see a represented
codefendant who had already cut a deal to testify against Kent's client. 1d. at 912.
Kent persuaded the codefendant to back out of the deal, fire his lawyer, and retain Kent
in an effort to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. 912-13. That effort was unsuccessful and
the codefendant received two life sentences instead of the thirty-year sentence he would
have received. Id. at 913. Mr. Kent was disbarred. Id. at 922.
514. See, e.g., Christi Parsons & Ray Long, Senate OKs Death Penalty Bill,
Ryan Would Veto GOP's Package, CHI. TRn., Dec. 5, 2002, § 2, at 1; Possley &
Mills, supra note 500; see also Bright, supra note 83, at 787 (describing the opposition
of the Georgia district attorney's association to a bill creating a statewide public
defender system, calling it "the greatest threat to the proper enforcement of the criminal
laws of this state ever presented").
515. For example, in the case of Lonnie Erby, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney
Office fought for six years to block Erby's access to DNA testing. The testing finally
exonerated him and Erby was released after serving seventeen years in prison.
Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Lonnie Erby, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
case/displayprofile.php?id= 136 (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). Similarly, in the case of
Larry Johnson, the St. Louis Circuit Attorney Office fought to prevent him from
obtaining DNA testing for six years. He was finally exonerated on 2002 after serving
eighteen years in prison. Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Larry Johnson,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=109 (last visited Feb.
19, 2006); see also William S. Sessions, DNA Tests Can Free the Innocent, How Can
We Ignore That?, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2003, at B2 (criticizing prosecutors for
opposing DNA testing and finding such opposition, from his perspective as former FBI
director, inconsistent with their professional duty and moral responsibility to seek the
truth).
516. See Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 703, 716-17 n.77 (2004) (discussing cases of prosecutorial resistance to
DNA results). See generally Medwed, supra note 506. For a chilling look at the
conduct of Oklahoma County prosecutors in fighting to uphold the conviction of Robert
Miller despite DNA results that showed he had not raped the women he was accused of
raping and murdering, see SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 153, at 101-37.
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The standard prosecutorial reaction to the phenomenon of
wrongful convictions is to insist that only in rare circumstances are the
innocent being convicted.517 After all, no one really wants to believe
that he or she played a role in sending an innocent person to prison.
Certainly it is the rare prosecutor who would knowingly seek to convict
an innocent person.i" Understandably, then, most prosecutors are
troubled to learn that a person they successfully prosecuted was, in fact,
innocent. Not surprisingly, some prosecutors-and some victims-
adamantly refuse to accept that a particular defendant was wrongfully
convicted.519
Finally, like most prosecutors, many judges may be reluctant to
acknowledge the fact that our system sends innocent people to prison. 2°
That also is quite understandable. Judges do not want to believe that
they are responsible for imposing harsh sentences on persons who are,
in fact, innocent. Thus, it is not surprising, given their role and
responsibilities in our system of justice, that judges would tend to have
considerable faith in the system's ability to separate the guilty from the
innocent. In light of the DNA exonerations, certainly some judges
recognize the need to reexamine the system and make needed
improvements.52 Unfortunately, others are likely to cling to the belief
517. See Liptak, supra note 501; Marquis, supra note 500. In the early 1990s,
I appeared at a debate at the University of Oklahoma with Cleveland County District
Attorney Tully McCoy who confidently assured the crowd that there were no innocent
people in prison in Oklahoma. See Boyer, supra note 288, at 51-52 (describing the
"white-hat syndrome," which makes coming to terms with having put an innocent
person behind bars "a very, very difficult thing to grapple with").
518. See Smith, supra note 510, at 388-91 (arguing that the culture of winning
in prosecutors' offices overrides everything else, including concerns about convicting
the innocent). As Albert Alschuler observed, prosecutors "seem to exhibit a
remarkable disregard for the danger of false conviction." Albert W. Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 62 (1968). To Alschuler,
this attitude derives from the fact that the decision to charge generally also includes a
personal judgment that the defendant is guilty so that the trial is just "a technical
obstacle standing between the defendant and the punishment he deserves." Id. at 63.
519. In Mark Bravo's case, supra notes 26, 313, infra notes 549, 574, the
prosecuting attorney who tried the case remained unconvinced of Bravo's innocence
despite his exclusion by DNA. See Kennedy, supra note 26. Four years after he was
convicted of rape, Brian Piszczek was exonerated by DNA. McCarty, supra note 303.
The victim remained unconvinced of his innocence saying, "I'm still 100% sure it was
him .... I was there. I know. I don't care what those DNA tests say. There was
nobody else." Id.; see also supra note 434 and accompanying text.
520. For a discussion of the system's reluctance to acknowledge that innocent
defendants are being convicted, see Givelber, supra note 338, at 1334-36.
521. For example, Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr. of the North Carolina
Supreme Court sponsored the round table discussion that led to the establishment of the
North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission. See Christine C. Mumma, The North
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that the number of innocent persons who plead or are found guilty at
trial is too small to merit serious attention. As discussed below, in the
face of a growing number of DNA exonerations, such an attitude is
inconsistent with our stated commitment to equal justice or with the
"maxim of the law ... it is better that ninety-nine ... offenders
should escape, than that one innocent man should be condemned. " 5 22
E. Our Flawed System Primarily Affects the Poor and the Powerless
Finally, there are some who acknowledge that our system is
flawed, but who argue, nevertheless, that innocent defendants who are
wrongfully convicted are just the inevitable byproduct of our system of
"rough justice." As Judge Richard Posner wrote:
I can confirm from my own experience as a judge that
indigen11L U~t;11UW1LS dfd gellely ralier poorly representeu.
But if we are to be hardheaded we must recognize that this
may not be entirely a bad thing. The lawyers who represent
indigent criminal defendants seem to be good enough to
reduce the probability of convicting an innocent person to a
very low level. If they were much better, either many guilty
people would be acquitted or society would have to devote
much greater resources to the prosecution of criminal cases.
A bare-bones system for the defense of indigent criminal
defendants may be optimal. 23
Thus, in Posner's view, innocent defendants like Larry
Youngblood, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, or Ronald Williamson may pay a
high cost, but society as a whole benefits from an inexpensive system
that ensures that guilty defendants get what they deserve-incarceration.
To Posner, providing better representation to the poor would not only
cost a great deal more, but would lead to more guilty persons going
free. That consequence, in turn, would actually cause more societal
harm because when guilty persons go free, they would commit new
crimes.524
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined by a Common
Cause, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 647, 648-49 (2004).
522. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting THOMAS STARKIE,
EVIDENCE 756 (1824)).
523. RicHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
163-64 (1999).
524. For a similar argument contending that the death penalty deters crime and
the failure to use it is morally unacceptable because a regime with capital punishment
produces fewer arbitrary deaths than a regime without the death penalty, see Cass
826
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Contrary to Posner's argument-and popular opinion-the lesson
of the DNA exonerations and other wrongful convictions is that the
system is more flawed than its supporters acknowledge.525 Posner
grossly overestimates the ability and willingness of police and
prosecutors to screen out the innocent. Additionally, Posner's faith in
the system minimizes the reality of bureaucratic shortcutting,
incompetence, and the pressure to solve cases. Moreover, he turns a
blind eye to the reoccurring police scandals and incidents of
prosecutorial misconduct that increase the danger that innocent
defendants will be victimized.5 26  Indeed, no one who reads Mark
Fuhrman's damning indictment of the criminal justice system in
Oklahoma County can confidently assert that the risk of convicting the
innocent in that jurisdiction is minimal.27
Similarly, Posner's claim that indigent defense lawyers are "good
enough" to ensure that the probability of convicting the innocent is very
low is, at best, unduly optimistic. 5 28 His assessment may hold true in
some adequately funded jurisdictions, but in most others, it is mere
wishful thinking. Even though the vast majority of defendants in this
country plead guilty, a claim that all or almost all of them are guilty
defies the harsh realities of the plea-bargain-driven system that
defendants like Arthur Lee Whitfield 529 and Nicholas Souder
530
experience. Given the widespread denial of effective assistance of
counsel to many Americans, we have no way of definitely determining
just how many innocent people have been-or will be-wrongfully
convicted. 31
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance
of Life-Life Trade-Offs (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Research
Paper No. 05-06, 2005), available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract=691447.
525. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at v, 3-4 (stating that the
indigent defense system is in a state of crisis by putting poor persons at constant risk of
wrongful convictions, a phenomenon "much more common than once believed");
Brown, supra note 297, at 804 ("[D]ocumented wrongful convictions are likely only a
small portion of the total number of wrongful convictions."); Editorial, Errors of
Justice, supra note 442 (stating that if a 6 percent error rate in the sample reviewed is
"anything close to representative, then wrongful convictions in major felony cases may
be far more routine than believed").
526. See supra notes 321, 323-24, 365, 443, 508-10, 516; infra notes 567-74
and accompanying text.
527. FUHRMAN, supra note 321.
528. POSNER, supra note 523, at 164.
529. See supra notes 386-95 and accompanying text.
530. See supra notes 397-409 and accompanying text.
531. See Tulsky, supra note 29 (concluding that inept lawyers were pressuring
arguably innocent defendants into guilty pleas and quoting Professor Laurie Levenson
as saying that the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty to crimes "happens
all of the time").
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Nevertheless, the data generated by the FBI since it began forensic
DNA testing in 1989 provides powerful support for the proposition that
the number of innocent people in American prisons is significant.
Between 1989 and 1996, the FBI tested DNA in sexual assault cases
referred to their lab in roughly ten thousand cases.532 These were cases
in which identity was at issue and eyewitness identification had led to
the arrest or indictment of the suspect. 33 In about six thousand of these
cases, the DNA testing matched the suspect with the DNA sample
while in about two thousand cases the testing was inconclusive-usually
because of an insufficient amount of DNA to test.534 In about two
thousand, or roughly 20 percent of the cases referred to the FBI, the
DNA testing excluded the suspect. 35 Even taking into consideration
laboratory error and some other false exclusions, "it is still plain that
forensic DNA testing is prospectively exonerating a substantial number
of innocent individuals who would have otherwise stood trial,
frequently facing the difficult task of refuting mistaken eyewitness
identification by a truthful crime victim who would rightly deserve
juror sympathy."536
Absent DNA testing, therefore, it is highly likely that a significant
number of those sexual assault exonerees would have been convicted.
Sadly, in the vast majority of cases, there is no DNA evidence or other
conclusive forensic evidence. 7 Yet, it is reasonable to expect that a
comparable number of robbery suspects are also wrongly arrested based
on faulty identifications. Indeed, the growing number of DNA
exonerations-and the recent exonerations in Virginia538-represent
conclusive evidence that, even in cases in which the evidence appeared
to the jury and judge to prove the defendant's guilt beyond any
reasonable doubt, our system gets it wrong. Contrary to Posner's
assumption, the system's flaws revealed by the DNA exonerations
make it extremely likely that there are hundreds of other Larry
532. Peter Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, Commentary, in NAT'L INST. OF
JUSTICE, supra note 348, at xxviii.
533. Id. at xxix.
534. Id. at xxviii.
535. Id. If the inconclusive cases are omitted, the exclusion rate for the FBI
tests rises to approximately 25 percent. See NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 348, at
20. This FBI data was included in a nationwide study of DNA testing that found that
test results excluded suspects in about 23 percent of the cases. Id. Recent statistics
indicate that the percentage of suspects excluded by DNA has remained fairly constant
since 1996. See generally Innocence Project, DNA News,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/dnanews/index.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
536. Neufeld & Scheck, supra note 532, at xxix.
537. See Bedau et al., supra note 289, at 601-02.
538. See supra notes 444-46 and accompanying text.
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Youngbloods and Arthur Lee Whitfields imprisoned across the United
States."
In addition, Posner's cost-benefit analysis also grossly
underestimates the societal costs to the many defendants and their
families who are victimized by a system that fails to afford them the
right to an effective lawyer.54 It fails to account for the unnecessary
time spent in jail, the lost jobs and the disruption of family life endured
by defendants held for weeks on minimal bail for offenses that may
warrant only a fine or are ultimately dismissed.5 4' His position
overestimates the extent to which procedural rights in our system
translate into freedom for guilty defendants and underappreciates the
pressure on innocent defendants to plead guilty. Moreover, his
argument fails to adequately consider the enormous losses suffered by
innocent defendants and their families who are compelled to plead
guilty or who are found guilty at a trial despite their innocence.
Finally, Posner's argument underestimates the harm to society suffered
at the hands of those perpetrators who escape justice because the wrong
person was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted.
An indifferent attitude toward fixing our flawed criminal justice
system frequently is a reflection of where one lives. Generally, a
person's neighborhood reflects his or her economic status and, in turn,
a person's experience with, and attitudes about, the criminal justice
system. Not surprisingly, those with positive attitudes about the system
tend to live in better neighborhoods, those in which judges and
legislators also live. They tend to have little first-hand experience with
the system, and if they or someone in their family has trouble with the
police, they can afford counsel. Americans from these neighborhoods
539. For various assessments of the scope of the problem of wrongful
convictions, see SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION
CASES (2004); C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); GIDEoMeS BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at
3, 16; Lefstein, supra note 11, at 858-61; Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523 (2005);
Givelber, supra note 338, at 1318-21; MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF
INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992).
540. After reporting examples of systemic deprivations of the right to counsel
that resulted in guilty pleas entered by unrepresented defendants, the authors of
GIDEOAS BROKEN PROMISE concluded that such stories "illustrate how innocent
defendants without legal knowledge or the assistance of counsel easily can be coerced
by judges or prosecutors into- believing they will receive jail time unless they plead
guilty." GIDEoAs BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 10, at 25.
541. See, e.g.. id. at 23. There have been a number of articles recounting the
devastating effects of detention on minimal bail for indigent defendants, many of whom
ultimately plead guilty for time served or see the charges against them dismissed. For a
sampling of such, articles, see Colbert et al., supra note 380, at 1720-27, 1756-57;
Alschuler, supra note 70, at 951-55.
2006:739 829
HeinOnline  -- 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 829 2006
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
rarely experience random police stops, police sweeps, or bus searches.
They may not appreciate the potentially devastating effects of an
erroneous municipal warrant because they do not know anyone who has
had to stay for weeks in jail, unable to post a $100 bond. It is harder
for people from some neighborhoods to assimilate the lessons of the
wrongful convictions because so rarely are their family members,
friends, or neighbors victimized by our flawed system.
In the end, the question becomes whether state legislatures and
Congress have the political will to face up to the shortcomings of our
criminal justice system and implement changes that are needed to
minimize wrongful convictions. Improving the criminal justice system,
especially by funding indigent defense services to make the promise of
effective assistance of counsel a reality, will take hundreds of millions
of dollars nationally. Historically, legislators have been very reluctant
to spend money that is earmarked for criminal defendants.542 Perhaps
the growing recognition that our justice system is broken and innocent
persons are being convicted will spark a greater willingness to spend
money to protect innocent citizens. Yet there are competing social
needs-health care, education, roads-that also need fixing and require
massive financial investments. Given these other needs, it is difficult to
imagine that most state criminal justice systems will see a significant
infusion of new resources.
V. IMPROVING THE SYSTEM: SOME FIRST STEPS
A. Task Forces on Systemic Reform
Despite the myths and barriers discussed in this Article, the
growing number of DNA exonerations and wrongful convictions may
produce a heightned awareness of the flaws of our state criminal justice
systems. Increased public awareness, in turn, may generate some
momentum to reform state criminal justice systems in order to
minimize the conviction of the innocent. Ideally, to improve the
operation of the criminal justice system, each state legislature would
542. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 7 (discussing
thirty-three studies over three decades documenting serious deficiencies in Virginia's
indigent defense system, yet noting that calls for reforming that system "have been
largely ignored by the legislative, executive and judicial branches of Virginia state
government"); Jessica McBride & Mary Zahn, Unequal Justice (Part 2): Without
Legislative Action, More Poor Will Struggle Finding Attorneys, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Dec. 8, 2002, at IA (noting that the Wisconsin Legislature is aware of the
problems with the public defender system, but reporting little legislative support for
fixing the system).
830
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begin by agreeing to increase resources for indigent defense services.
For some states, the additional expenditures would be fairly small,
while in others the amount needed to create an adequately funded
system for providing indigent defense services would be substantial. 43
Before determining the level at which to fund defense services, each
legislature might start by creating a task force or commission to
determine the optimal system for delivering defense services in light of
other needed improvements to that state's criminal justice system.5"
Each task force should be non-partisan. In addition to a significant
number of legislators, the task force should include criminal justice
experts, system regulars, and representatives of important stakeholders.
The task of each commission should be to recommend legislative
changes that would improve the reliability and fairness of the criminal
justice system without unduly compromising its efficient administration.
B. Improving the Utility of Forensic Evidence
In addition to the money needed to improve the delivery of
indigent defense representation, increased expenditures for police
training in the collection, handling, and storage of forensic evidence are
critically important. Money spent in ensuring that vital evidence is
gathered may well be the most cost-effective means of preventing
injustice. Hard forensic evidence represents the best vehicle for
quickly freeing the wrong suspect and identifying the right one.545 It
lessens our reliance on eyewitness identification testimony and other
less reliable forms of evidence. Not only does the existence of reliably
collected forensic evidence help to safeguard against wrongful
convictions, but it also encourages defendants who are, in fact, guilty to
plead guilty thereby eliminating some needless litigation.
The value of forensic evidence does not depend only on it being
collected and handled properly by the police. Such evidence must be
543. Missouri, for example, currently ranks forty-seventh in the nation in per
capita spending for indigent defense. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, MISSOURI, supra note
64, at 51. The Spangenberg Group stated that it would take $16 million just to bring
spending levels to the average of other southern states which, as a group, are the lowest
in the nation. Id.
544. Such task forces or commissions have been created, or are in the planning
stages, in Illinois, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina,
Texas, and Wisconsin. Ken Strutin, Wrongful Conviction and Innocence Resources on
the Internet, http://www.llrx.com/features/wrongfulconviction.htm (last visited May 1,
2006).
545. See supra notes 532-36 and accompanying text.
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properly preserved5" and then appropriately tested and analyzed.
States must improve the performance of crime labs so that they function
efficiently and effectively. Adequate resources must be provided so
that testing is performed in a timely manner. Huge backlogs and
lengthy delays are inconsistent with a criminal justice system designed
to promptly identify the right suspect and free the wrongly accused.
Similarly, there ought to be no place for bias in the work performed by
crime lab technicians and experts.547 Crime labs need to be independent
of the prosecution and immunized from pressure by the police or
prosecutors to generate any particular results.5" Such labs also need to
be accessible to the defense. Just as the police and the prosecution
should not lose the opportunity to develop potentially important
evidence because of inadequate resources, defendants should not be
deprived of their ability to use forensic evidence to establish their
innocence. 549 To the extent that defense counsel can confidently utilize
546. Certainly, in any homicide or sexual assault case, evidence should be
preserved. In Illinois, all physical evidence in a murder prosecution now must be
preserved permanently unless a law enforcement agency, with notice to the defendant,
obtains a court order permitting its destruction. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-4
(West 2003). Such a law minimizes the instances in which defendants are left in the
position of Robin Lovitt, who was deprived of the opportunity to test certain evidence
that he claimed could exonerate him because it was destroyed by a court employee. See
Michael D. Shear & Maria Glod, Warner Commutes Death Sentence, Governor Cites
Clerk's Destruction of DNA in Arlington Slaying, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2005, at Al.
It might be necessary to add a provision making the intentional destruction of evidence
a crime to curb the kind of misconduct that occurred in the Oklahoma crime lab.
FUHRMAN, supra note 321, at 102-03, 113-22, 181, 214-17, 229-30.
547. A common complaint in cases involving fraud or laboratory mistake is that
laboratory employees or scientists succumb to pressure to reach the results sought by
the police, prosecutors, or senior officials. See, e.g., Steve Mills, Forensics Under the
Microscope, Top Lab Repeatedly Botched DNA Tests, Cm. TaRB., May 8, 2005, § 1,
at 8 (reporting on Governor Warner's order to the Virginia State lab director to seek an
outside audit, which in turn revealed botched DNA tests by a senior DNA analyst).
548. For an extensive look at the forensic misconduct of Joyce Gilchrist and
her unholy working relationship with the Oklahoma County District Attorney's Office,
see FUHRMAN, supra note 321; see also Freedom Needed in Crime Lab Probe,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk), May 19, 2005, at B10 (calling for an independent
investigation and oversight of the Virginia State Crime Lab in light of crime lab
problems around the country).
549. In the Bravo case, defense counsel did not promptly request DNA testing
because counsel thought the prosecution was having such testing done. People v.
Bravo, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51-52 (Ct. App. 1993); see also supra notes 26, 313, 519,
infra note 574 and accompanying text. Counsel did seek a continuance to have a DNA
test run, but the trial court denied the motion. Id. at 52. The appellate court did not
find trial counsel "ineffective" for failing to have the DNA test run or that the trial
judge erred in denying the continuance motion. Id. at 51-52. Three years later, DNA
testing finally exonerated the defendant. See supra notes 26, 313 and accompanying
text.
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these expanded state or local crime labs; this will limit the number of
requests for experts by the defense."'
C. Videotaping Interrogations
Each state task force or commission should also consider
legislation requiring, at a minimum, that all custodial interrogations be
videotaped. 51 Such a measure is likely to deter abusive tactics, and
minimize police overreaching, without a significant expenditure of new
funds. Although the FBI and some in the law enforcement community
oppose such a measure,52 several states and a significant number of
local police departments around the country have already successfully
implemented a similar policy. 53 Indeed, Great Britain has required the
tape-recording of all police interviews since 1984."' 4 It is critical,
however, that videotaping include the entire interrogation. Videotaping
only the actual confession significantly undercuts the value of taping. 5
In Great Britain, and in the jurisdictions in the United States that
have adopted this policy, the police have not been unduly hampered in
conducting interrogations. Neither the number of confessions nor the
550. Defense access to state crime labs will not, however, eliminate the need
for the defense in some cases to retain defense experts. Unquestionably, there will be
times when the defense will need access to an expert to test the findings of a
prosecution expert, challenge conventional wisdom, or raise a debatable issue. See,
e.g., I.A. Pretty & D. Sweet, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark Analyses-A
Critical Review, 41 ScL.& JUST. 85, 90-91 (2001) (opining that a lack of hard scientific
evidence exists to support assumptions underlying bitemark analysis).
551. Several state commissions have already recommended the adoption of a
taping requirement. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 368, at 639 (citing Illinois,
Arizona, Connecticut, and North Carolina). Many commentators also have called for
electronic recording of confessions. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 413, at 486, 492;
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 370, at 495; Drizin & Reich, supra note 368, at 645-46
n. 157. Additionally, the ABA passed a resolution urging all law enforcement agencies
to videotape all interrogations of suspects and also urging courts and legislatures to
enact laws making such recordings mandatory. See Susan Saulny, National Law Group
Endorses Videotaping of Interrogations, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2004, at B4.
552. See Drizin & Reich, supra note 368, at 645-46.
553. See supra note 250 and accompanying text; Drizin & Reich, supra note
368, at 641 n. 131, 643 n. 144 (pointing to a growing number of police departments that
are videotaping and stating that at least 2400 departments already are doing so).
554. See David Kyle, Correcting Miscarriages of Justice: The Role of the
Criminal Cases Review Commission, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 657, 659 (2004). Great
Britain generally requires that the entire interview with the suspect be recorded.
McKenzie, supra note 364, at 443-45.
555. Drizin & Reich, supra note 368, at 644-45; see also supra note 368 and
accompanying text.
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rates of convictions have dropped significantly as a result of taping56
Taping does ensure a more accurate record of a defendant's statements
and of the circumstances surrounding that statement. In turn, the
defendant and defense counsel are in a better position to make an
informed choice as to whether to challenge the statement in a pretrial
motion or at trial. More importantly, the judge and jury are better
positioned to make an accurate decision about the reliability of that
statement should the defendant choose to challenge the statement in
court. Thus, videotaping interrogations encourages transparency and
enhances reliability at a minimal cost.
D. Improving Identiication Procedures
Similarly, each state should adopt, at a minimum, the new
identification procedures recommended by the Department of Justice. 57
These procedures, developed following a study conducted at the request
of the Department of Justice, are designed to increase the reliability of
any identification by eliminating suggestiveness."' Research indicates
the use of these recommended procedures will lessen the odds that
suspects will be identified based on bias introduced during the
identification process.559 Given the obvious fallibility of eyewitness
556. Indeed, the "vast majority" of agencies report that "videotaping has led to
improvements in police interrogation." William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations
and Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING 303-07
(Richard A. Leo & George C. Thomas III eds., 1998); see also David A. Sklansky,
Quasi-Affirmatve Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229,
1262 (2002) (indicating that a sizeable number of police departments have experimented
with routine interrogation videotaping with the "overwhelming majority [finding] the
costs negligible and the benefits considerable").
557. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/178240.pdf.
New Jersey was the first state to adopt a set of procedures based on the
recommendations of the Department of Justice. See DEP'T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR
PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
(2001), available at http://www.stat.nj.us/lps/. Similarly, Connecticut has mandated
new eyewitness identification procedures for all police departments and the state police.
See Lisa Stegel, High Court Tackles ID Flaws, CONN. L. TRm., Sept. 26, 2005. But
see Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application
of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 592-95 (2000) (criticizing certain
aspects of the Department of Justice guidelines).
558. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 557, at 1-2.
559. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewiess Identification:
Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
765, 766-67, 795-82 (1995).
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testimony, any reasonable measures that can be taken that will decrease
the possibility of false identifications should be taken.
The suggested procedures do not require significant or expensive
changes. In some instances, the new procedures may lengthen the
identification process. Moreover, there is the added cost of training the
police to use the new procedures. Nevertheless, if the procedures
improve the reliability of eyewitness identifications, then any modest
costs are far outweighed by the benefits to the system and to society of
accurately distinguishing the wrongfully accused from the real
perpetrator.
E. Enhancing Discovery
In the last twenty-five years, most states have adopted statutes that
provide for various types of discovery in criminal cases. Discovery
procedures, however, vary markedly from one jurisdiction to the
next. 60 Although it is no longer accurate to characterize the criminal
trial as trial by ambush,56' defendants in criminal cases are afforded less
access to information than civil defendants. Moreover, access to
information in the hands of the prosecution is very uneven and turns not
only on state law, but also upon the practices of local prosecutors. 62 In
particular, defense counsel's relationship with the prosecutor often will
determine whether and when counsel obtains copies of police reports
and other materials. Admittedly, counsel's available time and energy
ultimately determines whether information in the possession of the State
will actually be obtained, read, and acted upon.5 63 Making it difficult
for defendants to gain timely access to relevant information, however,
is inconsistent with the systemic goal of seeking the truth.
560. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 418, at 1221-56. Missouri, for example,
is one of the few states that gives defense lawyers the ability to conduct a discovery
deposition of prosecution witnesses. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 545.400 (West 2002).
561. As the commentary to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice states, the
premise behind pretrial discovery is that it promotes fairness and justice in criminal
cases and "reduces the risk of trial by ambush." ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY Standard 11-1.1 cmt. (3d ed. 1996); see also
RICHARD SINGER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: FROM BAIL TO JAIL 75 (2005) ("While trial
by ambush is no longer quite the order of the day, criminal discovery is still more
limited than in the civil arena.").
562. See SPANGENBERG GROUP, VIRGINIA, supra note 85, at 68-71
(documenting uneven access to discovery in Virginia).
563. See Robert L. Doyle, The National College-Mercer Criminal Defense
Survey" Some Preliminary Observations About Interviewing, Counseling, and Plea
Negotiations, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1019, 1025-27 (1986) (reporting that a significant
number of defense lawyers negotiate without doing more than briefly reviewing police
reports).
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State task forces should look to expand defense access to
information in the possession of the police and prosecutors and should
require that all information be provided as soon as feasible."'
Certainly there are cases in which the State has a compelling reason to
seek a protective order to avoid pretrial disclosure of a particular
witness or information. Generally, however, there is no reason why
police reports and other material in the State's possession ought not to
be promptly disclosed to the defendant.565 Doing so facilitates informed
plea bargaining. Prompt disclosure also helps ameliorate the problem
of limited access to defense investigators. No matter how many
additional resources are provided to the indigent defense system,
indigent defendants and those who retain private counsel at a modest
fee will still lack the ability to thoroughly investigate all of their cases.
For the innocent defendant with a busy lawyer, however, prompt
disclosure may enable defense counsel to undertake a more targeted
investigation that may uncover the information needed to exonerate the
defendant. 566
It is especially important that each task force address the question
of how to deal with the reoccurring failure of police and prosecutors to
turn over exculpatory material to the defense. 67  Despite a
564. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY
JURY Standard 11-2.1(a) cmt. at 14 (3d ed. 1996) (urging that the exchange of
discovery should occur as early as possible to make it meaningful). As Bruce Green
has observed, some prosecutors offer plea bargains with short deadlines and couple that
practice with a demand that the defendant relinquish the right to receive exculpatory
evidence, a practice approved in United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). Green,
supra note 83, at 1191-92. I agree with Green that "it is wrong for prosecutors to
exploit systemic neglect by pressuring defendants to plead guilty quickly." Id. at 1192.
565. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY
JURY Standard 11-2.1(a) cmt. at 13 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that the rules retain the
general system of "open file" discovery adopted in the second edition of the Standards).
566. I am not advocating for a system that is as reciprocal as the civil system.
The defendant's right against self-incrimination and defense counsel's role in our
system ultimately impose some limits on the extent to which the state can gain access to
the defense case. A full exploration of the reasons why discovery procedures for the
criminal defendant should not be identical to that for the prosecution are, however,
beyond the scope of this Article.
567. For a sample of the numerous articles and news stories attesting to the
wide scope of the problem of police and prosecutorial failure to disclose exculpatory
material, see Editorial, And Justice Undone in Virginia, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at
B8; Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative
Perspective, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1254-55 (2001); Stanley Z. Fisher, Just
the Facts, Ma "am: Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports,
28 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1 (1993); Stephan A. Salzburg, Perury and False Testimony:
Should the Difference Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537 (2000); see also
supra note 506 and accompanying text.
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constitutional mandate,568 an ethical command,569 and in many states, a
statutory obligation,57° some prosecutors choose to withhold exculpatory
evidence.57" ' Sometimes the decision to withhold exculpatory
information stems from a prosecutor's decidedly narrow view of what
constitutes exculpatory evidence.572 At other times, a prosecutor's
competitiveness or excessive zeal may blind the prosecutor to his or her
173responsibilities.
On the other hand, sometimes the failure of the defense to learn
about exculpatory material has little or nothing to do with the
prosecutor. Sometimes the police choose to hide from the prosecutor
the existence of witnesses or information that is favorable to the
defense. 74 Prosecutors have the responsibility to set up policies and
568. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
569. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004) (regarding the
special responsibilities of a prosecutor).
570. See, e.g., OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2002(2) (West 2003); WIs. STAT. §
971.23(1)(h) (2005-2006).
571. See Berlow, supra note 28, at 70-74 (discussing cases of the prosecution
withholding exculpatory evidence and the reasons such misconduct is rarely punished);
Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed, CHI. TRm., Nov. 14,
1999, § 1, at 1 (reporting that Illinois prosecutors routinely fail to disclose exculpatory
evidence).
572. Many prosecutors are inclined to adopt a narrow view of exculpatory
evidence because of a lack of information about the defense, a competitive incentive to
win, and an awareness that appellate courts apply a demanding materiality standard.
See, e.g., Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
91 CoLum. L. REv. 1369 (1991).
573. See, e.g., supra notes 321-24, 443, 506, 508-10, 516 and accompanying
text; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win,
The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRfn., Jan. 10, 1999, § 1, at 1; Griffin, supra note 567, at
1265-66.
574. See Fisher, supra note 567, at 52-53. Bravo illustrates an all-too-common
problem with an all-too-rare happy ending. See supra notes 26, 313, 519, 549. In
Bravo, the police failed to disclose that the victim had identified several other
individuals as her assailant, including a man named "Tony," who committed a sexual
assault two weeks before the incident leading to Bravo's arrest. See Sharon Bernstein,
Man Wrongly Jailed Could Get Settlement, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1998, at B3. Unlike
many defendants who never discover that the police failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence, Mark Bravo subsequently learned of the police misconduct, was able to
establish his innocence, and eventually was able to recover damages. Monte Morin,
He's Got 7 Million Ways to Tell Her "I Love You, "L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at
B21. At other times, police departments have systematically set up procedures or
followed practices that kept exculpatory material from prosecutors so that such
information would not be provided to the defense. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago,
856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the Chicago police maintained "street
files" that were withheld from prosecutors).
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procedures that prompt the police to turn over exculpatory evidence. 75
If the prosecutor's office has set up appropriate procedures and it is
discovered that the police are purposefully withholding information,
then prosecutors should utilize obstruction of justice statutes to
discipline offending officers.5 76 In the end, if we as a society are truly
committed to justice, we cannot continue to tolerate prosecutorial or
police misconduct that is inconsistent with the criminal justice system's
search for the truth. Requiring the prosecution to disclose all police
reports and any information pertinent to the investigation of a particular
crime at the earliest feasible time is an important step in the direction of
minimizing the number of wrongful convictions.
CONCLUSION
The growing number of DNA exonerations and the attendant
publicity surrounding these cases and other wrongful convictions sound
an increasingly loud discordant note in the normal chorus of praise for
the American criminal justice system. The work of the Ryan
Commission in Illinois and of other task forces and commissions
around the country5 77 are increasing awareness of the structural
deficiencies and recurring problems that plague our underfunded
criminal justice systems. More Americans, including legislators, are
raising questions about the reliability of state systems. Despite these
positive signs, however, the persistence of myths or misconceptions
about various aspects of the criminal justice system makes significant
reform difficult. Nonetheless, if Americans are, in fact, committed to a
just society, we must set aside those misconceptions and be willing to
devote the requisite resources and to make those improvements that will
ensure that our criminal justice system minimizes the conviction of
innocent persons.
575. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
576. Alternatively, courts may use their contempt power to encourage the
police to refrain from withholding exculpatory material. For a receat example of a
court using the threat of contempt to determine how exculpatory material was withheld
from the defense, see Joe Lambe, Police Cli'ef Told to Explain Video Edit, KAN. CrrY
STAR, Oct. 28. 2005, at Al (describing how the Kansas City police kept information
from the defense by providing the prosecutor with an edited version of the tape of the
defendant's arrest).
577. See supra note 544.
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APPENDIX I
State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services:
Fiscal Year 2002178
Alabama tUUZ $37,6198,403 $0 $37,698,403 100%
Alaska 2002 $23,493,700 $0 $23,493,700 100%
Arizona 2002 $150,000 $77,643,965 $77,793,965 0.002%
Arkansas 2002 $13,165,489 $0 $13,165,489 100%
California 2002 $30,541,000 $468,311,799 $498,852,799 6%
Colorado 2002 $40,629,765 $0 $40,629,765 100%
Connecticut 2002 $34,897,045 $0 $34,897,045 100%
Delaware 2002 $9,223,500 $0 $9,223,500 100%
District of 2002 $55,140,000581 0%
Columbia
Florida 2002 $144,800,000 $35,875,000 $180,675,000 80%
Georgia 2002 $9,423,078 $44,632,008 $54,055,086 17%
Hawaii 2002 $10,011,173 $0 $10,011,173 100%
Idaho 2002 $1,217,700 $7,352,599 $8,570,299 14%
Illinois 2002 $29,456,856 $86,759,701 $116,216,557 25%
Indiana 2002 $14,168,000 $16,687,264 $30,855,264 46%
Iowa 2002 $37,576,468 $1,166,884 $38,743,352 97%
Kansas 2002 $15,615,850 $4,498,419 $20,114,269 78%
Kentucky 2002 $26,739,314 $1,464,776 $28,204,090 95%
Louisiana 2001 $7,800,000 $23,930,000 $31,730,000 25%
Maine 00 $9,624,000 $0 $9,624,000 100%
Maryland 2002 $58,528,208 $0 $58,528,208 100%
578. The Spangenberg Group, 50 State & County Expenditures for Indigent
Defense Services FY 2002, in STATE & COUNTY EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2002 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/indigentdefexpend2003.pdf. © 2003 by the American
Bar Association. Reprinted with permission.
579. According to the author's research, the following states generate
additional state funding from increased fees or alternative sources: Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas.
580. According to the author's research, the following states provide no
funding at the trial level: California, Idaho, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Utah, and
Washington.
581. The money appropriated by the federal government to the District of
Columbia for indigent defense is neither a state nor a county expenditure, thus it is just
listed in the total expenditure column.
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Michigan 2002 $5,950,000 N/A $5,950,000 N/A
Minnesota 2002 $54,000,000 $0 $54,000,000 100%
Mississippi 2002 $1,157,825 $9,216,692 $10,374,517 11%
Missouri 2002 $31,601,168 $0 $31,601,168 100%
Montana 2002 $4,739,824 $4,553,824 $9,293,648 51%
Nebraska 2002 $660,000 $13,000,000 $13,660,000 5%
Nevada 2002 $627,300 $23,156,124 $23,783,424 3%
New Hampshire 2002 $13,396,398 $0 $13,396,398 100%
New Jersey 2002 $79,695,000 $0 $79,695,000 100%
New Mexico 2002 $29,000,000 $0 $29,000,000 100%
New York 2002 $47,261,644 $217,000,000 $264,261,644 18%
North Carolina 2002 $73,859,355 $0 $73,859,355 100%
North Dakota 2002 $1,900,000 $0 $1,900,000 100%
Ohio 2002 $42,188,424 $51,649,078 $93,837,502 45%
Oklahoma 2002 $16,102,393 $8,215,748 $24,318,141 66%
Oregon 2002 $87,806,912 $0 $87,806,912 100%
Pennsylvania 2000 $0 $86,947,485 $86,947,485 0%
Rhode Island 2002 $7,315,800 $0 $7,315,800 100%
South Carolina 2001 $14,836,835 $7,172,276 $22,009,111 67%
South Dakota 2002 $2,060,785 $4,293,282 $6,354,067 32%
Tennessee 2002 $42,024,312 $6,101,405 $48,125,717 87%
Texas 2002 $7,540,649 $106,296,379 $113,837,028 7%
Utah 2002 $0 $6,527,506 $6,527,506 0%
Vermont 2002 $7,461,030 $0 $7,461,030 100%
Virginia 2001 $76,338,842 $0 $76,338,842 100%
Washington 2002 $3,525,123 $60,000,000 $63,525,123 6%
West Virginia 2002 $24,730,658 $0 $24,730,658 100%
Wisconsin 2002 $67,420,000 $0 $67,420,000 100%
Wyoming 2002 $3,045,644 $537,467 $3,583,111 85%
State Total5 82  2002 $1,395,432,938 $1,372,989,681 $2,823,562,619 50%
582. A number of states with state-funded public defender systems, such as
Arkansas, Hawaii and Wyoming, require counties to provide office space for public
defender offices. The "County Expenditure" figures in the table do not include these
costs.
The "Total Expenditure" figure includes the $55,140,000 allocated by the federal
government for indigent defense representation in the District of Columbia, and because
this amount is neither a state nor a county expenditure, the "State Expenditure" total
plus "County Expenditure" total is less than this total expenditure figure.
The "Percent of State Funds" figure does not include the funds allocated to the District
of Columbia. See supra note 581.






National Total 2002 $3,309,462,619
Notes on Estimates:
In a number of states it was necessary for The Spangenberg Group
to estimate the indigent defense expenditure. This was due to a lack of
reliable data, either at the state or county level. Below are the states in
which the indigent defense expenditures were estimated and the
methodology used to makes these estimates.
In Illinois, Pennsylvania, Nevada and Mississippi there is no
statewide agency that collects county indigent defense expenditure data.
However, in recent years, a statewide study on indigent defense has
been conducted in each of these states by The Spangenberg Group. In
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Nevada, these studies produced a statewide
indigent defense expenditure figure for 1999, 2000, and 1999
respectively. The Spangenberg Group's estimate for the 2002 county
indigent defense expenditures in Illinois and Pennsylvania were arrived
at by increasing the reported expenditures by 5 percent for each year
that has elapsed since the state-wide reports were published. The
statewide study in Mississippi did not yield a statewide expenditure
figure.
In Kansas and Montana The Spangenberg Group was provided
with the state, but not the county, expenditure. To estimate the
counties' expenditures in each of these states, The Spangenberg Group
calculated the rate of increase in state funding since 1986. The 1986
figure was taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin: Criminal
Defense for the Poor, 1986. The Spangenberg Group took the 1986
county expenditure, as found in the report, and increased it by the same
percentage as the state funding increased over the same period (1986 to
2002). As of July 1, 2003, the state assumed 100 percent of the costs of
indigent defense in Montana.
In Idaho and Utah The Spangenberg Group was unable to find
reliable figures for the county indigent defense expenditure. Utah's
indigent defense system is entirely county funded. Idaho's state-funded
State Appellate Defense system is new since 1986. To estimate the
indigent defense expenditure in 2002 for these states, The Spangenberg
Group calculated the average percentage increase from 1986 to 2002
for all states that had reliable data. It then applied that rate of increase
to the county expenditure for Idaho and Utah in 1986.
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At the time of The Spangenberg Group's data collection, Michigan
was unable to provide updated county expenditures.
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